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ABSTRACT
The level and diversity of Japanese investment activity in
the U.S. real estate market was evaluated. An historical
perspective was offered to provide a framework for analysis
of current investment activities. Five different kinds of
sectors were independently evaluated, with emphasis given to
both intrasector similarities and differences. Investor
characteristics typical of all sectors were enumerated, and
adaptations necessitated by U.S. market conditions were
explored. A study of Japanese real estate investment
activity in Washington, D.C. was used to illustrate
investment patterns described earlier in the thesis.
It was found that Japanese investment in U.S. real estate has
grown dramatically over the last five years and is likely to
continue such expansion in both the near- and long-term.
Large Japanese institutions and companies have begun to
establish corporate infrastructure in the U.S., and are
consequently well-prepared to invest capital outflow from
Japan which is resulting from a host of macroeconomic,
geopolitical and portfolio management factors. More recently,
intermediaries acting on behalf of largely unregulated
smaller Japanese investors have begun to penetrate the
market, focusing upon investments which are largely ignored
by large corporations. Consequently, while certain
investments appeal to almost all investors, it was found that
there is far greater diversity among Japanese investors than
popularly thought. This presents new opportunities for many
different kinds of American real estate players, and the
authors elaborate upon a number of such opportunities.
Thesis Supervisor: Lynne B. Sagalyn
Title: Assistant Professor of Urban Studies and
Real Estate Development
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PART ONE:
Chapter
Chapter
PREFACE
"We are patient. We have studied, we
have prepared, and now, we are ready."
Tadao Toyofuku
Deputy General Manager
Headquarters of Real Estate
Department
Sumitomo Trust & Banking Co.,
Ltd.
Japanese activity in U.S. real estate is commanding a
growing amount of attention within the American real estate
industry. Most discussion of the phenomenon, however, has
lacked detail, particularly as to investor motivation and
market segmentation. As a result, most U.S. real estate
professionals whose product might be of interest to Japanese
investors are unable to understand this capital source and
to benefit from new investment, development and contracting
opportunities which it might afford.
This paper will focus on two central themes. First, the
Japanese are coming. Economic conditions and insufficient
domestic Japanese real estate opportunities make substantial
and sustained Japanese investment in U.S. realty an almost
irreversible trend. Second, the diversity and depth of
Japanese real estate activities are greater than is
generally understood. There is no singular "Japan, Inc."
approach towards U.S. real estate investment. The
variation among favored investment products, development
vehicles, project sizes and goals presents significant
opportunities to almost all participants in the American
5
real estate community.
The thesis is organized as follows. Part I primarily
offers background information, with Chapter I presenting a
broad overview of current Japanese real estate investment in
the U.S., and Chapter II elaborating upon macroeconomic
and geopolitical factors which have a pronounced effect on
such investment. This chapter also analyzes the role and
effect Japanese governmental regulation has upon the export
of capital into U.S. property, as well as how that
regulation is being relaxed to permit more liberal outflows.
Part II profiles five distinct kinds of Japanese investors
-- life insurance companies, construction companies, real
estate development companies, trading companies, and small
non-institutional investors -- as a way of illustrating the
diverse approaches to Japanese investment in U.S. realty.
Interconnections between these distinct sectors are also
explored, and the implications of such cooperation analyzed.
In Part III, organizational and attitudinal similarities
among different kinds of Japanese real estate investors are
reviewed (Chapter VII), together with a case study of real
estate investment activity in Washington D.C., where a surge
of such activity within the last twelve months illustrates
many of the trends analyzed in the body of the thesis
(Chapter VIII). In Part IV, the authors elaborate upon their
conclusions and enumerate perceived areas of opportunity for
American real estate players.
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A summary of conclusions reveals:
1. Favorable exchange rates and political pressure
upon the Japanese to address a chronic trade imbalance, a
lack of real estate investment opportunities in Japan, and
perceived opportunities resulting from changes to the U.S.
tax code will combine to promote significant Japanese
investment in American real estate.
2. There is neither a "typical" Japanese investor
nor developer. The nature of such real estate activity --
the vehicles employed, the cities and regions favored, the
scale and risk of projects -- is more varied than generally
perceived. Certain Japanese companies from different
industry sectors are better prepared to expand their U.S.
presence than others. Joint ventures between Japanese and
U.S. partners will characterize many investment, development
and construction activities.
3. Japanese life insurance companies, perhaps the
largest and most visible Japanese investors in U.S. real
estate over the last few years, will continue to expand the
amount and diversity of their investments.
4. Japanese construction firms intend to compete
against domestic contractors by providing fully integrated
construction and development services, backed by financial
access to Japanese capital.
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5. Japanese real estate development companies will
continue to expand development activities, including
residential and industrial projects. Alternatively, rather
than participate in the development process, trading
companies will become key intermediaries for other Japanese
wishing to participate in U.S. real estate activities.
6. There are opportunities for smaller U.S. property
owners to tap Japanese capital. Intermediation services
between smaller American real estate owners/developers and
like-sized Japanese investors are available, promoting
further diversification of Japanese investment in U.S.
property.
7. Japanese decision-making, which adheres to strict
corporate hierarchy and consensus-building, is adapting to
market conditions in the U.S. The Japanese are learning
that quick decisions are often vital to success in the
American real estate business.
8. Price premiums which have been paid by the Japanese
investors because of inexperience are becoming a thing of
the past.
9. Japanese investment in the Washington, D.C. will
continue to dramatically increase, both in relative and
absolute terms. The Washington market is likely to remain
a favored area of investment for the foreseeable future.
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PART I:
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE JAPANESE REAL ESTATE INVESTOR
Chapter I:
A Broad Overview of Japanese Activity in U.S. Real Estate
"We understand your way of thinking;
we've studied your language, we've
watched your movies, we play your
national sport. Such comprehension is
very important when we explain our
analysis and recommendations to senior
management."
Junichi Kogo
Associate Manager
International Division
Mitsui Real Estate Development
Company, Ltd.
"The real estate business is
combat... between particular people and
particular people."
Kunio Ohsawa
Manager, Real Estate Division
Sumitomo Corporation
The Case for Japanese Investment in U.S. Real Estate
Japanese investment in U.S. real estate is driven by a
host of mutually reinforcing factors, including financial
investment criteria, macroeconomic and geopolitical trends,
and domestic traditions.
Why real estate, rather than other kinds of assets ?
Specific interest in real estate -- as opposed to
such financial instruments as Eurobonds or U.S.
Treasuries -- is based on the fact that land in
Japan is in short supply . . . and consequently
very expensive. [Also], land and buildings are
seldom sold in Japan, so the emerging appetite for
more speculative transaction-oriented investments
9
cannot be met at home.(1)
Furthermore, according to an executive of a large Japanese
insurance company, "real estate is considered to be an
effective investment target in any portfolio."(2) The
reasons he cites do not differ greatly from the motives
driving such investment by U.S. institutions: potential
growth from rent reviews and property appreciation;
depreciation that engenders tax savings; protection against
currency risks in times of economic fluctuations; and a
stable income source.(3)
But, why U.S. real estate, rather than that in other
countries ?
There are three reasons why many Japanese
investors have recently entered the U.S. real
estate market. First, the Japanese are here
because the United States provides a stable
political and economic environment that guarantees
growth and free business conditions. [Secondly,)
although the U.S. real estate market is not a
perfectly open one, it is much larger in scale and
more open than the Japanese markets. Most
important, investment return may be higher in the
United States than in Japan.(4)
Between 1973 and 1984, the U.S. Department of
Commerce recorded 110 cases of Japanese direct investment in
U.S. realty.(5) Standing alone, this information does not
offer much insight, however, for the value of many of the
investments went unreported, and many other known
transactions were completely unreported. What most analysts
agree upon is that, prior to 1982, aggregate Japanese direct
investment in U.S. real estate was not great -- no more than
$500 million.
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Beginning in 1982, annual real estate investment by
Japanese entities began to climb. Estimates by analysts on
1984 direct real estate investment range from $630 million
(source: Department of Commerce)(6) to $1.7 billion (Real
Estate Research Corp.)(7); these amounts, according to
Japanese Ministry of Finance statistics, would have
represented between 15% and 35% of all Japanese direct
investment in the U.S. for that year.(8) A similar amount
of direct real estate investment took place in 1985,
although real estate's percentage of total Japanese
investment fell in light of a 60% growth in non-real estate
direct investment.(9)
Predictions for 1986 Japanese real estate investment
vary significantly, but there is consensus on one critical
point: it will increase rather dramatically, due to the
convergence of numerous independent factors discussed later
in this paper. Such predictions place the amount of 1986
direct real estate investment at between $2 billion and $5
billion.(10)
Assuming that the Japanese will increase their activity
in U.S. real estate, the next question is: "how will it take
place?"
Selective Investment Criteria
Location
Japanese have a strong preference for very well-
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located property. The cliche, "location, location,
location", was repeated in many of our interviews. "I
believe that the Japanese are far more location-conscious
than American investors. We tend to be a little more
adventurous, while the Japanese will sometimes settle for
less of a return in deference to location," says Bruce
Fowler, president of Chesshire Gibson Fowler, a Los Angeles-
based real estate consulting firm which acts as a U.S.
representative for a large Japanese development/construction
firm.(11)
There are a number of components in the Japanese
definition of "good location." First, there are areas in
which the Japanese have been involved for a long period of
time and about which they have developed an intuitive "feel"
from being local owners. Such areas would include
Honolulu, Los Angeles and San Francisco. Large Japanese-
American communities in those cities reinforce their
desirability.
Second, there is a general desire to locate in
commercial centers. Recently, this has led the Japanese to
focus more attention on the East Coast. "The big money from
Japan . . . is interested in 'Bowash' -- the Boston to
Washington corridor -- and the epicenter of that, of course,
is New York", claims Jack Shaffer, Managing Partner of
Sonnenblick-Goldman Mortgage Banking who, for several
years, has spent much of his time working with Japanese
institutions.(12) New York has a special appeal for most
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Japanese, for they believe that it epitomizes America and
American real estate. "In Japan, people have an impression
about the big skyscrapers. They think that they might be
able to purchase those skyscrapers -- that's their dream,"
claims an official of Mitsubishi Trust & Banking.(13) As a
result, New York is a preferred port of entry, with many
Japanese purchasers willing to accept yields on Manhattan
office buildings which are 100-200 basis points lower than
in other prime cities. Nonetheless, demand for Manhattan
product outstrips supply. "It is very difficult to find
good buildings in Manhattan any more," said Tadao Toyofuku,
the Tokyo-based Deputy General Manager of the Real Estate
Department of Sumitomo Trust and Banking, "for everyone
wants to invest there. Furthermore, while it is difficult
[to locate good buildings of almost any size], it is almost
impossible to find good buildings in the $5-$10 million
range there."(14) Such tight market conditions in Manhattan
have acted to enhance interest in the "Bowash" corridor in
the last year. A further enticement is the fact that at each
end of the corridor are cities with notable land-use
restrictions built into their zoning regulations. Such
restrictions reinforce Japanese interest because they are
viewed as a mechanism to preserve property values through
limitation of supply.
Product and Area
The vast majority of Japanese income-producing real
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estate acquisitions has been in large-scale downtown office
buildings. There are exceptions, such as The Essex House
Hotel and Madison Square Garden condominia in Manhattan.
Overall, office buildings almost certainly represent well
over 50% of the portfolio value of Japanese investment in
income-producing realty, which exceeds the percentage which
such property represents in the aggregate portfolios of
other foreign investors.(15)
To some degree, Japanese construction companies and real
estate development companies represent exceptions to the
general preference for downtown office product. While such
property comprises a large percentage of their respective
investment activities, they are also building and developing
a variety of product across the U.S. in second-tier cities
and regional markets. Japanese contractors are following
direct investments of Japanese manufacturers and automakers
in Michigan, Illinois, and Washington. Japanese real estate
development companies, which began building residential
subdivisions in Southern California in the early 1970s, have
expanded to markets such as Houston, Dallas, Atlanta, and
Phoenix. In both cases, major activity has been located
outside major metropolitan downtown areas. Construction
companies, for one, are hesitant to commit more resources to
office tower construction for they rightly perceive that
many metropolitan areas are currently overbuilt. Instead,
they want to establish competitive advantage by providing
integrated real estate services to high-growth sunbelt and
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western locations. Meanwhile, the motives of real estate
development firms are partially attributable to their
accumulated expertise in suburban and residential markets.
Concentrated investment in large, downtown office
buildings is explained by several factors. First, Japanese
investors have been influenced by their experiences at home.
There, office buildings, and particularly those in Tokyo,
are considered the most stable and secure forms of real
estate investments, due to extended periods of
extraordinarily high demand resulting in a current vacancy
factor of between 0.2% and 2%. On the other hand, the home
experience has offered less choice. The segmentation
between American downtown and suburban office markets is not
as mature in Japan, where investment-grade real estate is
located exclusively in urban centers. Consequently, those
Japanese investing in the already alien and idiosyncratic
U.S. market are often reluctant to look at suburban office
buildings because they have no domestic point of reference.
"Besides", notes one representative, " we prefer the
commercial center."(16)
Second, the "first wave" Japanese investors have
principally been very large institutions, capable of
investing upwards of $100 million per project. The
preference for large investments is, in part, a matter of
efficiency: smaller projects are not necessarily any less
complex to evaluate and negotiate than those costing $5
million-$15 million, and they do not allow for the effective
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use of a large institution's clout and economies of scale.
Also, smaller projects do not significantly expand the
asset base of a large institution's U.S. real estate
portfolio -- and portfolio size is an important
consideration when budgets and staffing decisions are being
established back in Tokyo. Furthermore, it is less likely
that smaller projects are owned or developed by major
American institutions or developers. "Name" figures
prominently into the decision for many Japanese realty
investors, particularly for the large institutions. The
prestige of such Americans carries great weight with the
reputation-conscious Japanese. Name-recognition also
facilitates the approval process back in Tokyo, where many
of the decision-makers may neither be real estate men nor
familiar with the American market. For Japanese investors,
such American institutions and developers embody a wealth of
experience and market acceptance -- qualities which, by
riding coattails, the Japanese hope to assimilate.
Finally, downtown office buildings are viewed as an
easily managed annuity. The Japanese focus upon asset-
management criteria for two key reasons. First, they want to
maintain a high-quality physical plant, for their corporate
culture emphasizes quality and a long-term investment
perspective. Investor representatives believe that in a
city, due to the large number of professional building
management firms offering their services, one is more likely
to find a company whose management standards match those of
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the Japanese owners. Second, hotels and certain types of
retail facilities (particularly those oriented towards
percentage sales) are products deemed to be as much a
"business" as a real estate investment. Unless the Japanese
investor already has had considerable experience in the
particular business, such as JAL with hotels and Daiei
(Japan's largest retailing company) with retail centers,
they believe it wise to shy away from such investment.
Yield and Return Requirements
Are Japanese investors willing to pay prices higher
than the market? No longer, according to Timothy J.
Welch, executive vice president of Equitable Real Estate
Investment Management, Inc., and one who has worked directly
with Equitable's Japanese joint venture partners over the
last five years.
There's been a lot of talk about Japanese
investors paying more for properties than U.S.
investors . . . But what was missed was the fact
that the Japanese were willing to pay a premium to
get top-quality, relatively low-risk buildings. If
that period isn't over, it is approaching an end.
(17)
Japanese investors target investment criteria within a
relatively narrow band: going-in yields on office buildings
of 8%-9% (except in Manhattan, where 5.5%-7% is the norm),
and IRR's of 11%-13% (assuming a 3%-4% inflation assumption
and a 10-year hold). These investors can accept a lower
initial cash-on-cash yield, provided that the property is
well-located and that a significant portion of the current
17
leases are both under-market and up for renewal or re-
leasing in the next two-to-three years.
The Japanese do not place much reliance upon IRR as a
measure of a project's investment quality. Granted, as a
method of currently valuing project flows, IRR generates a
healthy skepticism among many within the American real
estate community, too -- particularly with respect to the
assumptions about the reinvestment rate, and need for
inflation and future-sale assumptions -- but it would be
logical to assume that the Japanese, given their propensity
to view real estate with a long-term perspective, would be
quite favorably disposed towards its use. This is not the
case, however. In many interviews, the investor had no
specific IRR targeted or, if he did, it was neither well-
defined nor founded upon clear assumptions. The experience
of other Americans has been similar; "[the] Japanese
investors are less enthusiastic than their American
counterparts about the IRR as a measure of return. They are
wary about the number of required assumptions and
distrustful of the reliance on residual value."(18)
Investment Vehicles
Given the great and growing variety of Japanese
investors active in the U.S. real estate market, it should
come as no surprise that the forms of investment are
similarly diverse. Nonetheless, most Americans are unaware
of such variety among Japanese investment mechanisms.
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The Japanese have employed many forms of real estate
investment, such as:
1. All equity purchases (from 50%-100%)
2. Credit enhancement/ letters of credit
3. Convertible loans
4. Mini-permanent loans
5. Participating loans
6. Hybrid debt/equity development financing
7. Below-market financing associated with deals in
which Japanese construction companies hold a
position and perform construction-related
services.
Moreover, a growing number of Japanese investors are
showing a preference for convertible loans. This is a
cautionary approach taken by many Japanese investors in
response to the temporary oversupply of space in certain
markets. They can enjoy the security of a priority lienor
while retaining equity conversion rights should markets
rebound and property values increase. Straight equity
investments in existing and well-established office
buildings are still favored by many, but equity investments
in development deals are losing popularity -- for reasons
which will be elaborated upon in Part II later in the paper.
Summary
In summary, if one were to choose a single generalized
"activity profile" for Japanese investors, developers or
contractors, the choice would be:
-a well-located, fully-leased downtown office
building on which the Japanese investor has placed
a convertible loan which currently yields 8%-9% and
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shows an internal rate of return of 11%-13%;
-a medium-sized construction project in a
western or south-central city in which the
contractor can co-venture with an established local
developer and contribute a portion of project
financing; or,
-an attractive suburban development proposal
in a sunbelt area in which the Japanese developer
can invest while learning the essential elements of
the development and brokerage businesses. Other
Japanese investors may participate through the
intermediation of a trading company or the
development company itself.
However, such a profile would not do justice to the true
diversity of Japanese investors, nor to their
sophistication. As will be demonstrated later, investment
strategies vary greatly. "Shadow" goals often play a
factor in an investment decision. The desire to educate
themselves is often a goal in itself; depending on a
company's prior experience, a desire to explore new
markets and new products may underpin investment decisions.
One thing is for certain: there is no "Japan, Inc."
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Chapter II
Relevant Macroeconomic and Regulatory Factors
A. Economic Overview: Surplus-driven Investment
"The exchange rate is like the
Challenger booster rocket for
Japanese real estate activity in
the U.S...it keeps pushing up, up,
up.. .and then, what?"
Kunio Ohsawa
Manager, Real Estate
Sumitomo Corporation
Japanese real estate investment, development and
construction activity in the U.S. are affected by four
factors which collectively boost investment. First, trade
surpluses and enormous domestics savings in Japan are
fueling record levels of investment in U.S. financial
instruments and real estate. Returns on U.S. government
securities and real estate are higher than comparable
investments in Japan, and the U.S. is politically stable.
Second, volatile exchange rates are driving an increasing
proportion of such investment into hard assets such as real
estate, which will conserve value and generate capital gains
when the yen eventually falls against the dollar. At
present, Japanese real estate participants can invest,
develop and construct in the U.S. with very inexpensive
dollars, and it is less risky to hedge capital with real
estate assets than with interest differentials on financial
instruments. Third, pending U.S. tax reform discourages
borrowing and encourages equity financing of real estate
investment and development. This favors Japanese developers
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and contractors who can finance investments and fund
development projects because they are either cash-rich or
enjoy close relationships with powerful Japanese banks.
Fourth, there is more available capital than real estate
opportunity in Japan. Since Japanese real estate owners
rarely sell property and land is scarce for new development
projects, real estate investors, developers and contractors
must look overseas for business opportunities.
Japanese activity in U.S. real estate markets occurs in
the context of profound economic disequilibrium between the
two nations. A recent spate of trade negotiations involving
Japanese semiconductor exports and U.S. import restrictions
of textile and manufactured goods aims to decelerate a
projected 1986 trade deficit of $66 billion. U.S. pressure
on Japanese authorities to adopt market-opening measures and
stimulate domestic demand is occuring against a backdrop of
massive capital export to the U.S., projected to reach $77
billion this year. In 1986, as the U.S. became the world's
largest debtor nation, Japan assumed the role of the world's
largest creditor.
Japan's predominant role is the consequence of historic
measures to reconstruct a war-ravaged economy. Japanese
post-war economic policy conceived of economic
competitiveness as the key to national survival without
military power. Japan became a savings-intensive economy and
a major exporter of capital. Japan's economic miracle and
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subsequent industrial reconversion expanded Japanese goods
and services worldwide, and structured economic power on a
three-fold foundation of extended advantage: the "new
industrial revolution" in manufacturing technology,
concentration on service sectors, and expansion of research
and development activities.(19) By 1980, Japan had surpassed
the U.S. as the leading global producer of autos, and a year
later it instituted a ten-year government plan to build a
fifth generation computer system in order to become the
world's number-one producer of advanced computer
systems.(20) Japanese firms developed skills for managing
technological change and achieving improvements in
productivity. In the service sector, companies concentrated
financial resources into fast growing areas such as fashion,
publishing, tourism, construction, and real estate. Research
and development of commercial technologies by large private
sector companies led to rapid applications in such fields as
microelectronics and biotechnology. Japanese human resources
rivaled those of capital, for managers excelled at planning
and high standards of quality, and Japanese trading
companies successfully completed world-wide projects of
great complexity.
Public discussion of Japan's competitive advantage has
unfortunately been limited to economists' narrow views of
exchange rates, interest differentials and savings rates.
However, there is much to suggest that measures for reducing
chronic trade imbalance must attack structural problems
23
rather than focus on cyclical patterns of Japanese external
surpluses, such as those which occured in 1972 and 1978.(21)
For example, the Japanese government's "neomercantilist
policies help keep savings rates high, the cost of capital
low, the commercialization of new inventions rapid, and
trade barriers in line with national strategy."(22) Despite
the recent call by the Nakasone administration for increased
domestic spending, economic adjustment will be a long
process, because manufacturing productivity improvements can
lower price increases on Japanese export products and
internal Japanese government deficits will constrain
domestic policies to stimulate public works spending.
History shows that, as in the case of Britain and the United
States, countries accumulate growing current account
surpluses as the result of long-term economic dynamism.
Japanese capital outflows have more than offset trade
profits over the last three years and this year, although
the Japanese current-account surplus will reach US$66
billion, the long-term capital-account balance is projected
to register a US$77 billion deficit.(23) Such capital
exports play many roles, such as restraining U.S. interest
rates and moderating inflation through the finance of cheap
imports. Japanese capital exports account for approximately
one-third of the U.S. current account deficit, and may
increase in the present adjustment period following a
sharply weaker dollar. Lower interest rates at home are
forcing Ministry of Finance (MOF) officials to allow
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Japanese investors to access better investments abroad in
securities, options markets, and real estate. Massive
capital outflows, which will impact U.S. real estate
activity, are likely to continue at very high levels for a
foreseeable future.
The yen's 40% appreciation against the dollar, from 260
in February 1985 to 154 in August 1986, has heightened
dollar purchases of U.S. government securities and set the
stage for huge Yen-financed U.S. investments once the
exchange rate stabilizes at some future level. Japanese
investors have greatly increased investments in long-term
dollar bonds since U.S. short-term rates dropped during the
spring of last year. Japanese purchases of foreign
securities had historically been financed in the yen-
conversion market. Some 60% of these recent purchases,
however, were funded with short-term dollar borrowings from
foreign branches of Japanese banks due to investor
uncertainty over the exchange outlook. As a result, the yen
has stayed high because of a lesser amount of investments
financed with converted-yen funds. U.S. long-term rates
decreased and short-term rates remained stable, in spite of
discount rate cuts by the Federal Reserve, because dollar-
financed purchases on long-term securities put upward
pressure on short-term rates and reverse downward pressure
on long-term rates. In turn, this has caused the difference
between short- and long-term rates on U.S. securities to
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narrow and plateau further financings of bonds with dollars.
In Japan, short-term dollar funds are used to pay taxes,
wages, and other obligations of corporations, and are not
generally targeted for savings. When these dollars are used
for bond purchases, however, corporations cannot borrow as
usual and the net effect is to generate domestic Japanese
savings in dollars. When the yen finally stabilizes against
the dollar, Japanese investments in dollar bonds will once
again be financed with yen-converted funds. Because Japanese
domestic yields on investment will likely remain low, this
should create another sizable pool of funds seeking good
investment opportunities overseas.
Three factors indicate an increase in the popularity of
futures transactions and, importantly, real estate as an
outlet for these funds. First, floating exchange-rate
systems have not worked well since countries began to relax
capital movement restrictions in the early 1980s. As such,
governments are compelled to more actively manage
international capital transactions in order to allow
exchange rates to balance current accounts. For example,
recent initiatives by the Japanese Ministry of Finance (MOF)
to permit trust banks to invest abroad and life insurance
companies to purchase more foreign securities and real
estate are driven by the rapid appreciation of the yen
against the dollar. In particular, as of August 1986 trust
banks will be allowed to operate trust accounts in foreign
currencies. MOF deregulation should become a flexible tool
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for increasing the government's ability to manipulate
exchange rates.
Second, Japanese institutional investors are restricted
from participating in overseas futures and options trading
markets. In an increasingly volatile international interest
rate environment, Japanese investors have bought foreign
securities to stabilize and improve the rate of return on
their assets. In effect, they must run considerable risks to
take advantage of a difference between domestic and foreign
interest rates in order to hedge against exchange risks.
Since Japan is a huge exporter of capital, the MOF will be
compelled to permit Japanese investors to take advantage of
risk management products. Just as Japanese investors desire
to hedge short-term exposures with futures products, and
long-term positions with options, similarly institutions
will desire to invest in hard real estate assets to maintain
extended returns and security on overseas investments.
Surplus funds and a keen desire to limit precarious exchange
environments will drive Japanese institutional, corporate,
and individuals buyers to invest in a diversified range of
U.S. real estate products.
Third, a stronger yen and cheaper oil have combined to
increase Japanese current account surpluses. Therefore, the
MOF is likely to place emphasis on implementing structural
measures to remedy the current imbalance. Foreign direct
investment in U.S.-based manufacturing facilities will be a
27
key means to reduce exports and promote gradual trade
balance and will benefit Japanese construction companies
abroad. Tax incentives to the private sector should hasten
industrial movement overseas, particularly to the U.S.
Internal expansion of the economy will be limited, however,
because Japanese government debt to GNP is among the highest
of the industrialized nations and the anticipated burden of
social programs for Japan's aging population is expected to
grow. In essence, these measures suggest a forceful argument
for increased Japanese investment in risk-hedging foreign
assets such as futures, options, and real estate. In
addition to these factors, Japanese investment in U.S. real
estate is further boosted by favorable exchange rates, U.S.
tax reform measures and domestic Japanese land scarcity.
Exchange rates provide additional incentive for asset
diversification into overseas real estate. Japanese
investors anticipate substantial capital gain from exchange
shifts on dollar denominated assets, hence there will be a
rush into dollar bonds and, to lesser extent, real estate
when investors feel that the dollar will not fall any
further. This explains, in part, the reluctance of Federal
Reserve and Bank of Japan officials to intervene in currency
markets of late, even when the exchange rate has become
unruly. Support of the dollar will send signals to investors
that the slide of the dollar has ended, and will only be
undertaken when a weaker dollar threatens to drive up U.S.
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interest rates.
Taxes in Japan have traditionally promoted savings,
whereas in the U.S. they have incentivized borrowing. As
such, tax reform measures in both nations are attempting to
correct opposite economic extremes. Japanese tax incentives
aim to increase new investment in housing and infrastructure
and relieve exchange rate and trade pressures by the use of
more capital at home. They serve to reduce artificial
incentives to save and disincentives to invest. In the U.S.,
the opposite is true: tax law changes will attempt to reduce
artificial incentives to borrow and disincentives to save.
In Japan and the United States, the real estate sector is
particularly impacted by these changes.
Domestic Japanese real estate conditions positively
require investors to search for productive investments
overseas. Tokyo suffers from an acute shortage of both
office space and available land for development. Annual
lease turnover rates average under .2%, and leasehold laws
favor existing tenants. Evicting a tenant in order to
increase rents is considered unacceptable behavior in
Japanese business practice. Many tenants with interminably
long leases pay less than half current market rates.
Existing office space is nearly full and demand far exceeds
projected new developments in commercial locations. Real
estate companies estimate that 43 million square feet of
office space is required for the future to satisfy the needs
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of domestic and foreign corporations in Tokyo.(24) Major
real estate companies' own fully depreciated assets with
little debt and low expenses. Nevertheless, yields on
leasing operations average barely 1-2%, less than one-fourth
the comparable return on commercial properties in Manhattan.
Real estate giants such as Mitsubishi Estate, which is
Japan's largest commercial landlord, desperately seek
developable land in order to be able to relocate existing
tenants and build new, profitable office space. Investors
are thwarted by leases which neither turn nor produce market
returns, and contractors cannot build for lack of space.
Developers can borrow, but have no projects which justify
extension of credit. An apparent solution is to invest,
build, and develop in the United States where tax reform
encourages equity rather than strictly debt financing of
major property acquisitions and development projects.
Market conditions at home and tax reforms abroad are
channeling real estate opportunities from Japan to the U.S.
for an entire spectrum of Japanese institutional, corporate,
and individual real estate participants.
Against the backdrop of these factors, economic
measures have an objective of stimulating domestic Japanese
demand and maintaining a high yen/dollar rate. This will
moderate current account surpluses and increase Japan's
external assets, which as of last year had reached $120
billion, the world's largest. Economic history shows that
maintenance of external assets depends on free trade and
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trading partner leverage, exchange risk hedging, and
military power to preserve external credits. Japan is
seeking to invest overseas to: diffuse trading partner
anxiety and finance debtor country obligations; increase the
use of yen-denominated capital; and, take a direct role (via
MOF) in capital adjustment policies throughout the
international monetary system.
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B. The Japanese Ministry of Finance:
A Force To Be Contended With
The Ministry of Finance (MOF) is an enormously powerful
governmental agency. It combines regulatory, ministerial
and discretionary functions in such a way as to influence
Japan's economy far more comprehensively than any comparable
U.S. body. It is a kind of Department of Treasury,
Department of Commerce and Federal Reserve Board, all rolled
into one. More relevantly, the role and effect of the MOF
on Japanese investment in U.S. real estate is significant
indeed, and Americans planning to work with Japanese
investors should be aware of its impact.
Currently, real estate investments undertaken by
Japanese life insurance companies, trust banks and pension
funds are strictly regulated by the MOF. At present, due to
many of the macroeconomic factors noted earlier, the MOF is
relaxing some of its restrictions upon the export of
Japanese capital into foreign currency denominated assets,
including real estate. In March of 1986, life insurance
companies and trust banks were permitted to increase the
percentage of their assets held in foreign currency
instruments from 10 % to 25%. Five months later, on August
6, the MOF increased the percentage again, this time to 30%;
furthermore, it removed regulations which limited the speed
with which a company could increase the holdings in its
foreign asset portfolio up to the 30% benchmark.
One should not interpret such relaxations as an
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abdication of power, however.
nothing to suggest that these actions are permanent. MOF
policy, and regulations related thereto, may change rapidly
and almost without warning. For instance, in 1975, in order
to stem a superheated domestic land boom, the MOF prohibited
life insurance companies from investing in real estate.
Prior to 1980, almost all investors in U.S. real estate --
not just life insurance companies, trust banks and pension
funds -- were subject to strict regulation by the MOF. And
prior to 1981, life insurance companies were prohibited from
investing in overseas real estate. Other than the
constraints of current governmental policy, there is nothing
to prohibit the reinstatement of some or all of such
regulatory restraints.
The Investment Approval Process
Even more than the broad policies established by the
Ministry of Finance, it is important for American real
estate professionals to understand the scrutiny which
overseas real estate investments are given. Simply said,
almost every such investment must be approved by the MOF.
Investments by certain sectors, such as real estate
development companies or trading companies, are lightly
regulated and receive little more than perfunctory review.
This is not the case with life insurance companies, trust
banks and pension funds, however; because of the fiduciary
role played by such organizations, MOF feels a special
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First of all , there is
obligation to closely scrutinize each prospective
investment. According to the manager of the International
Real Estate Division of Nippon Life Insurance Company,
Japan's largest,
The Ministry [of Finance] checks the submitted
application to determine whether the project is
healthy, stable, and especially whether the
investment risks are minimized and a reasonable
amount of investment return can be expected.
Sometimes, the Ministry requires the applicant to
provide explanations of the U.S. market, results of
feasibility studies, information about the
reliability and creditability of partners and
whatever other information it deems pertinent.(24)
Furthermore, the absence of any clearly articulated
standards and procedures to which a prospective Japanese
investor must adhere further complicates the process.
The consequence of such a rigorous review process is
that it may take up to six months for the MOF to make a
decision, which may very well be a veto. Knowledgeable
industry executives, however, claim that the time period has
generally shortened as the MOF has become more familiar with
the American real estate market and as their policy
restrictions on overseas investments have relaxed.
Furthermore, the larger Japanese institutions have special
departments whose sole function is to work with the MOF to
ensure that all information requests are honored
expeditiously and that any questions are answered
immediately. To further expedite the process, such
institutions will apply to the MOF while still in the
negotiation stage in the U.S., attempting to work a
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parallel track in an effort to avoid disadvantageous delays.
Consequently, institutions large enough to have such
departments enjoy a comparative advantage over those that do
not.
The Mystery of MOF, and How Americans Can Deal With It
To most American observers, and to many Japanese
investors, the Ministry of Finance is a cryptic and
byzantine agency. Certainly, the ad hoc review process
injects an element of mystery -- and anxiety. Furthermore,
on a larger scale, the MOF operates in a most discreet
fashion, if not under a veil of secrecy. As with our own
Federal Reserve Board, policy changes and tangible actions
are often rumored, but rarely ensured; effective dates for
new guidelines are generally the date of the public
announcement, not some future date.
There are a number of steps which Americans can take to
enhance their position when dealing with -- albeit
vicariously -- the Ministry of Finance. The first is
attitudinal; be prepared for contracts submitted by Japanese
institutions to include the clause, "subject to review and
approval by the Ministry of Finance." At an early stage in
negotiations, one should ask the prospective investor to
venture an opinion on how long it might take to gain MOF
approval of the deal. While it would be unrealistic and
unfair to expect a guarantee from said individual, the
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information should be helpful, and could be of critical
importance.
Secondly, the more information one can provide to the
prospective Japanese investor, the better. Expect that the
investor will be required to submit detailed information and
sophisticated project analyses to the MOF. The better the
quality of the information, and the earlier it is submitted
to MOF, the better one's chances of a quick and favorable
approval.
Finally, if the prospective investment requires an
extremely quick decision, or is a particularly arcane
venture which is unfamiliar to the MOF, one would do better
to look to those Japanese investors who are not as
rigorously regulated by the ministry. Even if a highly
sophisticated investment is an extremely conservative one,
thereby satisfying the "prudent investor" standard to which
corporate fiduciaries such as life insurance companies must
comply, one can be assured that the MOF will spend an
inordinately long time getting into the details of the deal.
This is not to in any way suggest, however, that MOF
officials would have difficulty in comprehending the deal;
indeed, almost all parties familiar with such officials have
a very high regard for their sophistication and competence.
Instead, it is meant to suggest that any deal, and
particularly a complex one, takes longer to comprehend the
first time through.
Thus, in conclusion, Americans dealing with Japanese
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investors should always be attentive to the role played by
the Ministry of Finance.
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PART II:
DIFFERENT STROKES FOR DIFFERENT FOLKS:
PROFILES OF DISTINCT TYPES OF INVESTORS
In this section the authors evaluate various "sectors"
or categories of Japanese real estate investors active in
the U.S. market. Understanding the traits and standards
that are characteristic of each sector provides a base-line
profile, while idiosyncracies which differentiate companies
within each sector demonstrate the dynamism and diversity of
investors wishing to place their money in U.S. real estate.
Further, examples of cooperation between Japanese companies
from different sectors are portrayed, and reviewed with an
eye toward understanding how such interconnections would
affect U.S. investment strategies.
At least nine distinct sectors of real estate investors
exist within Japan. They are:
a. Life insurance companies
b. Construction companies
c. Development companies
d. Trading companies
e. Trust banks
f. Securities firms
g. Individuals
h. Commercial banks
i. Leasing companies
In addition, many related or hybrid organizations exist.
Among these are consulting firms, brokers and merchant
bankers. Other sectors, such as manufacturing, likewise
have significant positions in real estate, although such
ownership is typically ancillary to the principal corporate
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activity and is not investment-oriented.
In the following chapters, we evaluate the U.S. real
estate activities of six of the aforementioned sectors.
Four of them -- life insurance companies, construction
companies, real estate development companies, and trading
companies -- are reviewed individually, while securities
firms and individuals are analyzed together as examples of
investments being made by non-institutional smaller
investors.
First, however, a few words on two sectors which are
not evaluated in detail. One of these sectors, trust
banks, has actually been quite active in the U.S. real
estate market. The staffs of trust banks are relatively
large and very well trained. Many supplement these
resources by affiliating with an American real-estate
consulting firm. Yet, the Ministry of Finance does not
permit trust banks to invest their own funds in U.S. real
estate; instead, they may only represent and advise their
clients on such investment. Accordingly, the "investment
profile" of trust banks is functionally defined by the
strategies and goals of their clients, to wit, life
insurance companies, pension funds, corporations and high
net-worth individuals.
The other sector, pension funds, is not yet permitted
to directly invest in U.S. real estate. Restrictions
prohibiting Japanese pension funds from making such
investments are analogous to those suffered by American
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pension funds prior to passage of ERISA in 1974. Pension-
fund assets are managed either by life insurance companies
or trust banks, and each is regulated by a separate
department of the Ministry of Finance. Currently, a small,
almost insignificant amount of that pension-fund money which
is managed by life insurance companies in commingled funds
has been invested in U.S. real estate; to date, however, the
MOF has not permitted trust banks to make such investments
on behalf of their pension fund clients.
While Japanese pension funds are not currently a major
factor in American real estate, regulatory relaxations are
reportedly imminent.(25) It is unknown to what degree such
relaxation would permit pension-fund capital to flow into
U.S. realty. Nonetheless, in view of the fact that Japan's
four largest trust banks -- Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo and
Yasuda -- manage aggregate pension fund assets totaling
more than $40 billion, while total Japanese pension fund
assets exceed $250 billion, even a relatively small
percentage allocated to American real estate would amount to
a significant gross capital inflow.
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Chapter III:
Life Insurance Companies:
Growing Activity, Growing Conservatism
" Our dream is to do
ourselves."
everything
Takahide Moribe
Manager
International Real Estate
Investment Division
Nippon Life Insurance Company
Japanese life insurance companies are a major force
behind Japanese investment in U.S. realty, and represent a
major offshore capital market source for American real
estate owners and developers. In the pages which follow, we
evaluate not only the size and scale of this capital market
sector, but also identify and highlight the intra-sector
diversity
First, w
insurance
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patterns.
realty,
insurance
industry
investmer
follows,
ends with
in investment strategies, goals and criteria.
e present a brief synopsis of the status of life
company investment in Japanese real estate,
by an overview of life insurance company investment
Third, a case study of a major investor in U.S.
Nippon Life, is used to illustrate the life
company approach and to illuminate salient
characteristics. A section detailing U.S.
ts made by other Japanese life insurance companies
with emphasis upon lessons learned. The chapter
a summary profile of investment characteristics of
Japanese life insurance companies.
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Overview
Japanese life insurance companies are not newcomers to
real estate investment. There are twenty-three life
insurance companies in Japan with aggregate assets in excess
of $275 billion, and collectively they own approximately $13
billion of Japanese real estate, almost all of which is
commercial office product.(26) This amount represents
approximately 6.5% of their total book assets, a percentage
which, although below the 20% permitted by the MOF, is
understated in light of the fact that real estate assets are
reported at book value. Two of the four largest owners of
Japanese commercial real estate are life insurance
companies: Nippon (second largest, with 17 million square
feet of leasable space book valued at $2.75 billion in real
estate assets) and Sumitomo (fourth largest, with 12.5
million square feet book valued at $1.75 billion).
Taken collectively, Japanese life insurance companies
are among the largest investors in U.S. income-producing
property of any of the aforementioned "sectors," holding in
excess of $1.2 billion of American real estate. To date,
however, only six of Japan's twenty-three lifes have
invested in the U.S.: Nippon, Dai-ichi, Sumitomo, Meiji,
Asahi and Mitsui. Such a small number of companies
investing in the U.S. suggests a hierarchy within the life
insurance industry, and one indeed exists: these six
companies are also the six of the seven largest within
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Japanese life insurance companies.
As it relates to U.S. investment, such a hierarchy is
in large part attributable to the asset bases of the
respective companies. As of December 31, 1985, the total
corporate assets of these six companies were as follows:
Nippon Life: $42,498,000,000
Dai-Ichi Life: $27,906,000,000
Sumitomo Life: $23,129,000,000
Meiji Mutual Life: $15,313,000,000
Asahi Mutual Life: $13,793,000,000
Mitsui Mutual Life: $10,446,000,000 (27)
By comparison, America's three largest life insurance
companies -- Prudential, Metropolitan and Equitable -- had
year-end 1985 assets of $91,139,140,000, $76,494,165,000 and
$47,989,964,000 respectively,(28) while Aetna Life &
Casualty had year-end 1985 assets of $58,294,000,000.(29)
Of those assets held in real estate, no more than
twenty percent is allocated to U.S. realty. This allocation
is a function of Ministry of Finance investment
restrictions, together with in-house standards of portfolio
prudence. As a consequence, even a company of Meiji's size
-- Japan's sixth largest life insurance company, with assets
exceeding those of MassMutual, New England Mutual and MONY
-- is limited to $200 million-to-$250 million of U.S. real
estate within its portfolio; its annual investment range is
$50 - $100 million. Therefore, given the entry costs of
establishing an organizational structure to coordinate
direct investments in U.S. real estate -- capitalization and
formation of a U.S. subsidiary, establishment of offices and
staffing up -- only a suitably large insurance company can
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easily afford to set up shop. Admittedly, one way to help
cover such overhead costs would be to increase the amount of
investment, in the form of commingled funds, made on behalf
of clients and beneficiaries; indeed, this is a long-term
goal. However, MOF regulations, together with a prudent
desire to learn more about the U.S. market prior to using
clients' money, limit the current ability of life
insurance companies to do so.
Investment Patterns and Parameters
" For equity investment, long-term
investment is our motto"
Nippon Life Annual Report, 1985
Japanese life insurance companies are generally
credited with being the most conservative of the Japanese
investors in U.S. real estate. "Typically," according to
Arthur Mitchell, an lawyer with the international law firm
of Coudert Brothers and one who will be profiled later in
the paper, "Japanese life insurance companies prefer joint
ventures with large developers or American insurance
companies; typically, they look to a long investment
horizon, for they do not readily entertain the thought of
selling; typically, they accept a lower return, but they
seek an income guarantee in the early years."(30) Most life
insurance company representatives are quick to emphasize the
underwriting limitations to which they must adhere:
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obligations as fiduciaries for their policy holders;
matching of assets against liabilities; and strict review by
the Ministry of Finance. As noted in Sumitomo's 1985 annual
report, "real estate investments are ideally suited to the
operations of life insurance companies in view of their
potential to yield long-term income."(31) "We cannot take
risks," notes Akira Yashiro, chief representative of Dai-
Ichi Life Company, Japan's second largest. "We take no
short cuts, for we are a life insurance company having a
very long view. It may take a long time, but we don't
care."(32)
In the summer of 1984, a representative of Nippon
Life's international real estate section wrote a sort of
"investment manifesto" for those Japanese life insurance
companies which invest in U.S. The author's words are
applicable to the industry as a whole:
Nippon Life seeks long-term, stable real estate
investment in the United States that is compatible
with the nature of funds available to life
insurance companies. It avoids speculative
investments such as those that promise short-term
capital gain. An insurance company like Nippon
Life has to make sure that every effort to minimize
the investment risks that accompany high-return
ventures is taken. This investment policy means
that the company has focused on existing prime
buildings in financial districts in major cities
.. It is reluctant to invest in growing cities,
suburban areas and development projects because it
believes that such investments are speculative and
vulnerable to changes in the state of the economy.
(emphasis added) (33)
Furthermore, unlike their American counterparts, Japanese
life insurance companies cannot make unsubordinated
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permanent loans on U.S. property. The Ministry of Finance
prohibits such investments; even participating debt
vehicles do not satisfy its scrutiny. The result is that
insurance companies are obligated to invest by way of
convertible debt, outright purchase, or as an equity co-
venturer in a joint venture; in the case of the latter,
however, straight permanent loans are often permitted if
used as leverage to acquire the equity stake.
Given such limited investment options, and in light of
the putative conservatism of the life insurance companies,
one might expect that a nascent Japanese investor would
likely opt for the relatively conservative convertible loan
or outright purchase vehicles, provided adequate coverage
ratios and yield protections were put in place. As will be
shown, however, this is not necessarily the case, for while
there is uniform verbal adherence to the gospel of
conservatism, the actions of the respective insurance
companies suggest that they have chosen investment paths of
varying risk. One man's conservatism is another man's
"speculative and vulnerable" investment.
Case study: Nippon Life Insurance Company
It is generally acknowledged that Nippon Life is the
leader among Japanese life insurance companies investing in
U.S. real estate. "They are substantially, if not light
years, ahead of their contemporaries in terms of
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sophistication and experience," according to a knowledgeable
institutional representative.(34)
Nippon's size allows them an advantage. Founded in
1889, they are Japan's largest life insurance company.
Furthermore, with total assets in excess of $40 billion,
they are the world's fourth largest, topped only by
Prudential, Metropolitan and Equitable. Of that amount,
$2.75 billion is in Japanese real estate, with another $500
million owned by their U.S. subsidiary, Nissei Realty, Inc.
Because they are not licensed in the U.S., Japanese life
insurance companies are not permitted to directly invest in
the U.S. in their own name, and as a result, must invest
through wholly-owned U.S. subsidiaries. Over $300 million
was invested by Nissei in U.S. realty in 1985, alone.
Nissei's investment goals are not materially different
from those of other Japanese life insurance companies:
Nippon Life has been exploring investment
opportunities giving the highest priorities to high
quality buildings located in the business districts
of major cities. Our major concern is to realize
the highest possible income gain from long-term
possession of such buildings. The Company
accordingly has adopted a basic policy of working
in partnership with major developers, insurance
companies, pension funds or other concerns in the
U.S. that have a similar objective.(35)
While this statement appears to be quite consistent with the
investment parameters of the industry , it is interesting to
note that, in the short period from the summer of 1984 to
December 1985, Nippon's stated goals had evolved from
investments strictly limited to existing buildings to
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include those in previously unpalatable development joint
ventures ( "[we are reluctant to invest in] development
projects because . . . such investments are speculative and
vulnerable to changes in the state of the economy"). Such
an evolution may be seen as a reflection of Nissei's
dynamism and growing confidence; it is corporate
methodology more than goals which seem to set Nissei at the
forefront of those Japanese life insurance companies
investing in U.S. realty.
The Organization
Nippon's presence in the U.S. real estate market
antedates by far that of other Japanese life insurance
companies. It began evaluating the market as a potential
target in 1978 -- three years before the Ministry of Finance
permitted direct investment by Japanese life insurance
companies. This evaluation was largely coordinated by
Takahide Moribe, whose decade of experience in Nippon's
domestic real estate division in Osaka prepared him for the
expansion abroad.
In 1979, two years before Ministry of Finance
deregulation, Nippon formed Nissei Realty in New York and
named Moribe as its vice president and office chief. The
staff of Nissei (currently, four professionals) set out to
absorb information about the U.S. market in anticipation of
the day when they would be at liberty to invest. A
strategic plan was formulated, calling essentially for four
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separate stages: first, cautious investment with a
respected U.S. institutional investor in existing
properties; second, development projects with such
institutions; third, direct investments in existing
properties without institutional partners; and finally,
directly and independently negotiated development deals.
Then, as now, Nissei underook its own research in-house
and to develop its own information base, rather than rely
solely upon consultants and other advisors. "Real estate is
a local business," notes Moribe, "and we like fresh
information."(36) Thus , with the structure in place and
their level of expertise growing, Nissei awaited the
opportunity to invest.
The Deals
As soon as the Ministry of Finance permitted life
insurance companies to invest in U.S. realty in 1981, Nissei
charted a cautious course of investment in accordance with
the first stage of its strategic plan. Furthermore, it
wanted to start on a relatively small scale. Accordingly,
in July 1981, Nissei acquired a fifty percent of the
Equitable's interest in 645 Madison Avenue, a 145,000-
square-foot Manhattan office building. It was a landmark
acquisition as well, for it was the first such purchase by a
Japanese life insurance company. In this (and with all
subsequent) investments, Nissei became a general partner in
the project; "we like to be deeply involved in the
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management of the project, so that we can acquire the know-
how to do everything."(37) A spokesman for the Equitable
confirms such involvement by Nissei, and welcomes it. "They
are very well prepared, and by bringing a different
perspective to the process, can be very helpful."(38)
Almost two years passed before Nissei acquired its next
property interest. The time in between purchases was used to
analyze the operations of 645 Madison Avenue thoroughly, as
well as the market at large. In April 1983, Nissei acquired
in excess of fifty percent of Gerald Hine's Continental
Resources Center, a leased, 425,000-square-foot office
building in Houston; Nissei reportedly paid $40 million for
the stake.(39) This was followed in August 1984 with the
purchase of a fifty percent interest in the Union Bank
Square project, a 606,000-square-foot office building in the
CBD of Los Angeles. Like 645 Madison Avenue, this interest
was acquired from the Equitable, which retained the
remaining fifty percent. Nissei's investment cost them
approximately $85 million.(40)
Up to this point, all of Nissei's investments shared
the same fundamental character: the acquisition of a
partial interest in an existing office building in a major
downtown, with a large, sophisticated institution as their
partner. Their portfolio was diversified only in a regional
sense; product type and investment vehicle lacked any
diversification. By 1985, Nissei, in accordance with its
plan, was prepared to embark on its second stage of
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investment.
The first investment in 1985 was the financing of Japan
Air Line's purchase of the Essex House from Marriott.
Nissei issued a convertible loan against the property, which
reportedly cost $175 million. This vehicle enabled Nissei
to learn about American (or more specifically, New York)
hotel operations without the accompanying managerial
concerns, while retaining the ability to convert their debt
into an equity stake. This transaction was followed by
Nissei's first developmental joint venture, Texas Commerce
Tower/2200 Ross Avenue in Dallas. This 53-story tower is
scheduled for a 1987 completion, and is a blue-blood
project: Trammell Crow is the developer, Johnson/Burgee the
architect, and the Equitable is co-financier. Together,
Equitable and Nissei are lending all of the development
costs to the venture, in exchange for which they will
receive annual debt service on their loan, together with a
large equity stake in the project on which they receive a
non-preferred return. The final transaction in 1985 was the
acquisition of a forward purchase option for an office
building in Washington, D.C. When purchased, this building
will represent Nissei's first U.S. real estate investment in
which it acquired one hundred percent of the deal, without
any partners or co-venturers -- an investment which is
characteristic of the third stage of Nissei's strategic
plan.
Thus, by the end of 1985, Nissei had undertaken many
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strategic advancements in a year's time: (1) the size of
their portfolio had more than doubled, to in excess of $500
million; (2) their portfolio remained regionally
diversified, while adding a little diversity in product type
and investment vehicles; (3) important new partner
relationships were established, giving it greater exposure
within the real estate community and enabling it to expand
its educational base; and (4) it had committed itself to
going it alone on a project.
Nissei's view to the future seems to be well charted.
Clearly, as noted in the introduction to this chapter, they
at one point hope to "do everything ourselves," and the
evolution of their investment portfolio suggests a
systematic approach towards this goal. A likely next step
-- and one consistent with the fourth stage of the strategic
plan -- will be a joint venture in which they are the sole
partner of an American developer.
Yet, there does not appear to be a firm timetable for
fulfillment of the strategic plan, and representatives of
Nippon exude patience. When asked about the risks of
investing in the U.S. at a time when many markets are
oversaturated, Moribe is philosophically sanguine. "People
in the United States sometimes forget that real estate is a
cyclical business. I recall when people laughed at Olympia
& York's Manhattan acquisitions in the late '70s. Even
Houston will recover within our investment cycle."(41)
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Divergent Paths and Lessons Learned
Thus, Nippon is not only the largest Japanese life
insurance company, but it was the first to establish an
office in the U.S., the first to study the market closely,
and the first to invest. Given this, one might naturally
expect that the other Japanese life insurance companies
which followed Nippon into U.S. real estate investment would
largely pattern their investment strategies after Nippon's.
Such parallels have been surprisingly infrequent, however,
both as to investment characteristics and strategic plans
(or lack thereof).
A large condominium project in a midwest city was the
initial U.S. investment for one of the "gang of six.". The
company, according to one of its representatives, would have
preferred to "get its feet wet" with an investment in an
U.S. office building. Nevertheless, the decision to
proceed as an equity co-venturer was made, prompted in part
by their preexisting relationship with the other venture
partner, a Japanese construction company. Condominium sales
have sagged, due in part to a glut of product. Currently,
the units are being leased pending the return of a stronger
market. "[I]t was a test," said a company spokesman, "and
we paid the tuition."(42)
Another company's initial entry in to the U.S. market
enjoyed similarly mixed success. Relying in part upon the
development expertise of the American developer, and gaining
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comfort from an association with a Japanese institutional
co-venturer, the life insurance company -- also one of the
"gang of six" -- invested in a 300,000-square-foot office
development on the West Coast, a project which "represents
the first investment by a Japanese life insurance company in
the construction of a landmark office building in the United
States."(43) The company enjoys both an equity and debt
position in the project, which has leased very slowly in a
depressed market and is only 85% leased over two years
after delivery. While all of the parties involved in the
project express various degrees of pleasure and optimism
about the deal, outside observers are not as sanguine. "It
didn't make sense," opined an investor knowledgeable about
the goals and limitations of Japanese life insurance
companies.(44) " It may well end up being a solid, good
deal, but we would not have recommended such a project to a
first-time investor, under almost any circumstances. It was
a development deal, not an existing property. The market was
soft, the local economy weak. A major employer was moving
its headquarters to the Sunbelt. The risk profile was
higher than we would have recommended." (45) An advisor who
is familiar with the Japanese investor questions whether
the they were aware of the market dynamics and the planned
headquarters move.(46)
Both of these investment experiences exhibited some
common qualities: they were to-be-built projects located in
relatively small, but major, cities (neither is among the
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ten largest in the U.S.) that are not known for their well-
diversified economies. In addition, both projects were
developed by experienced, but relatively small, non-
institutional developers. Both projects included another
Japanese institutional investor which not only enjoyed a
pre-existing relationship with the respective Japanese life
insurance company, but also had a pre-existing relationship
with the respective American participants -- relationships
which had been galvanized by earlier successful ventures.
And perhaps most importantly, neither company had formulated
a well-developed strategic plan towards investment in U.S.
real estate.
Not surprisingly, both of these investors have altered
their investment criteria and strategies in subsequent
projects. The second U.S. project for the latter company is
a joint venture with the Equitable. Together, they own fifty
percent of a well-located office project, in addition to
enjoying a first position as the project's permanent lender.
This deal varies dramatically from the investor's West Coast
project, despite some superficial similarities. It is
located in a large city with a well-diversified economy; it
was introduced to the project by and is a partner with
Equitable, an investment relationship which was not swayed
by a pre-existing Japanese relationship. Reliance upon
Equitable's clout and expertise is viewed as a form of
laying off risk, and even though the market has shown some
signs of oversupply, the company's representative notes that
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he is "not nervous, because we have a long investment
window, and I trust Equitable."(47)
Notwithstanding such confidence, however, this company
plans to shy away from away from development deals in the
near future. "Our [current] strategy of investment is one
that primarily emphasizes cash flow -- not capital gain.
Given this, we favor existing properties."(48)
Similarly, a senior representative of the first life
insurance company is charting a more cautious, wait-and-see
course in keeping with a strategic plan:
We are in our second stage. The first was the
"tuition stage." The second: existing office
buildings and co-ventures [with American
institutions]. The third will come, but we're not
exactly sure what it will be.(49)
Subsequent purchases have been consistent with this plan.
Among them are large, fully-tenanted downtown office
buildings in San Francisco and Dallas. In both instances,
an American institution is a co-venturer.
The experiences of these two Japanese life insurance
companies should not suggest, however, that those companies
which have opted instead for all-equity investments have
enjoyed thoroughly satisfying experiences. Another "gang of
six" life insurance company, which has been active in a
number of markets and which has invested via different
vehicles, acquired an existing office building in a suburb
of a major city within the Boston-to-Washington corridor in
1985. In addition to watching the value of the dollar slide
thirty percent against the yen almost immediately following
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closing, this company paid a price which many knowledgeable
individuals believe incorporated an unwarranted premium. of
course, opinions about price often vary widely, and often do
not incorporate considerations which are idiosyncratic to
the purchaser. Nonetheless, in this instance, there
appears to be some objective verification of such an
assessment; according to a employee of another Japanese
institution, this life insurance company, in contravention
of a cultural and institutional disinclination to sell real
estate (elaborated upon in Chapter VI), is quietly seeking
to unload the property in Tokyo.
Unlike the two life insurance companies noted earlier,
however, this life insurance company, in keeping with a
strategic plan for investment, has attempted to spread its
risk by investing through different vehicles in different
cities. In New York, it acquired a fifty-percent interest
in a new office building currently in the lease-up stage,
protecting itself with a three-year yield guarantee of
approximately ten percent, together with a bifurcated
funding schedule; the developer, depending on the success of
leasing efforts twenty-four months after building delivery,
will "either get a bonus or suffer a penalty."(50) Active
management of the venture is left to the developer, who
claims that "the arrangement is a splendid one. Although
[his Japanese partners) are very well informed and very well
prepared, I am the managing partner and they are the
sleeping partner."(51) In a similarly sophisticated
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venture, the company made the construction loan and issued a
convertible loan commitment on an $80 million mixed-use
project in downtown Chicago. The loan is convertible in
"between five and fifteen years"(52), and the project, forty
percent pre-leased to a major corporation, gives every
indication of being a rather successful venture.
In both of these projects, the life insurance company
is a general partner (although technically, it is a
corporate subscriber in the former case, a fact which the
American developer believes gives the Japanese institution
great comfort: "They know that I'm not in a position to
pocket the cash and run"[53]). Such a status is desired
not so much to exert greater control over the project, but
instead to ensure that the educational process is richly
enhanced -- an important goal emphasized by all Japanese
institutional investors.
Despite its initial and arguable investment stumble,
this life insurance company appears to be well-prepared to
expand its scale of investment in the U.S. One of its chief
employees in Tokyo apprenticed with the Equitable in New
York, and is comfortable with the American market. A
strategic plan has been formulated, and while they are
rather secretive about its components, it appears to
emphasize regional and product diversification. Why does
this company feel comfortable with such a diversified
investment strategy ? "We -- both in Tokyo and in New York
-- systematically monitor our selected thirty cities on a
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quarterly basis, and on a monthly basis go into great detail
on four or five cities. This process ensures that we stay
fresh, stay current."(54) So, while they may in fact be
the "sleeping partner" in a particular deal, they certainly
are not sleepy in their evaluation of the markets.
SUMMARY
The disparity between investment patterns of different
Japanese life insurance companies is likely to continue for
at least a number of years. Such disparities are not just a
function of size, staffing and experience; just as important
is a company's structural preparedness, often in the form of
a strategic plan. A company whose office head notes that
"we have no concrete idea on how to invest in the United
States" (55) may well enjoy great success with its
investments, but is probably less likely to be on the
cutting edge of new programs or to show high responsiveness
to new opportunities. Of course, higher risk often attends
novel investment programs and vehicles, so such a "go slow"
investment strategy may be not be inappropriate for a life
insurance company, after all.
Notwithstanding such differences, certain
generalizations can be made with some confidence about the
Japanese life insurance companies as investors in U.S. real
estate:
1) Existing office buildings will remain the
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favored product. Particular emphasis is being
placed on cities within the "Bowash"(Boston-
Washington) corridor. Interest in suburban areas
is slow to develop, as most companies are still not
familiar with the dynamics of such markets;
notwithstanding this, some of the more advanced
companies are beginning to look seriously at
different kinds of product, including suburban.
2) Satisfactory cash-on-cash yields are of
paramount importance, while upside potential takes
a decided back seat. Yield enhancements, via
income guarantees, are a growing standard, with two
or three years as the norm. Current yield
requirements on existing propoerties fall in the
7.5%-9% range, with the exception of Manhattan,
where yields of 6%-7% are bought. Yields on
buildings currently in the lease-up stage run 100-
300 basis points higher. IRRs fall within the
10.5%-13% range, using a ten-year schedule and a
3.5%-4.5% inflation assumption.
3) Affiliations with "big name" American
developers and institutions are preferred. Such
affiliations not only give the relationship-
oriented Japanese greater comfort, but they also
make a prospective investment easier to sell to the
bosses back in Tokyo. Such an affiliation is
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particularly important on a developmental joint
venture.
4) None of the companies expressed an interest in
an investment of less than $10 million, while $100
million appears to be the effective upper limit.
Some current annual investment ranges are
approximately as follows:
- Nissei: $200-400 million
- Sumitomo: $100-300 million
- Meiji: $50-100 million (1-2
deals per year)
5) While the traditional long-term view towards
real estate investment still predominates, certain
experts who work closely with the Japanese see a
growing tendency to adopt a more "American-like" --
hence, a shorter-term, more commodity-like --
perspective. Such tendencies are apparently seen
more frequently in the more experienced and
advanced companies, such as Nissei and Sumitomo.
6) All U.S. offices are trying to beef up their
staffs in order to cover more territory and to
enhance their ability to make quick decisions. The
home offices in Tokyo, however, are apparently not
quite as anxious to increase staff size and
overhead.
7) According to Gordon Clagett, Executive Vice
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President of Equitable Real Estate Group, Inc.,
There are two opposing trends, but they balance out
to greater conservatism -- a better informed,
rather than reactionary, conservatism.
On the one hand, the Japanese have spent a lot of
time learning about the market in a short period of
time. They are now better educated, and may be
more inclined to take greater risks. For instance,
some who used to look exclusively at downtown
office buildings are now looking at retail and
industrial.
On the other hand, as they view the current
oversaturation within the market, they are becoming
more conservative.(56)
One manifestation of such conservatism is a
growing appetite for debt-oriented investments,
rather than equity. Whenever possible, such
instruments are structured to allow for conversion
into an equity stake, so most of the same
underwriting standards are being employed.
In sum, Japanese life insurance companies are
positioning themselves to play an even greater role in the
U.S. real estate industry.
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Chapter IV:
Construction Companies: Financiers in Builder's
Clothing
"There are peaks and valleys. The peaks
have always been to follow the
Japanese investor; you find valleys
trying to go it alone before
understanding the market."
Fujio Suzuki
Asst. to the President
Kajima Corporation
Japanese construction companies generated $1.7 billion
in 1985 revenues in the U.S., which more than doubled
earnings from the previous year. This year these companies
are projected to capture a 4% share of the domestic U.S.
construction market.(57) Yet, the role of these large-
scale construction concerns remains relatively obscure.
The U.S. domestic construction industry is
regional, competitive, and primarily supplied by local
inputs of labor, materials, and management. Unlike
industries in automobiles, consumer electronics, and steel,
success in the construction industry is not wholly dependent
on low-cost production, quality, and distributive
efficiencies. Some success factors are intangible, such as
knowledge of local customs and work habits, politics, and
regulatory environments. "You can't just walk into this city
and start doing projects," notes John Johnson, Vice
President of Tishman Construction in New York which has
recently collaborated with a Japanese developer on a high-
rise condominium project. "You have to deal with so, so many
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different sectors: the unions, the suppliers, the city, the
agents, not least of all the contractors and building
management companies. It takes years, and even then, most
folks don't make it."(58) In spite of apparent obstacles,
however, our research indicates that major Japanese
contractors are preparing and, in certain cases, already
implementing a long-term, methodical entry strategy for the
U.S. marketplace.
The Japanese construction firms which are actively
pursuing business in the U.S. are some of Japan's largest
contractors which began offshore activities over a decade
ago in response to the decline of domestic Japanese
construction markets. These firms are staking their future,
both overseas and in Japan, on technological innovation and
advanced construction techniques. Japanese contractors view
several facets of the domestic U.S. construction industry,
such as project scheduling, quality controls, and building-
systems innovation, as inefficient and ripe for improvement.
Japanese products have a reputation for quality and
performance, and these contractors want to extend that
impression to the construction industry. Furthermore,
Japanese contractors will attempt to transfer a vertically-
integrated construction service approach to the United
States. The combined effect of technology and service
integration is the comparative advantage which Japanese
construction firms are intent on bringing to the U.S. They
do not believe that there is a sustainable niche for foreign
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contractors in the pure "build and sell" business. Japanese
contractors want to create a new dimension in construction
services and quality rather than copy or compete against
existing market mechanisms.
Joint ventures with U.S. developers are a prevalent
means by which Japanese contractors are absorbing the
essential day-to-day details of the U.S. construction
business. These companies can bring substantial capital to
U.S. construction projects, frequently in the form of
limited-partner equity contribution. In return, they want to
participate in the construction process and earn a
reasonable return. As Japanese construction firms learn the
business practices and methodology of U.S. general
contractors, they likewise plan for future application of
new technologies and service concepts. In Middle Eastern and
Southeast Asian countries, these construction companies
successfully introduced expertise not available in those
markets. In the U.S. the situation is different, for
Japanese contractors must learn the U.S. construction
business first before attempting to revolutionize it.
An anticipated increase in foreign direct investment in
the U.S. by Japanese manufacturing firms will provide
construction firms with a transitional foothold to the U.S.
market. Because Japanese clients are accustomed to
integrated project planning and construction services,
contracts for manufacturing facilities throughout the U.S.
will offer Japanese construction companies an opportunity to
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test new methods and technologies as they learn the U.S.
market through joint ventures on purely U.S. projects.
The scale of projects and the expertise of such
contractors vary considerably. Yet, little is known of the
underlying motives for rapid expansion into the U.S., the
world's largest construction market. Equally obscure are the
critical relationships which link large Japanese contractors
to other Japanese firms currently investing, developing, and
brokering throughout key metropolitan areas of the U.S.
Although Japanese construction firms will confront entry
barriers that are distinct from those of the investment,
development, trading, and financial sectors, their eventual
success is closely tied to the related activities of these
Japanese firms operating in the U.S. Moreover, the Japanese
government has traditionally supported the overseas
expansion of key industries, such as autos and steel, and
regards their success as a matter of national priority.
Because construction industry health is very important to
the Japanese economy, the government can be expected to
promote construction industry activity in the U.S. Our
analysis intends, therefore, to explore the objectives of
construction companies from a broad perspective which
includes:
Objectives and Strategy;
Comparative Industry Characteristics;
Construction Industry Background;
Movement to Offshore Markets;
Recent experience;
Case Study: Hasegawa Komuten Ltd.;
Conclusions
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Objectives and Strategies
Japanese construction companies moved to generate
overseas business when domestic markets, adversely affected
by economic adjustments and oil shocks, could no longer
promise sustained periods of new construction projects. Most
were immediately successful in transferring proven expertise
for large infrastructure projects, plant construction, and
high-rise residential facilities to developing country
environments. Japanese construction firms built projects
that could not be delivered by domestic Middle Eastern or
Southeast Asian contractors. Entry into foreign markets
succeeded by providing differentiated services in terms of
scale and complexity. As a reaction to the decline of
domestic Japanese construction activity, overseas expansion
was less a clearly articulated plan than an urgent, ad hoc
extension of existing business to new markets. Success
reinforced a commitment of these big companies to vertical
integration, which combined with financial strength, allowed
contractors to adapt to differing conditions of individual
markets. Japanese contractors offered expertise based on
responsibility for all aspects of a project, an approach
which characterizes the way they view themselves as
competitors in the U.S. market. Michael Porter observes in
Competitive Strategy that previous business patterns may
determine competitive strategy:
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Every firm operates on a set of assumptions about
its own situation ... These assumptions about its
own situation will guide the way the firm behaves
and the way it reacts to events ... Companies
develop perceptions or images of themselves and
their relative capabilities, which are reflected
in the implicit assumptions that form the basis of
their strategies.(59)
Major Japanese construction companies which operate in
the U.S. today have adopted a strategy based on acknowledged
strengths in financing ability and potential advantages in
areas of technology and construction management. The
objective of most companies is to build profitable real
estate development operations which utilize existing
expertise in wide-ranging, fully integrated project
services. Few are interested in simply building and selling,
because they believe that the breadth of U.S. real estate
activity offers profit opportunity in design, engineering,
research, and property management businesses, in addition to
building and construction. They recognize that large-scale
infrastructure projects, such as the ones they built in
developing countries, will not be a stable source of revenue
in the U.S. While Japanese contractors earned success in
the Middle East and Southeast Asia by transferring
conventional expertise, penetration of the U.S. market will
require a different strategy: implementing new technologies
and work methods to the overall development business.
"Development allows for general contracting work, but not
the reverse," says Shimizu America's Naoshi Oinuma.(60) Most
companies believe that it will be difficult, at best, to
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compete on a head-to-head basis with established U.S.
contractors and builders. "We want to emphasize the sum of
the parts rather than each individual element," observes
Keisuke Mine of Kajima Corporation's Real Estate Development
Division in Tokyo. "Our idea is that there is more profit in
development than pure construction in the U.S." (61)
Their objectives for the U.S. market are, therefore,
more expansive and ambitious than previous experience in
other countries might suggest. These goals reflect long-term
diversification strategies which have changed large, family-
held contractors into sophisticated multi-national
construction engineers and developers. Japanese construction
firms view the U.S. market as both testing ground and long-
term payoff for expensive R&D investments and adaptive
innovations. Construction expertise and technology
successfully implemented in the U.S. can be subsequently
transferred to other countries. Sustainable advantage in the
U.S. market will broaden firms' capacity to withstand
cyclical swings of narrowly-focused construction activity,
such as those which many suffered in Middle Eastern markets.
These common objectives are being pursued,
nonetheless, through a variety of short- and medium-term
strategies. Top-ten firms such as Kajima, Shimizu, and
Ohbayashi plan to gain a foothold in the U.S. by securing
contracts on Japanese direct investment in automotive and
electronics manufacturing facilities, but meanwhile have co-
ventured several medium-sized development projects in
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regional cities. For example, second-ranked Kumagai-Gumi is
a joint venture partner in over $1.2 billion of
developments with the Zeckendorf Company in New York City,
and Aoki Corporation activities range from residential
development in Dallas to a hotel project for Japan Air Lines
in Chicago's Riverfront Park. Hasegawa Komuten has invested
in, developed, and sold smaller-scale condominium projects
in Manhattan. Each strategy is a beginning step toward total
involvement in the U.S. development business.
Joint venture relationships with contractors and
developers are a common strategic means to become familiar
with doing business in the United States. Japanese
contractors understand that developers seek capital in
exchange for market access and experience, but they do not
regard their role in projects as limited to mere passive
equity investment. They seek temporary, intensive
apprenticeships in local regulations, relationships, and
business realities in order to cope with complicated
approval procedures, frequent litigation, and on-going
negotiations over cost-plus contracts. Formerly, equity
participations were debt disguised as equity or "dequity",
cautions Jack Shaffer of Sonnenblick Goldman, who brought
Kumagai-Gumi together with the Zeckendorf Company, "because
(Japanese) contractors really didn't do anything other than
contribute funds similar to a non-involved lender."(62)
Now, however, cautions Cushman & Wakefield's Jim Montanari,
construction companies are taking more active roles in
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projects so that "developers who are looking for purely
passive partners aren't necessarily going to find them."(63)
"It took me five years to build land location expertise,"
says Katsu K. Kiuchi, Chief New York Officer at Hasegawa
Komuten, a condominium builder, "to the point where we are
now known and acknowledged in the local marketplace. We have
the ability to serve as genuine general partners."(64) Joint
venture agreements allow Japanese contractors to spread
project risk to American partners. They instruct Japanese
firms unaccustomed to the U.S. market on the development
process, out of which competitive advantages can be first
identified and subsequently implemented. Over an extended
period, joint ventures help overcome subtle costs of entry
barriers to an industry,(65) such as expense overruns and
scheduling delays to which newcomers to the development
business are particularly susceptible. Japanese contractors
are utilizing joint ventures to transform the comparative
advantage of financing ability into a long-term strategic
weapon.
Comparative Industry Characteristics
Japanese construction activity overseas is limited to
the top 20-30 ranked, very large, integrated construction-
engineering firms. Although these firms are of a scale
comparable to some of the principal U.S. construction
giants, dependence on overseas contracts has historically
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been less than for major U.S. firms:
Table 1: Comparison of U.S. & Japanese
Construction Firms (1984)
Rank Firm Total Contracts Percent Overseas
(US$ MM)
U.S. FIRMS:
1 Kellog Rust 10,855 80
2 Fluor 8,353 18
3 Bechtel 8,220 60
4 Parsons 7,514 40
5 Stearn 4,932 11
6 Brown & Root 3,884 33
-------------------------------------------
JAPANESE FIRMS:
1 Taisei 4,192 7
2 Kajima 4,034 7
3 Shimizu 3,998 9
4 Ohbayashi 3,317 5
5 Takenaka 2,972 7
6 Kumagai 2,660 21
Source: (66)
Japanese firms generate stable annual revenues from
many small and medium-sized projects in Japan, whereas U.S.
firms experience wide year-to-year fluctuations because of
the variability of huge overseas projects. Also, Japanese
firms are not differentiated from each other in terms of the
integrated services they provide. U.S. construction majors,
by comparison, tend to specialize in specific technical-
industrial project capabilities. Only the largest firms of
either country possess the qualified staff, experience,
varied know-how, and financial strength to be able to
venture into international markets. In Japan, executives and
engineers with requisite language skills and international
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training from prestigious universities are recruited almost
exclusively for the largest firms. Smaller firms have
neither an appetite for overseas activity nor an ability to
absorb the costs of overcoming unfamiliar competitive entry
barriers. For these reasons an understanding of Japanese
construction companies operating in the United States is
necessarily limited to a review of large scale, well-known
firms.
The ability of construction firms to adapt and succeed
in an unfamilar environment depends not only on how well
they are able to transfer advantages, but also the skill
with which they adjust to different competitive ground rules
and work relations. The Japanese domestic construction
industry is more stable and regulated than that of the U.S.
Therefore, Japanese firms bring to the U.S. expectations
formed from a different kind of competitive environment.
The Japanese domestic construction industry differs in
notable respects from the U.S. construction industry.
Although labor and material costs have risen steadily in the
U.S. and Japanese construction industries, cost structure in
domestic Japanese construction depends on a multi-layered
subcontracting system. General contractors provide engineers
to coordinate and manage subcontractors under a uniform
lump-sum contract system. Japanese general contractors
neither employ large staffs nor maintain a permanent force
of workers as do some large U.S. contractors. U.S.
contractors negotiate and bid with labor unions and open
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shop workers when staffing a project, and maintain a payroll
until project completion. Japanese contractors deal
exclusively with selected major subcontracting firms with
which they have long-term relationships. Although labor
costs are similar for both large and small-scale contractors
in the U.S., in Japan larger firms extract lower labor costs
due to bargaining power over subcontractors with which they
have steady relationships.
The standard bidding system used in private and public
projects in Japan constitutes a form of restricted
competition among similar sized firms. A small group of
firms determined by size and relationship to the public or
private client, will be selected to bid on projects. Open
competitive bidding is uncommon in Japan. This system is
particularly important on contracts awarded by the Ministry
of Construction for domestic public-sector projects. The
Ministry of Construction annually ranks and selects firms
according to a "pointing system" based on size, capital
sufficiency, total project volume (i.e. billings worldwide),
research and development strength, staff expertise, and
previous project experience. Eligibility for public sector
contracts depends very much on position in ranking, so
contractors must be particularly attentive to maintaining a
consistent, year-to-year volume of work. An example of 1985
rankings is:
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Table 2: Japanese Construction Company Ranking (1985)
Rating Company Points Awarded
1985 1984 Change
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1 Shimizu Construction 466 462 4
2 Kumagai Gumi 462 466 -4
2 Toda Construction 462 462 0
2 Maeda Construction 462 462 0
5 Kajima 459 456 3
5 Ohbayashi 459 459 0
Source:(67)
Japanese construction firms are, therefore, unfamiliar
with an open competitive bidding process and must adjust to
the cyclical nature of the U.S. construction industry.
The Japanese system functions in the context of
long-term professional and personal relationships which
underscore the bidding process. Taken as a whole, this
process ensures earnings stability by channeling small
projects to small firms, medium projects to medium firms,
and large projects to large firms. "Large general
contractors have enjoyed this system," notes Makoto
Taketoshi of the Ministry of Construction, "because it
buffers them against cyclical risks of the business."(68)
The competitive restrictions underlying the Japanese
construction industry further emphasize the differing
expectations and problems which contractors may encounter in
the United States.
Japanese firms are integrated to provide a complete
range of construction services and in-house construction
management. Major firms which have recently entered the U.S.
market are planning to offer services from initial site
selection to building maintenance and brokerage services.
Japanese construction companies view this fully integrated
capability as their key advantage for success in the U.S.,
where construction projects frequently bring together
independent participants at separate stages of the
feasibility -> planning -> design -> construction ->
operation -> maintenance process. In this sense, Japanese
construction firms view U.S. construction methods as poorly
organized and inefficient, so much so that owners require
construction managers to supervise all elements of a project
from start to finish. Japanese construction executives are
convinced that they can deliver U.S. projects at cost and on
time, and as such differentiate their product by service
quality. Yet, some Japanese admit that established
traditions of the U.S. marketplace, such as union power,
local regulations, and accepted ways of doing business could
reduce or eliminate this quality advantage and, by
extension, profits. Others doubt that much money can be made
over the medium term in the U.S. marketplace. "Until
Japanese construction companies have been able, over several
years time, to learn the day-to-day aspects of U.S. business
methods, there is no money to be made at this game,"(69)
noted Tsuneyoshi Shimizu of the Kajima Corporation, who is
an intern with a well-known Boston developer/broker.
The largest Japanese contractors devote significant
resources to research and development. In doing so they
follow a consistent pattern of process-oriented, long-term
76
planning characteristic of Japanese industry in general. The
significance of research and development helps to explain
the belief held by Japanese construction executives that
process efficiency will translate to competitive advantage
in the U.S. In The Japanese Industrial System, McMillan
observes that for research and development activities:
The emphasis is on the long term, not the short
term. The emphasis is on learning and know-how, or
process, rather than end product. The rationale is
to develop sunrise sectors.. .Technological policies
and practices go hand in hand with many micro and
macro strategies at the level of the firm,
industry, and society. For example, Japan's R & D
policies help explain the strong emphasis and
skills at process development and enviable record
in quality control.(70)
Research and development of construction technology and
intelligent structures is a key long-term goal of Japanese
contractors operating in the U.S. They view the scant
attention paid by U.S. contractors to R & D as a critical
oversight which will work to their competitive advantage.
"We have techniques," says Shinzo Matsumiya, General Manager
of international planning at Shimizu Construction, "for land
reclamation, high-tech ventures, and anti-seismic buildings
which keep us ahead ... for the moment." (71) As an example,
the annual report of the Shimizu Construction Company,
ranked first by the Ministry of Construction in 1985, states
that "On the basis of abundant experience and results,
Shimizu has risen above being a systems organizer and taken
a new step forward as an 'engineering constructor'." (72)
Japanese contractors view themselves as technology leaders,
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and believe that this advantage will help them to become
winners in the U.S. construction business.
Family and financial institution ownership
characterize most major Japanese contruction firms. Some
firms, such as number-five ranked Kajima Corporation, are
controlled and operated by founding family groups. Others,
such as number-two ranked Kumagai-Gumi and Takanaka Komuten,
are private companies which have not issued public shares.
Large Japanese banks are principal shareholders of these
same firms and are, by extension, principal sources of
borrowing. A page from the 1985 Kajima Corporation Annual
Report illustrates these relationships:
Table 3: Principal Shareholders of Kajima Corporation (1985)
Company Stock: Name % Shares
(at 11/30/85)
The Sumitomo Bank, Ltd. 4.7
Shoichi Kajima 3.4
The Kyowa Bank, Ltd. 3.4
The Mitsui Bank, Ltd. 3.3
The Sumitomo Trust and Banking Co., Ltd. 3.3
The Mitsui Trust and Banking Co., Ltd. 2.4
Sumitomo Life Insurance Company 2.2
Nippon Life Insurance Co. 2.0
Principal Borrowing Sources:
The Sumitomo Bank, Ltd.
The Kyowa Bank, Ltd.
The Mitsui Bank, Ltd.
The Mitsui Trust and Banking Co., Ltd.
The Sumitomo Trust and Banking Co., Ltd.
Source: (73)
The closely-held nature of these firms and their
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interlocking relationships with banks provide major Japanese
contractors with a wide range of financing sources and
techniques. Japanese contractors' entry strategies for the
U.S. market will be facilitated by significant financial
strength. Although U.S. lenders may frequently reserve the
right of approval over the choice of a project's general
contractor, the relationship of financing source and builder
is usually at arms-length. Furthermore, it is rather
uncommon for a U.S. general contractor to arrange financing
for a developer. In Japan, however, project financing is
often contingent upon use of a designated contractor.
Moreover, Japanese contractors are themselves developing
sophisticated capital-market operations. For example,
number-one ranked Shimizu Construction Company, in which
financial giant Dai-ichi Kangyo Bank is a major shareholder,
organized a financial subsidiary in Amsterdam in 1979 to
raise funding for international projects. "Our traditional
role in projects is expanding quite rapidly," states Naoshi
Oinuma, Vice President of Shimizu America Corporation. "We
are becoming fiduciaries of a sort, bringing Japanese
investors to U.S. development projects."(74) "American
developers expect low-cost financing in order for us to
become involved in a project," notes Mikio Ishikawa, Manager
of International Planning at Shimizu headquarters in Tokyo,
"and we can raise money, our own money, at below-market
rates in Euromarkets. However," he adds, "where we take
risks, currency risks above all, we will want to become very
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involved."(75)
The ability to deliver financing to projects endows
Japanese contractors with a potent competitive advantage for
winning contracts in the U.S. market. A recent article in
Institutional Investor notes that "Japanese equity investors
act as a magnet for other Japanese money. Such Japanese
banks as Bank of Tokyo, Fuji Bank and Sumitomo Bank are
making construction and bridge loans to their Japanese
colleagues, and some have also been involved more directly,
making loans to American developers."(76) U.S. developers
will search for capital and find construction contracts
linked to loans. Many future projects financed by Japanese
banks will be built by Japanese construction firms. For this
reason, clarifies Shinzo Matsumiya, General Manager of
International Planning at Shimizu Construction Co., "we are
studying your development process from beginning to end."
(77)
An understanding of these facets of the Japanese
construction industry suggests a perspective from which to
evaluate key strengths and weaknesses of major firms'
strategies in the U.S. market. Some aspects of the Japanese
construction industry, such as cost structure, restricted
competition, long-term relationships, and fully integrated
capability, are not advantages transferable to the U.S.,
where ad hoc subcontracting, open bidding, deal-by-deal
partnerships, and segmented business units are common
methods of operation. Other characteristics, such as
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intensive research and development efforts of major firms,
should yield benefits in the long term, especially in areas
such as quality control and intelligent-building technolgy.
The outstanding advantage which major Japanese
construction companies bring to the United States is
financial strength. Most are capable of funding projects
themselves, at attractive rates, through a variety of
instruments in national and international markets. The
largest firms operate in-house money market trading
operations. Relationships with financial institutions, some
of which are major construction company shareholders, is an
additional source of capital. "Developers have no cash,"
observes Hasegawa Komuten's Kiuchi, "and we fill the
bill."(78)
Construction Industry Background
Governmental agencies have exerted considerable
influence over Japanese economic development since the
period immediately preceding World War II. The Ministries of
International Trade and Industry (MITI) and Finance (MOF)
set policy for industrial development, which moved from
textile manufacturing to heavy industry during the build-up
of munitions industries under a series of military
governments prior to 1945. Industry was destroyed at the end
of the war, and post-war administrations understood that
heavy, export-oriented manufacturing was essential to the
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survival of a resource-poor nation. The task of
reconstructing plants, ports, transportation, and homes fell
squarely on the shoulders of the construction industry.
The construction industry was viewed by government,
most Japanese people, and firms as an essentially domestic
business, a supporter of the national priority of rapid
industrialization. The market for Japanese construction
firms was wholly domestic, and was deep enough to provide
prosperity for the industry until the first energy crisis of
1973. In fact, from 1960 to 1973 construction investment
grew 20% annually, divided roughly between 40% public- and
60% private-sector investment; overseas construction
activity amounted to less than .25% of total industry
revenues. (79)
By 1980 the Japanese domestic construction market had
become second only in size to the U.S. However, it accounted
for slightly more than 20% of Japanese GNP, fully double the
comparable impact of U.S. construction activity on its own
domestic market. Moreover, industries such as steel, glass,
wood, and mining sold half of production to the
construction industry, which in 1984 employed almost 9% of
the total domestic workforce.
The construction industry was harshly affected by the
oil shock of 1973. Year-to-year construction industry growth
had often outpaced a phenomenal 10% annual increase in GNP
which lasted almost 20 years. Costlier oil acted to reduce
private-sector investment, curtail public spending, make
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inputs for construction materials more expensive, and
provoke credit restrictions by the Bank of Japan.
Construction investment in Japan decreased in 1974 for the
first time since World War II. Following a brief recovery
stimulated by government contracts, the construction
industry was jolted by a second oil crisis in 1980. Since
then both public and private investment have shifted
downward, and the value of real and nominal construction has
decreased. Furthermore, the character of Japanese industry
began shifting to accomodate new energy realities, moving
away from heavy industries such as steel, shipbuilding, and
chemicals to high-tech, less capital-intensive businesses.
These companies chose to invest in R & D rather than in
construction of plants as had been the practice in the
declining industries. Manufacturing businesses began to make
direct investments overseas in order to maintain cost
competitiveness and allay protectionist sentiments of
foreign governments. Japan itself, much like the United
States, was moving toward a service-oriented economy in
which major capital investment declined. Decreasing returns
on investment property and scarcity of available urban land
for new development projects reduced the number of large-
scale domestic construction projects. These combined factors
lessened opportunities for sustained construction activity
and pushed Japanese contractors to search for new markets
overseas.
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Movement to Offshore Markets
Large Japanese construction firms began to focus
on foreign activities in the late 70s and early 80s,
primarily in Southeast Asia and the Middle East -- project
volumes which accounted for 84% of total Japanese overseas
activity by 1980. As subsequent declines in oil prices
curtailed development plans and construction activity in
oil-producing states, international contractors invaded the
Southeast Asian market, which had been the major arena for
Japanese international construction activity. Japanese
contractors shifted an important portion of work to the
United States, which, by 1984 became their largest single
market for overseas activity.
Table 4: Geographical Spread of Japanese Contractors
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
SE Asia 45% 61% 76% 67% 54%
Middle East 39% 27% 13% 16% 8%
United States 3% 3% 4% 8% 22%
Australia 1% 1% 1% 6% 12%
Other 12% 8% 6% 3% 4%
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source:(80)
The U.S. construction market had a undeniable
allure for Japanese contractors. First, the U.S.
construction market is three times larger than the entire
international market shared by some 250 multinational
contracting companies.(81) Second, the American market is
characterized by established participants: clients, design
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firms, contractors, sub-contractors, suppliers, and
engineers. Third, project expense can be reasonably
predicted due to stable costs of labor and materials, and
transportation and communications systems allow for relative
certainty in planning and scheduling operations. Fourth,
political stability assures against abrupt, unforeseen
changes in government policy, exchange controls, capital
requirements and long-term commitments. Fifth, the great
triumphs of Japanese automotive, electronic, and steel
exports in the vast U.S. market, although indirectly related
to construction, was assuredly not lost on major
contractors. Comparing experience in developing country
environments to that of U.S., Ryuichi Komori, Overseas
Business Manager of Hasegawa Komuten in Tokyo, Japan's
largest builder of residential condominiums, stated that in
some countries negotiations can be virtually impossible. In
the U.S., he counters, "We can negotiate. We can understand
one another very quickly."(82)
Recent Experience: Project Ventures
Japanese construction companies are following
differing strategies in geographically diverse markets
throughout the U.S. Some firms are taking on many differing
projects while others focus on a particular market segment
and area. For example, Kitano Corporation has targeted
residential subdivisions in suburban Maryland, while
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Hasegawa has keyed on the New York condominium market.
Shimizu ha
with Japan
constructin
Corporation
residental
Minneapolis
California,
in Chicago
Plant
the U.S.
capability,
contracts.
s co-ventured a Phoenix office park and invested
Air Lines in New York's Essex House while
g Toyota's Toronto assembly facility. Kajima
is involved in two Southern California
projects, mixed-use joint ventures in
, office parks in Dallas and Long Beach,
and is building Mitsubishi and Mazda auto plants
and Detroit.
construction serves as a transitional step into
market, and allows contractors to test service
gain credibility, and profit from large Japanese
"Kajima has good quality and, after the big
projects have succeeded, we'll have credibility," predicted
Fujio Suzuki, Assistant to the President of Kajima
Corporation. "Our plan is to go through stages: Stage one is
general construction, like Turner; Stage two is engineering,
like Bechtel; and Stage three is construction and
development, like Tishman."(83) As an example, Shimizu
Construction has organized four U.S. subsidiaries to
implement separate business plans: Shimizu America
Corporation for construction, Shimizu Development Inc., for
property management and hotel operations, Shimizu Land
Corporation for real estate development, and Shimizu
Equities Inc., for high-tech building information, money
market operations, and venture capital investment. Porter
notes in Competitive Advantage that diversified firms
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require horizontal strategy to face a dual set of issues in
corporate planning: first, the selection of industries in
which to compete; second, the coordination of the chosen
business strategies. Japanese construction companies are
implementing horizontal strategies to leverage the
advantages of vertical integration in the fragmented U.S.
construction market:
Horizontal strategy is a coordinated set of goals
and policies across distinct but interrelated
business units. Horizontal strategy is a concept of
group, sector, and corporate strategy based on
competitive advantage, not on financial
considerations...It encompasses both existing
business units and the selection of new industries
to enter based on interrelationships with existing
units. (84)
Japanese construction firms do not view competition
across individual businesses, but rather seek to establish
competitive advantage from the mutually reinforcing
activities of different businesses. Bringing Japanese
construction expertise to new businesses, however, such as
U.S. real esate development, involves risk and has thus far
yielded uneven results. In one successful example, Shimizu
co-ventured the development of an Arizona office park with
partners Mitsui & Co., Ltd., a leading Japanese trading
company, and Westcor, a local developer. Mitsui provided
market knowledge, introductions, and equity along with
Shimizu Land Corp., which established an office in Phoenix
to monitor day-to-day progress. This project has led to a
follow-up joint venture with the same partners for hotel
development in Tempe, Arizona. However, while Kajima
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Corporation successfully co-ventured with Dai-Ichi Life and
developer Bob Boisclair on Minneapolis' first high-rise
condominium, Lake Point Tower, it stumbled on a follow-up
project, River Place, a downtown condominium which failed to
sell. Both Shimizu and Kajima view these results as learning
experiences which rework and redefine strategic plans.
Case Study: Hasegawa Komuten Co., Ltd.
Hasegawa Komuten (Haseko) is a leading Tokyo-based
developer of residential high-rise condominiums; it has
diversified operations in office buildings, land brokerage,
property management, condominium sales, structural
refinishing, and commercial rentals. It is a closely-held,
family-operated concern among whose principal shareholders
figure the Mitsui Trust & Banking Co., Asahi Mutual Life
Insurance Co., The Daiwa Bank Ltd., and the Yasuda Trust &
Banking Co. Although net sales exceeded $700 million in
1985, it is less than one-fifth the size of such giants as
Shimizu or Kajima. Haseko has built more than 160,000
condominium units in Japan and invests in R & D, aiming to
create an "integrated condominium apartment production
system," according to their 1985 annual report. Haseko began
overseas activity in Hawaii in 1973 as a high-rise
condominium, hotel, and office building developer. It
extended U.S. operations to California and New York in 1982
and has pursued a cautious and deliberate strategy of
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learning the U.S. development business.
In Japan, Haseko is implementing a vertically
integrated shift away from dependence on the construction
business to increased reliance on broad real estate
development and brokerage activities. Its main domestic
business segment, residential condominium development and
sales, is vulnerable to macroeconomic conditions which
influence government policy in housing construction. In
1985, for the first time in company history, a greater
portion of revenues resulted from real estate sales than
from construction activities. Overbuilding in the Japanese
condominium market has slowed new construction, and Haseko
is responding with horizontal strategies which include Tokyo
land speculation, luxury condominium development, and six
office building developments for financial institution
clients. Land brokerage is an important new business in
which Haseko sells, transacts, analyzes, and constructs
residential properties for client investors. It invests in
information systems which provide brokerage and property
management data to clients in domestic branch offices, and
is developing features such as computer-assisted design
presentations of investment opportunities. The company views
itself as a leader in residential project technolgy, and
desires to implement a similar strategy in foreign markets.
Haseko's objective in the U.S. is to provide fully
integrated investment, feasibility, transaction, and
construction services to Japanese and American clients.
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It started with a strategy of gaining experience in
condominium and hotel construction in Hawaii, where Japanese
investors represent a strong investment market. The company
established offices in Los Angeles and New York in 1982 to
expand U.S. activities and reduce exposure to the cyclical
and overbuilt Hawaiian market. In Los Angeles, Haseko
Townhomes, Inc. is building low-rise, townhouse
condominiums in the suburb of Pasadena. These units,
modeled after closely studied Colorado resort developments,
reflect some of the technology-intensive marketing themes
which characterize Haseko's real estate sales approach in
Japan. The units are designed with multiple-option features
for individual buyer modification and carry a 10-year
structural warranty as a result of advanced anti-seismic
construction techniques. Earthquake resistent residential
structures, in which Haseko has invested R & D and developed
proprietary know-how, are a unique and desirable feature for
the Southern California home market. In New York, Haseko has
co-ventured condominium projects with a Japanese trading
company and, most recently, a local developer, W.J. Haines.
This New York experience illustrates a learning progression
of strategy and objectives similar to those experienced by
other Japanese contractors in the U.S. real estate market.
Haseko's first step in the Manhattan market was a
series of purchases of 46 apartments in recently completed
East-Side condominiums as a means to study buyer/renter
preferences. The successful sale and rental of all units
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within a year prepared Chief Officer Katsu K. Kiuchi for
active development of a similar East Side location. "Kiuchi
learned quickly by getting involved in very basic aspects of
the New York real estate business," says Kunio Ohsawa, who
spent eight years in Manhattan with Sumitomo Corporation and
managed to observe Haseko's strategy. "He learned timing,
when to get in and out of condominium markets, and also
capitalized on a key strength of the Hasegawa organization:
lean staff and quick decison-making."(85)
Next, Haseko formed a "124 East 79th Partnership"
with Nissho Iwai, Japan's sixth largest trading company, to
purchase a suitable site for development of a high-rise
condominium project. After an eight-month special-permit
approval process, construction began on the 22-story, 66-
unit Belgravia condominiums in March, 1984. Architect
Peter Samton of Gruzen, Samton, Steinglass Architects
recalls that Haseko executives were committed to the idea of
30 stories, smaller units, lower prices, and maximum
density, but "listened to our advice that 22 stories was
optimum and thereby learned a tremendous amount about
neighborhood goodwill and approvals."(86) Logistics on the
tiny 6743 square foot site were difficult and time
consuming. Construction management was handled by Tishman
Construction because, Kiuchi observed, "major contractors
are able provide working drawings quickly and sales agents
can become involved from the outset. Also, there is no worry
about materials delivery or completion bonds."(87)
91
Nevertheless, there were significant cost overruns and
scheduling fell five months behind because delivery of high
quality materials was delayed, window frames had to be
rejected, and interior work redone. Furthermore, almost one
year after completion of the building in November, 1985, 13
of the 66 units remain unsold. Haseko learned about U.S.
methods of design, construction management, and marketing.
For example, when costs exceeded budget, Haseko assumed that
prices could likewise be raised on units. However, when the
higher-priced condominiums did not sell, "they learned about
the prices which buyers in a soft market will pay," observed
Jim Stuart, President of Gilbert, Charles, Baylen real
estate brokers.(88)
In October 1984, Haseko and Nissho Iwai formed a
subsequent joint venture "584 Anderson Partnership" to
develop the Cliff Heights condominium project in Cliffside
Park, New Jersey. The five-story, 24-unit project, was
brokered to Haseko by a Japanese/American who introduced the
local developer/land owner. The project was completed on
schedule in October, 1985 and sold out within 24 hours. The
units were aimed at investors rather than users, and many
were purchased by Far Eastern expatriate executives who live
in the area. The example of this project taught Haseko that
user and investor preferences are sometimes very different,
according to Jim Stuart, whose firm was not involved in
Cliff Heights. "Cliff Heights was an effective lesson in the
smaller condominium market," says analyst Makoto Kaimasu,
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who follows the Japanese construction industry for the
Nomura Research Institute in Tokyo. "It is a small, simple
project which taught a lesson in real estate marketing.
Haseko's interest is to become a sales company, similar to
its strategy in Tokyo."(89) "Timing was excellent," notes
Ryoitsu Mukai of Nissho Iwai America, "and it was the type
of project with which we were more familar than the
Belgravia. We didn't use consultants nor even have enough
time to raise the prices!"(90)
Currently, Haseko has joined in "225 West 83rd
Associates" as a 30% limited partner with Manhattan
developer W.J. Haines on the 306-unit Bromley condominiums
on Manhattan's Upper West Side. Nissho Iwai was invited to
join the project, but declined as many of the Belgravia's
units remain unsold. As an example of the financial
flexibility which Japanese contractors bring to U.S.
development projects, Haseko both contributed $10 million
cash and guaranteed a similar sum via a standby letter of
credit from a Japanese bank, the same one which had
introduced them to the W.J. Haines. The developer complied
with project completion guarantees and a nominal amount of
collateral. Introductions between the developer and the
equity partner were arranged by the local subsidiary of a
Japanese bank. "We understand why we were offered this
project," reveals Kiuchi, "but this is the only way for us
to get into this business."(91) The 400,089-square-foot
project is targeted for a different, more moderate-income,
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non-investor buyer than was the upper-end Belgravia, and is
being aggressively pre-sold a year before expected
completion date by Market Directors, Inc. The new market
segment which Haseko hopes to understand lies somewhere in
between the Belgravia and Cliff Heights. The marketing firm
"has a different philosophy, of extensive pre-selling, which
by experience seems sensible to us,"(92) says Hiro Higashi,
who served as Haseko's project manager on the Belgravia as
well as the present site.
These New York projects suggest that Haseko is
proceeding to learn the subtle distinctions of New York
condominium markets as groundwork for eventual full-product
capability. Such a strategy would be an extension of its
Japanese domestic experience and commitment to full-
service, high-tech residential development. It believes it
can establish a niche for full-service capability because it
has found no comparable service in New York, where buyers
confront a confusing array of brokers, bankers, and building
managers. The scope of its U.S. projects has purposefully
ranged from Hawaiian hotels to New Jersey townhouses, and
from luxury Manhattan condominiums to moderate California
rental units. Haseko contributes capital in return for
project experience and marketing know-how, and is taking the
initial steps toward implementing a horizontal strategy
similar in scope to those of other Japanese construction
firms. These strategies aim to create market conditions in
which real estate development businesses can thrive on
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integrated service transactions rather than traditional
build-and-sell relationships.
Conclusions
The United States will be the principal arena for
overseas activities of major Japanese contractors in the
future. The U.S. market presents a unique range of
opportunities for companies to implement full-project
service businesses in all categories of development
activity. Japanese construction companies have adopted
ambitious horizontal strategies aimed at penetrating the
real estate development business, because they do not
believe that construction alone can overcome entry barriers
nor become a separate, profitable business. It will,
however, be employed to drive a number of peripheral, new
businesses such as land development, planning, construction
management services, building technology, and property
management. Japanese contractors are convinced that
integrated project services will bring comparative advantage
and help to differentiate them from many highly fragmented
real estate development competitors. It is their key
business objective.
Strong incentives exist for Japanese general
contractors to engage in overseas activities. Scarcity of
available land, shrinking property investment returns, and
construction industry overcapacity in Japan have
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incrementally pushed contractors to international projects.
Importantly, contract awards for public sector projects
depend, in part, on steady construction volume which can be
supplemented by strong overseas billings. overseas projects
boost rankings of top companies which follow each other's
activities closely and are especially sensitive to changes
in position. For example, although international contracts
have historically been a small portion of a large
contractor's billings (less than 3%), Kumagai-Gumi set a
precedent in 1985 by achieving number-one ranking on the
basis of strong (21% of total) overseas activity. There is
an historic gearing-up in the industry for increased foreign
work.
The Japanese government has historically assisted key
industrial expansion into foreign markets, and will promote
overseas construction company success. Further, contractors
are relatively free of cumbersome MOF restrictions such as
those placed on financial institution foreign investment.
The construction industry is among Japan's most important
contributors to GNP, and employs almost 10% of the stable
workforce.
Direct foreign investment of Japanese manufacturers in
U.S. facilities will provide a transitional source of
revenue for contractors over the immediate future, and will
school organizations in land use planning, regulatory
constraints, political negotiations, supplier relationships,
and labor disputes. Japanese banks and multinational trading
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companies will provide financial backing and market
knowledge to construction companies. Financing ability
provides access to the development process, which in turn
permits Japanese construction companies to define goals,
structure capabilities, and position resources.
Many domestic characteristics of the Japanese
construction industry, such as cost structure and
competitive relationships, cannot be transferred to the U.S.
market. Contractors are aware that favorable exchange
rates and excess liquidity provide an immediate boost for
long-range objectives, but are not content to invest in a
passive manner.
Joint ventures with established developers are a
strategic alternative currently used by most Japanese
contractors to begin business in the U.S. Active project
involvement allows contractors to overcome entry barriers
and learn the processes of competition in the development
business. It provides invaluable perspective from which
Japanese construction companies can adjust horizontal
strategies. Joint ventures form relationships and -share
responsibilities, and set a context in which Japanese
contractors can overcome difficult cultural obstacles.
It is uncertain whether Japanese construction firms
can achieve their ambitious objectives for the U.S. real
estate development business. Industries open to competition
are usually distinguished by either high-growth environments
or scant proprietary information. The legendary entrance of
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Japanese automakers and television producers to the U.S.
market involved the export of domestically developed
Japanese competencies, such as lower costs, durability,
innovation, and quality. The domestic U.S. construction and
development industries present an entirely differing
scenario, in which Japanese entrants must make substantial
adjustments to the local marketplace. We believe that many
of these adjustments will be made by means of intense joint
venture activity on many projects throughout the U.S.
Successful projects increasingly depend on, and benefit
from, a coordinated approach of large, fully integrated
development companies. Japanese construction companies have
historically prospered along these lines, both at home and
abroad. They will commit substantial resources to create a
demand for full service U.S. real estate services in the
future.
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Chapter V:
Real Estate Development Companies & Trading Companies
"It's a wilderness out there...
if you cannot find a buyer,
you're lost."
N. Ide
Property and Service
Business Group
Mitsui & Co., Ltd.
"We have been involved in Real
Estate for 20 years, we think we
understand this business."
Kenichi Tsuboi
Property and Service
Business Group
Mitsui & Co., Ltd.
Overview
Japanese real estate development companies began
operating in California, Arizona and Texas in the early
1970s as land and residential subdivision developers.
Although some are investors, their primary focus is sales
development of land, homes, commercial and industrial
property. These companies generate U.S. development
investment opportunities for their own account, for Japanese
institutional and individual capital sources, and provide
joint venture funding for domestic U.S. real estate
developers. Leading firms such as Mitsui Fudosan, Mitsubishi
Estate and Sumitomo Realty are associated with huge
banking/trading concerns of the same names, but operate
independently of group-wide corporate management.
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By comparison, trading companies such as Mitsui & Co.,
Mitsubishi and Sumitomo form the hub of massive
multinational corporations which are not oriented to real
estate, but are intermediaries of goods and services in
international markets. They have traditionally managed the
overseas activities of virtually all Japanese manufacturers,
investors and financial institutions. Japanese investment in
the U.S., in securities, industrial plants and real estate,
is expected to double in 1986 and trading companies want to
play a role in the process. Although they may be somewhat
unfamiliar with individual activities, such as real estate
and financial services, Professor Michael Yoshino observes
in The Invisible Link that trading companies adjust to new
opportunities in order to survive as intermediaries:
. . . The basic strategy of a sogo shosha (trading
company) must be to build series of relationships with
major as well as minor actors. . . and always be
searching for new business opportunities to add to its
existing array of services to specific clients. It also
means that the sogo shosha must constantly strive to
identify the emerging points of greatest leverage over
a particular product system and then undertake
activities, such as research or investment, that give
them influence or control over those points.(emphasis
added)(93)
Trading company interest in U.S. real estate is based upon
adopting an intermediary role between Japanese and U.S. real
estate participants. They want to find, analyze, finance,
manage and market all types of U.S. real estate for every
kind of Japanese client. Trading companies view real estate
as "an emerging point of leverage" among a number of new
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intermediary activities which result from increased Japanese
investment in the U.S.
Real estate development companies need outlets for the
investment opportunities which they create. Trading
companies require real estate product for their vast network
of Japanese investors. Each performs a complementary role
in matching Japanese capital with U.S. real estate
opportunity.
Real estate development companies possess an important
comparative advantage over other U.S.-based Japanese real
estate companies because of their links to major
multinational financial/trading conglomerates such as
Mitsubishi, Mitsui and Sumitomo, as well as the fact that
their activities are not severely restricted by Japanese MOF
authorities. Over time they have accumulated development
experience and U.S. real estate know-how which in many ways
is superior to that of other prominent Japanese
participants in U.S. real estate markets. Real estate
development companies have in-house expertise for varied
activities such as residential development, income-producing
joint ventures and project consulting. Moreover, while real
estate companies are engaged in an effort to build up each
of these businesses to profitable self-sufficiency, they
likewise have a fiduciary-type objective to invest, develop,
and sell for others. They intend to provide diverse
development and investment alternatives for many types of
Japanese client institutions and individuals. Some will
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attempt to provide these services directly to Japanese
clients, whereas the larger firms will use affiliated
trading companies to intermediate the investor developer
process.
Background History
The U.S. real estate activity of both development and
trading companies occurs within the context of an evolving
pattern of Japanese direct foreign investment. Prior to 1972
virtually all forms of overseas investment were restricted
by the Ministry of Finance. Foreign investment was limited
to raw materials, natural resources, and small scale
manufacturing in developing countries targeted for Japanese
government bilateral aid. Japanese overseas activity
differed historically from that of western countries such as
the U.S., Britain, West Germany and France because
penetration of foreign markets was promoted by sophisticated
export products rather than direct overseas investment in
plant and equipment.
Foreign investment strategies were led by major
financial/trading firms, termed "Zaibatsu" (zai=business,
batsu=group), which managed Japan's traditional supply
dependence overseas and either controlled or coordinated
every aspect of foreign involvement by Japanese client
companies. Author Edwin Reischauer notes in The Japanese
that:
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Japan entered its modern period with a complex, even if
pre-industrial, economy. There was a unified nationwide
market, banking institutions were well developed, large
family enterprises like Mitsui operated in several
regions and diverse fields, such as banking and dry
goods...The distinctive new Japanese economic institution
that first caught the attention of the outside world was
the zaibatsu system, as this had developed by the 1920s.
The zaibatsu were the great commercial and industrial
combines, which embraced a remarkably large proportion of
the upper level of the economy.. .The four greatest
zaibatsu combines were Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and
Yasuda. . . (which) spread widely across the fields of
banking, manufacturing, mining, shipping, and foreign
marketing. Each centered around its own bank, which
financed the component parts. Another key institution was
the general trading company (sogo shosha), which started
in foreign trade...(94)
Real estate development companies and trading companies
share a common zaibatsu heritage. The development companies
were originally formed to administer the domestic Japanese
real estate holdings of the zaibatsu families and, during
the 1930s, became Japan's forerunner of modern property
management and brokerage firms. Nowadays firms such as
Mitsui Real Estate and Mitsubishi Estate are among the
largest property owners, managers and brokers in Japan; as
of March 1985, Mitsubishi Estate, owner of 24.6 million
square feet, was by far Japan's largest property owner,
while Mitsui (13.7 million square feet) was the third
largest.(95) The trading companies continue to act as the
centerpieces of pre-World War II conglomerate umbrellas
described by Yoshino as follows:
A holding company extended over a network of
subsidiaries and affiliates, through linkages of
intercorporate stockholdings, interlocking
directorates, management help, personnel
transfers, and bank credit. operating decisions
for the subsidiaries and affiliates were made by
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American occupation forces dissolved the formal holding
company ties in 1946, splitting off the real estate
development and trading companies from ownership by zaibatsu
group banks. Individual companies were incorporated under
separate charters with independent managements. Today former
zaibatsu banks, trading companies and real estate
development companies, many of which share the same
corporate names, operate in close informal cooperation with
each other through interlocking corporate ownership
patterns. Real estate development companies provide U.S.
development projects for trading companies to market in
Japan, either directly to clients or via small investor
commingled funds. Trading companies have extensive, long-
established business contacts in the U.S. and can introduce
development companies to developers and entrepreneurs.
Zaibatsu banks such as Mitsubishi, Sumitomo and Fuji
(formerly Yasuda zaibatsu) are among the largest in the
world and stand behind the efforts of both trading and real
estate development companies. These long-standing inter-
company (but intra-zaibatsu) linkages can be potent forces
in connecting Japanese capital to real estate opportunity.
Real Estate Development Companies
Real estate development companies began operations in
Hawaii and California prior to the arrival of most other
Japanese real estate investors and contractors now active in
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the U.S. marketplace. Establishment of a U.S. development
business offered an "emerging point of leverage" in U.S.-
based real estate businesses for bank, trading and property
management arms of the former zaibatsu groups. The group
idea was to strategically position these companies over an
extended period in U.S. real estate development businesses
so that they would be able to generate development
opportunities in geographically diverse markets for Japanese
institutional and individual investors. Establishing a
foothold in this business was perceived as a long-term
effort because Japanese executives and investors share a
common perception that the U.S. development business is
quite risky. "Although experience is helpful in consistently
choosing above-average investment properties, it is
absolutely essential to be able to cope with the high risk
of on-going development," observed Toshio Koga, Manager of
Planning and Development for Toyo Real Estate Co., the
development arm of Sanwa Bank.(97) Trading companies could
complement and coordinate, rather than compete against, the
efforts of these Japanese real estate development companies
in the U.S.
Trading Companies
The process of bringing Japanese capital together with
U.S. real estate investment will be managed by zaibatsu-
related trading companies, because they can provide access
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to medium-to-large scale Japanese investors and channel
funds to real estate development companies in the U.S. It
is an intermediary service similar to the one they have
traditionally offered in the now-declining export sector.
Different trading companies will accomplish this
objective, however, through distinct approaches to the U.S.
real estate development and investment process. Yet,
although a common strategy for the development business does
not exist even among the largest trading firms, some similar
patterns of trading company real estate objectives are
beginning to emerge. A few large trading companies, such as
Mitsui and Sumitomo, want to concentrate on brokerage
rather than direct investment and partnership involvement in
development projects. Some of these trading firms invested
in Californian and Hawaiian income-producing properties in
the early 1970s. They acknowledge, however, that many
ventures have not been profitable. These trading firms made
initial approaches to the marketplace without a clear idea
of objectives or eventual goals. "The attitude was 'OK,
let's buy a property and study it'," admits Kunio Ohsawa
of Sumitomo Corporation.(98) Today, most are turning
attention to finding, rather than investing in existing
properties and development projects. Although they will co-
venture on U.S. projects with Japanese client firms which
are new to the U.S. market, they intend for this direct role
to be a temporary means for establishing intermediary
relationships in the U.S. real estate business.
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Alternatively, other trading companies such as C. Itoh
& Co. pursue co-venture development projects for their own
account. In 1985, for example, C. Itoh & Co. increased the
value of its U.S. development projects from $50 million to
$375 million. "We are unique because we take leadership
roles on our projects," stresses Hiroshi Abe, General
Manager of Overseas Construction and Contracting at C.Itoh &
Co. in Tokyo. "If a developer has a good project we must be
able to analyze it ourselves rather than depend on a bank or
consultant, because Japanese clients look to us for
guidance."(99)
Both of these approaches underlie, albeit through
differing means, the basic intermediary role of the trading
companies. It is a role with which trading companies are
comfortable and confident. "I joined this company 27 years
ago," observed N. Ide of Mitsui & Co., "when cement, sugar,
and rubber were key businesses; later, textiles dominated,
but they have also dropped away, . . . now, real estate.
There is no difference, except its immobility."(100)
Inter-Company and Intra-Zaibatsu Relations
Relations between real estate development companies and
trading firms may lead to vertically-integrated development
activities by zaibatsu-group companies. Since World War II
the major businesses of the zaibatsu holding companies have
operated with what might best be termed "coordinated
autonomy." There is potential for group-related businesses
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to impact on U.S. real estate projects at different stages
of the development process. For example, whereas Mitsubishi
Estate (the development company) may not have a strict
reporting relationship to the board of directors of the
Mitsubishi Bank or the Mitsubishi Trading Company, each real
estate project it undertakes in the U.S. is nonetheless
likely to be affected in some fashion by other businesses in
the Mitsubishi Group. A Portland, Oregon office tower
project in which Mitsubishi Estate invested was partially
funded by a group-related insurance company, Meiji Mutual
Life. The trading company marketed steel and elevators for
the building to the U.S. contractor, and portions of the
project may eventually be sold off as securities to the
Mitsubishi Banks' client base. Marketing of the securities
will be accomplished by the financial services division of
the Mitsubishi Bank.
There are many other aspects in which group-related
companies can contribute to a project. For example, Mitsui &
Co. Finance Inc., (trading company affiliate) was recently
formed to provide "financial services to Mitsui-related
companies in the U.S. and Canada, and for Japanese companies
making direct investments in these countries." (101) These
services will include residential mortgage financing,
general construction loans, and intelligent-building
construction financing. Additionally, Mitsui U.S.A. (trading
company subsidiary) has recently formed a venture capital
fund with U.S. investors, Japanese banks, and the Shimizu
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America Corporation for the purpose of technology
application to a variety of projects, among them intelligent
buildings.
Two brief overviews of zaibatsu group companies engaged
in U.S. real estate-related businesses, and the relation
between the development and trading companies operating in
the U.S., suggest future patterns of group interrelations in
the U.S. real estate market:
a) Mitsui Real Estate Development Co., Ltd. (MRED) is
the real estate development operation arm of the Mitsui
Group. It is just one of many Mitsui-group companies engaged
in real estate activities, as the following list
demonstrates:
Company
Mitsui Matsushima Co., Ltd.
Mitsui Construction Co., Ltd.
Mitsui Harbour & Urban
Construction,Ltd.
Mitsui Home Co., Ltd.
Mitsui Lumber Co., Ltd.
Mitsui Road Co., Ltd.
Mitsui Real Estate Sales Co.,
Ltd.
Mitsui Real Estate Development
Co., Ltd.
Business (principal
and otherwise)
Real Estate Services
Construction/Engineering
Land development;
construction materials
Land sales; design;
construction, and sale of
housing
Building materials
Civil Engineering
Commercial/Residential
Brokerage
Real Estate Development
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Mitsui Kanko Development
Co., Ltd. Commercial/Residential
Hotel Management
Sunland Co., Ltd. Recreational Development
and Management
Source: (102)
The trading company began U.S. real estate activities as a
strict investor, but has shifted to co-venturing development
projects as a transitional step in the direction of
providing intermediary real estate services such as
brokerage. For example, Mitsui & Co., Ltd. (trading firm)
initially entered into Southern California development
projects in the early 1970s. After mixed financial
performance on some projects, such as the Portman-designed
Bonaventure Hotel in Los Angeles, the development business
was largely entrusted to MRED's U.S. subsidiary, Mitsui
Fudosan. In addition to development activities, the
development company later expanded into investments. It owns
two prominent Manhattan office towers, as well as the
Crocker Bank Center and adjacent land in Los Angeles.
Mitsui & Co.(trading company) is currently involved in
high-tech communications ventures with the Enhanced Network
Services group of AT&T, a part of which operates out of the
AT&T Center, a Los Angeles office building recently
purchased by MRED and the Dai-ichi Life Insurance Company.
MRED (development company) generally assumes a joint venture
partnership position in these purchases, but is brought to
the joint venture by Mitsui & Co.(trading company). However,
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occasionally Mitsui & Co. (trading company) will be
obligated to ease U.S. market entry for a Japanese client
via direct joint venture participation, which provides the
client with a degree of comfort in the unfamiliar U.S.
market environment. For example, Mitsui & Co. has recently
arranged and invested in a joint venture with Shimizu
Construction Company and a local developer in a Phoenix,
Arizona office park and hotel/recreational facility. Shimizu
had desired to become involved in the fast-growing Southwest
area, and Mitsui & Co. (trading company), which maintains
offices in Dallas/Fort worth, El Paso, Phoenix, and Los
Angeles was able to prospect on a Sunbelt area-wide basis to
find an appropriate match of project with developer and
investor.
b) The Sumitomo Realty & Development Company (SRDC) is
the real estate development arm of the Sumitomo Group which
began U.S. operations in 1973 with a Hawaiian hotel project.
It then moved on to Southern California residential
subdivision development and sales, before further
diversifying into commercial properties in 1983. Only after
ten years of development projects did it invest in existing
U.S. property, but less for strategic than financial
reasons. It purchased a New York City office building in
1985, according to Yoshiteru Nishimoto, Executive Vice
President of East Coast operations, "because we foresaw a
downturn in the profitability of the California residential
development business and wanted to protect ourselves from
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the cyclical nature of the development business."(103)
SRDC's principal focus remains real estate development, and
in a fashion similar to Mitsui Real Estate Development
Company's, they view their sister trading company (Sumitomo
Corporation) as a means to eventually market U.S. real
estate product in Japan. For example, the company has
recently co-ventured a $20 million mixed-used commercial
center in Ontario, California, portions of which it desires
to syndicate in the future. "We would like to begin to
liquefy our investments," observes Takaaki Ono, SRDC's
Overseas Business Director and former head of the U.S.
operation, "and obviously the Sumitomo Bank and Trading
Corporation could handle the marketing and distribution
aspects with the Japanese investors."(104) The New York City
investment could likewise be sold or syndicated to a wide
range of Sumitomo Corporation (trading company) Japanese
clients.
The Sumitomo Group's trading company, Sumitomo
Corporation, is primarily an investor in U.S. real estate,
but appears to be moving toward an intermediary role similar
to that of Mitsui & Co. (trading company). It boasts, like
the Mitsui Group, of a wide range of real estate activities
and services. For example, Sumitomo Corporation's (trading
company) 1985 annual report describes its group's
Construction and Real Estate Division "as investor,
developer, contractor, and investment consultant for real
estate and construction operations in domestic and overseas
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markets. This division is engaged in real estate businesses
and in the construction of private homes, condominiums,
offices, shopping centers and industrial facilities."(105)
The Sumitomo America Corporation (trading company
subsidiary) owns the 42-story, 600 Third Avenue building in
New York City, has developed an office tower and hotel
complex in Hawaii, and purchased industrial warehouse
properties in Houston and Kansas City. The Sumitomo
Corporation (trading company) is investing in U.S. real
estate in order to satisfy Japanese investor appetite for
existing U.S. property opportunities. The SRDC (development
company) is poised to develop U.S. real estate projects that
can be sold by the Sumitomo Corporation (trading company) in
Japan to these same institutional and individual investors.
A closer look at Mitsui Fudosan will help highlight
many of the underlying motivations and goals of Japanese
real estate development companies active in the U.S. market.
Case Study: Mitsui Real Estate Development Company, Ltd.
Corporate Heritage
Mitsui Real Estate Development Company, Ltd. ("MRED")
owns 14 million square feet of office space in Japan, an
inventory which is exceeded only by landlords Mitsubishi
Estate (25 million) and Nippon Life (17 million). Its FY
1985 assets of $4.025 billion would rank it in the top half
of the Fortune 500, ahead of such companies as TRW, NCR,
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Reynolds Metals and Delta Airlines. Moreover, with 75% of
its land holdings carried at book value, asset value is
understated on the balance sheet.
In the past, MRED's principal activities in Japan were
development oriented. Income-producing property was largely
represented by office buildings held for rental income and
long-term appreciation. Sales or short-term investment were
not a principal component of the MRED modus operendi, a
philosophy consistent with that of most Japanese real estate
investors who, whether large or small, generally share a
strong disinclination towards selling real estate.
In the early 1980s, however, MRED began to formulate a
new corporate strategy. The Japanese economy had slowed and
office leasing stagnated, so MRED's board sought to
diversify corporate activities. This included, where
appropriate, the development and sale of office buildings.
In the 1984 annual report, Mr. Hajime Tsuboi wrote, " .
increasingly diverse strategies are becoming essential.
Until recently, most energies have been directed toward
building construction and leasing. Now, the Company is
expanding its scope of operations into such diverse areas as
sales of office buildings [and] construction and management
of hotels .... "(106) This goal to effect a more blended
portfolio was stated even more explicitly in another section
of the annual report:
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In the real estate industry, maintaining a healthy
balance between sales and income requires constant and
careful consideration. It is no longer desirable to
concentrate solely on leasing buildings, a long-term
capital investment. This area must be complemented by
the construction and development of buldings for sale, a
short-term capital investment. As a result,
profitability will be raised, and income flow will
become more stable. In other words, we at Mitsui Real
Estate believe that a long-term stable income source in
the form of leasing activities supplemented by short-
term capital gains anticipated from our new area of
operations is the best combination to ensure continuing
prosperity. (emphasis added)(107)
U.S. Activities
MRED's activities in the U.S. are largely defined by
policy set in Tokyo. The long-term strategic plan calls for
the development and sale of a small number of select U.S.
properties. Sales-oriented activities have yet to be
implemented in the U.S., however, in large part because MRED
executives want to learn all facets of the American
development process before putting the firm's name on the
line.
MRED opened its U.S. subsidiary, Mitsui Fudosan ("MF")
in 1972 in Los Angeles, and subsequently expanded to New
York in 1983. Among the thirteen recorded real estate
transactions in which MRED and MF have participated are the
following:
1. The AT & T Tower -- a 1 million square foot office
in L.A. Equity purchase with Dai-Ichi Life (Date of
completion/execution:1984).
2. Palomar Airport Business Park -- a 340-acre
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business park near San Diego (1984).
3. The Hyde Park Hotel -- a 16-story Manhattan hotel
at 77th and Madison which is currently being refurbished
(1984).
4. Suburban Chicago office building -- a $48 million
participating permanent loan, from which MF receives
coupon yield plus cash flow and future sale
upsides (1985).
5. Development project -- a planned 260,000-square foot
office building at the corner of 40th and Fifth in
Manhattan. MF will co-develop and has a forward
purchase commitment. (1987).
Mitsui Fudosan desires to assemble an American
portfolio that is risk-diversified (by property type,
investment vehicle, development stage and region) at the
same time that it creates opportunities to gain first-hand
experience for maximum educational benefit. The projects
noted above confirm such dual objectives. For example, the
Hyde Park hotel project, in which MF is a limited partner
with a New York developer, adds a hotel to the portfolio
while enabling management to witness a thorough renovation
job and assess its impact upon hotel operations. Financing
arrangements test their ability to underwrite deals in new
and distant markets, as well as innovate an investment
facility which is unprecedented among Japanese investors.
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The 40th & Fifth office project, in which MF is a general
partner, will test its ability to develop a major Manhattan
office building.
There are two components to this educational process.
First, like its principal competitors (Mitsubishi and
Sumitomo), MRED categorically supports learning experiences
which familiarize them with U.S. business methods and
markets. This is evident in the educational backgrounds of
management; among the ten or so individuals currently
assigned to the U.S. is a senior executive who was educated
at Cornell Business School and a junior executive who is
matriculated at Harvard Business School. Their knowledge of
Americans and the U.S. real estate market is impressive by
any standards.
Second, MRED wants to learn about many different
investment products and vehicles, for they intend ultimately
to export such techniques back to Japan. The Japanese real
estate market has neither the sophisticated financial
instruments nor the varied techniques of the U.S. market.
In an article appearing in a Mitsui & Co. market update
report, a Japanese real estate analyst writes that "the
United States and Europe are still far ahead of Japan in the
real estate industry, so it is very likely that the
opportunity to gain broader experience is part of the allure
for Japanese companies to move abroad." (108) MRED believes
that participants in the Japanese real estate market desire
to utilize such advanced techniques, a belief reconfirmed by
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the reaction to their Chicago participating loan. "When
word got out that we had placed the [heretofore
unprecedented] loan on the Chicago office building, many
Japanese banks and securities companies contacted us for
details," claimed an MRED executive in the Tokyo
office.(109) MRED prides itself on innovation and speed.
"A solid understanding of market needs, an eye for new
opportunites, and most importantly, the flexibility to
respond quickly and creatively" are corporate
characteristics which the company lauds.(110) When dealing
in an overseas market, however, the risks attending the
practice of such traits may be high. Nonetheless, MRED
considers such risk essential to both the educational and
long-term investment exercise.
Strategy, Strengths, and Weaknesses
Real estate development companies have expertise and
knowledge in differing aspects of the business, such as land
banking and development, residential subdivision and sales,
and industrial property prospecting and development. Until
recently, large commercial office projects have been an
exception rather than a rule for most group-related as well
as smaller, independent development companies. For example,
Mitsubishi Estate (development company) has developed the
following residential projects over a ten-year period in the
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U.S.:
Houston, TX 470 single family lots on 122 acres
1981 Commercial center on 14 acres
Atlanta, GA 300 single family lots on 174 acres
1982 Commercial strip center on 6 acres
110 single family lots on 89 acres
Palm Beach, FL 120 single family lots on 115 acres
1983 10 Condominiums on 5 acres
In 1984, Mitsubishi Estate co-ventured a 736,000-square-foot
office tower in Portland, Oregon with Meiji Mutual Life, a
zaibatsu group-related insurance company.
For all of these organizations, practical experience
has seasoned management and places them in an exceptional
position to generate geographically diverse development
projects for Japanese investors. Additionally, development
company managements have experienced good and bad times in
the U.S. real estate business, and in many cases were
fortunate to be able to shift away from regional markets
before boom conditions turned to bust environments. Takaaki
Ono, Director of Overseas Business at Sumitomo Realty, and
Akihiro Inouye, Overseas Business Manager at Mitsubishi
Estate, have each spent over 12 years in a variety of
development assignments, and consider themselves local U.S.
developers. "I know what will sell, where it should be
built, and who is best qualified to build it," noted Ono,
"and I understand equally well the dynamics of the Southern
California market."(111)
Real estate development companies are confident that
119
project capabilities will permit lucrative tie-ins to
Japanese investors through trading company contacts. "We
used to leave details to general partners, but no longer,"
cautions Mitsubishi Estate's Akihiro Inouye. "We now have
experience and alternatives in each market area. We
believe," he adds in referring to future trading company
links, "tthat these companies will come witn us."(ll2)
The fact that development companies have learned about
the U.S. real estate development process liberates trading
companies to concentrate on recognized strengths for selling
and brokering, rather than building or buying. Therefore,
although strategies and objectives have occasionally
overlapped between real estate development companies and
trading firms, there appears to be an increased awareness on
the part of each of the benefits involved in coordinating
long-term goals and the means used to achieve them. Trading
firms are moving from direct investment and project
involvement to concentrate on intermediary and transactional
aspects of the real estate business. "Trading companies are
getting away from long-term return situations with which
they are basically unfamiliar and uncomfortable," advises
Makoto Kaimasu, construction and real estate securities
analyst for the Nomura Research Institute in Tokyo, a
division of Japan's largest securities trading firm. "They
are aiming for brokerage as a strategic direction for
involvement in U.S. real estate."(113) Trading companies are
neither accustomed to holding assets nor comfortable in the
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production phase of products, but are rather buyers and
sellers of goods. As such, they want to clearly define and
limit the extent of their involvement in the U.S. real
estate business. "Recall that a trading company has few
depreciable assets," cautions Sumitomo's Ohsawa, "and that
until the 1970s, even after 30 years of U.S. activity, we
just started to think about depreciation!"(114) "The
trading company is in the business of organizing," states
Mitsui & Co.'s Ide, "so that we foresee three distinct
stages of involvement: development, brokerage, and
securitization."(115) Having decided to pass stage one to
development companies, the trading companies are emphasizing
the second stage of involvement.
Both development and trading companies possess
complementary strengths and weaknesses. Development
companies do not have mechanisms to bring their projects
directly to Japanese investors, because investment packages
must be brokered through banks, securities firms, and
trading companies. Alternatively, trading companies have not
had great success in generating development opportunities
for the sources of capital which they are uniquely capable
of channeling. Zaibatsu group companies are increasingly
aware that strategies may be coordinated by promoting
trading company sales of development company projects, and
development company access to trading company sources of
capital. This is a way for both kinds of company to
eliminate the significant weakness and avoidable costs of
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failing to focus on available strengths.
Conclusion
our treatment of Japanese real estate activity in the
U.S. encompasses a diverse range of participants.
Development companies are positioned to substantially
increase the size and scope of real estate projects
available for investment by principally institutional
investors in Japan. They have been active developers in the
U.S. for longer than any other category of Japanese real
estate concerns. They now have the product and require a
distribution mechanism. Meanwhile, trading companies are
withdrawing gradually from direct investment in order to
concentrate on marketing, rather than generating, real
estate products for investors. It is an appropriate match.
Trading companies occupy a unique place in the spectrum
of buyers and sellers of properties and developers of
projects. The trading firms are moving into the basic
service of putting capital together with investment
opportunities. "Bankers have a limited audience, they have
only their depositors," suggested Ide of Mitsui, "but we are
connected to almost everyone."(116) They will operate on the
development side of real estate through a relatively small
group of zaibatsu-related development firms.
Successful coordination of development companies with
investors will create an important, and as yet unrealized,
product segment within the Japanese market for U.S. real
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estate. Currently, it is presenting opportunities for the
large as well as medium and smaller-sized institutions; in
the future, they will intermediate for the huge individual
investor market which is analyzed ahead in chapter
five. There is potential for an integrated chain of
investment and development, with Japanese investors setting
parameters, trading companies determining markets, and
development companies providing varied projects. It is
within the proven capabilities of major zaibatsu concerns to
manage this process of real estate capital allocation and
investment.
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Chapter V:
Small Investors:
An Overlooked Market Coming Of Age
"There are countless people who wish to
invest in U.S. real estate. The problem
is finding the product. What we need are
American developers to present us with
product."
Hideo Niou
President
Jones Lang Wootton (KK)
This section treats, in an omnibus fashion, the
subject of investment in U.S. real estate by smaller
Japanese investors, including individuals. Examples of such
investment and potential areas of opportunity for Americans
will be reviewed.
Partially because such U.S. investment is a
new and untested area, market segmentation is not well
defined in terms of prospective investors or sorts of
vehicles available. But although there is disagreement
among some observers as to the "investor profiles" within
this sector, almost all agree that it is a sector which
holds a huge potential for capital inflow into U.S. realty.
Investor Personality Traits and Investment Biases
"Small investors" are small-to-medium non-financial
corporations, closely-held companies, high-net-worth individuals,
and middle-income individuals. Not surprisingly, there are
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investment disparities among these groups.
Notwithstanding such differences, however, the investment
personalities of these groups show a correlation on most issues.
Among these are the following:
a. Such investors are increasingly edgy about investing
in Japanese real estate. While they used to be quite
comfortable with reasonable 4%-6% yields and capital
appreciation, they are finding it difficult to tolerate
the current 1%-2% yields. Furthermore, the high gross
entry costs put much real estate beyond the means of
such investors. The allure of America's 8%-10% yields
is great, as is the potential availability of product
of varying price ranges within a large market and
stable country.
b. Small investors have found it difficult to locate
appealing and affordable U.S. product, and they believe
that only those products offered by "name" institutions
can be treated without skepticism. Yet, such
institutions are disinclined to trade in small
investment magnitudes, due to diseconomies of scale.
The result: a severe shortfall in supply of "endorsed"
product.
c. These Japanese are unfamiliar with most American
cities, with the exception of Honolulu, Los Angeles, San
Francisco and Manhattan. This is not to say that they
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have not heard of Dallas, Chicago, Philadelphia and,
certainly, Washington, D.C., but the Japanese are no
more familiar with their location or respective city
dynamics than Americans are familiar with, say,
Yokohama, Osaka, Nagasaki and Kyoto. Such unfamiliarity
breeds reluctance and suspicion, and dissuades
investment.
d. The preferred real estate product is urban office
buildings, but not so exclusively as with larger
institutions. Other kinds of products may appeal to
small investors who are personally familiar with the
their operation in Japan. Second homes in Hawaii,
though not investment-driven purchases, have been
popular.
e. Japanese are unfamiliar with partnerships as legal
vehicles for investment (although, if passage of the
germane provisions of the Senate version of the new tax
bill takes place, such unfamiliarity may be moot as a
barrier). There is no legal concept of partnership
within Japanese law. Thus, deals which call for special
allocations to various partners for tax reasons and the
like are unacceptable. Importantly, such investors are
not favorably disposed towards shared ownership. "They
want to see their property -- they don't want a
percentage of a pool. There's some mystique to
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ownership."(117) They prefer direct investment in hard
real estate assets rather than financial securities.
f. These individuals are not market risk-takers. They
prefer to wait not only until larger and more
knowledgeable institutions have invested in a market,
but also until the verdict is in. "[They want] to be
close to where Mitsui and others have put their money
down. In other words, we find them wanting to be in
clusters ."(118) However . . . while slow to be
convinced, smaller investors, once comfortable with a
market, often exhibit a characteristic lacking in most
large institutions: the ability to make a quick
decision. "Any company owned by one person can make a
quick decision -- regardless of size."(119)
h. Difficulty in comprehending U.S. real estate goes
beyond regional unfamiliarity; it is compounded by
different investment and underwriting norms used by the
respective countries. For instance, the American norm
(and often, goal) of assigning the greatest amount of a
building's value to its improvements is contrary to the
Japanese valuation system, which places most of the
value in the underlying land -- a difference partially
explained by dramatic differences in the respective
depreciation schedules (U.S.: 19 years, likely to be
increased to 30 or more years under the proposed tax
bill; Japan: 65 years).
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i. There is growing moderation in the traditional
Japanese aversion towards selling real estate; real
estate is slowly being viewed as more of a transactional
commodity. Intermediaries who have worked with such
investors claim that they may be somewhat receptive to
deals calling for a shorter hold. This may be
particularly true of smaller investors because of their
relative freedom from "public perception" considerations
(specifically, "loss of face") which tends to inhibit
the sale of real estate.
In order to develop these and other points further, we
address the issue of "smaller investor" investment by
focusing upon the vehicles available to them: direct
investments, sponsored programs, and securitized real estate
and pooled funds.
Opportunities for Direct Investment
Japanese real estate investors of almost any size
generally prefer to own all of a small building than part of
a pool. "It's very difficult for them to invest in a basket
of properties." (120)
A principle deterrent to such acquisitions by Japanese
investors has been the absence of product -- particularly in
Manhattan. This shortage is largely a function of two
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factors: the disinterest of large institutions and brokers
for such product, together with a fairly efficient market
for such smaller properties in the U.S. More U.S.
individuals and institutions are interested in and capable
of acquiring properties costing $1 million-$15 million than
in the "mega-deals," and such investors often enjoy all of
the benefits coming with a home-field advantage.
Nonetheless, a corollary problem exists.
Notwithstanding the relative efficiency of the American
small property "market," situations exist where a
prospective American seller would find an even greater
demand for his product in Japan. Currently, however, few
mechanisms exist whereby American property owners can tap
into Japanese smaller investors.
Such truly global market inefficiencies create
opportunity. One who is attempting to capitalize upon such
opportunities is K.S. Wu, president of Peers & Company, a
U.S.-based merchant banking house devoted to facilitating
trade -- including real estate investment -- between the
U.S. and Japan. "My observation is that the bottleneck of
trade between the U.S. and Japan doesn't lie between multi-
nationals like IBM and Sony. The real bottleneck lies in
medium and small companies unable to find access on the
other side of the Pacific."(121) Peers & Co. employs
American and Asian employees with long backgrounds in
international business and investment banking. It also
takes advantage of both the capital and the market knowledge
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of the $ 73 billion Japan Long-Term Credit Bank (LTCB), a
shareholder in Peers. To date, most of its investments have
been in non-real estate fields, but Wu sees a growing market
demand for U.S. realty.
Not surprisingly, given such market barriers, together
with the disaggregation and lack of coordination within the
small-investor market, a variety of remedial steps are being
tried. Some companies have attempted to go directly into
the U.S. market, with apparently mixed success. A case in
point is the experience of Kato Kagaku Corporation's Masao
Kato, chairman of the Japanese malt syrup and cornstarch
manufacturer. "Spending a week in Manhattan to look for a
major hotel for sale, Kato learned of a few . . . possible
deals. But 'our negotiating partners didn't appear at the
appointed hours, and the selling prices were never fixed'."
(122) He returned to Japan empty-handed.
Another step has been the establishment of Japan-based
consulting firms which affiliate with an American consultant
or broker. One such company is Pacific Rim Research, Ltd.
(PRR). PRR acts strictly as an intermediary; furthermore,
it does not pretend to be a real estate expert, and relies
heavily upon advice obtained through a cooperative agreement
with the international law firm of Coudert Brothers in New
York, together with information obtained through other
American contacts. According to its marketing brochure,
current consulting activities by Pacific Rim Research
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include introducing "Japanese investors to investment
opportunities in United States, Western European and
Australian real estate and introduc[ing] foreign real estate
owners and developers from such jurisdictions to Japanese
investors."(123) The chief of the Tokyo office, Yoshinori
Takagi, claims that "we want to be known within the market
as being able to produce quick decisions." (124) PRR has
been in business for a number of years, but its office in
Japan is a new one; therefore, there is no track record on
which to judge its success. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy
that a company such as PRR has identified a market demand
for such intermediation.
A similar step is the opening of U.S. offices by
Japanese real estate companies which have established
networks of smaller-sized clients. In Japan, these companies
exhibit organizational structures and orientations somewhat
similar to a Century 21. Toyo Real Estate Company, which
has incorporated a U.S. subsidiary in Los Angeles, is one
such company. With an emphasis upon smaller properties, it
brokers "dwellings, small shopping centers, office
buildings, Hawaiian condominiums and other properties to
Japanese investors."(125) One typical Toyo activity is to
select "dwellings for Japanese residing in [L.A.), drawing
up a prospectus for each such home and soliciting rich
Japanese to become the owner."(126) Toyo's success clearly
demonstrates that a market for their services exists, and
that it is growing fast; "our 1986 commissions should double
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to $15 million," claims Toyo's vice president, Imao
Kawai.(127)
A Case Study of What a Small Investor Seeks 1001
Pennsylvania Avenue
In early 1986, Kokusai Kogyo, a Japanese aerial survey
company, purchased 10%-15% of the equity in a 700,000
square- foot, two-stage office building in Washington, D.C.
"The investment marks a significant milestone for the non-
institutional investor. This is the first-ever investment
by a non-institutional investor," claimed Daniel M. Murphy,
president of Lehndorff-Pacific, Inc., a subsidiary of the
major international consulting and brokerage firm, Lehndorff
U.S.A. While such a statement borders on hyperbole, the
Kokusai purchase is most significant for a number of
reasons.
First, the project represented the sort of "name"
project which Japanese investors prefer, and Kokusai saw
plenty of prestigious names on the project list.
Approximately 50% pre-leased upon opening, 1001 Pennsylvania
Avenue is a high-visibility building. It is equidistant
from the Capitol and the White House, was designed by highly
regarded Hartmann-Cox/Smith Segreti Tepper McMahon &
Hargred, and was developed by Cadillac Fairview. Other
equity investors include the pension funds of Kodak, United
Technologies, The World Bank and a British utility company.
The size of Kokusai's investment is estimated to fall in the
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$10-$20 million range, and was selected because "Kokusai
believes the United States to be the safest market and also
provides the best return on such investments."(128) Because
Kokusai is not a real estate company, its investment gives
testimony to the depth of Japanese demand for real estate as
a component of an investment portfolio.
Secondly, the purchase was facilitated by a strategic
plan that targets small investors. According to Murphy,
"Lehndorff formed an alliance with the Mitsui companies to
invest Japanese funds in U.S. properties to meet the growing
need of medium-to-small sized investors to invest their
surplus funds in attractive foreign assets."(empahasis
added)(129) He claims that Lehndorff is currently working
on two more deals "involving non-institutional investors."
(130)
Finally, the 1001 Pennsylvania Avenue purchase
gives an example of the role which Japanese firms can play
in such deals; in particular, Mitsui Trust & Banking (MTB),
which has Kokusai as a client, and Mitsui Real Estate Sales
(MRES), which is making a market in locating suitable
investment opportunities for smaller Japanese investors. In
this particular deal, Lehndorff contacted MRES to inform
them of the availability of the stake; MRES then contacted
its sister organization, which originally wanted to acquire
the stake for the portfolio of one of it pension fund
clients. Approval of the pension fund investment could not
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be obtained from the Ministry of Finance, however, so MTB
turned to Kokusai, another client, and the deal was quickly
done.
A closer look at Mitsui Real Estate Sales provides an
example of this small investor market and how it will be
serviced.
A Case Study of a Small Investor Intermediary: Mitsui Real
Estate Sales
"In Japan business society, the name of
the company is critically important.
Companies are eager to keep the good
name,so people trust it".
Takahiro Fujiwara
Vice President
Mitsui Fudosan (N.Y.), Inc.
Mitsui is one of the more heralded names in Japanese
real estate. And Mitsui Real Estate Sales, as one of the
many independent companies operating under the Mitsui
umbrella, enjoys substantial corporate goodwill.
Within Japan, MRES is best known for its domestic
residential and small properties brokerage business.
However, in 1982, a feasibility study identified a potential
demand by smaller Japanese investors for U.S. real estate.
As a result of these conclusions, an international
operations department ws formed.
In 1983, "we began to knock on the doors of the middle-
sized real estate holding companies in Japan, principally
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Tokyo," says Mayumi Oda, manager of MRES's international
operations department.(131) Despite these efforts, clients
were slow to respond. Most individuals were content to
invest in the market they knew best -- Tokyo. Yields at
that time were satisfactorily high, and real estate
opportunities were available. Furthermore, despite the
ackowledgement on the part of such prospective investors
that "the U.S. is the world's most stable country,"
discrepancies between the norms of the American and Japanese
markets "caused the Japanese big problems."(132) As a
result of these factors, little international business was
transacted in 1984, and Oda and his staff (eight individuals
in Tokyo, two in L.A.) used this time as an opportunity to
learn about the U.S. market.
Things began to change in 1985. Two macroeconomic
conditions began to make Japanese investment in U.S. real
estate a more desirable proposition for smaller investors.
First, the real estate market of Tokyo became superheated;
not only did prices, due in part to the involvement of large
companies, rise beyond the means of many smaller investors,
but yields (due to a host of factors, including governmental
rental accomodations policies which favor existing
commercial tenants) fell to 1%-2%. A related phenomenon was
that property, affordable or not, became less available;
"now, transactions are becoming less frequent and slower,
and the holding period is becoming even longer."(133)
Second, the yen, starting in late 1985, began a forty
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percent climb against the dollar. Combined with the market
constriction in Tokyo and other macroeconomic factors, the
currency-induced fall in U.S. real estate prices increased
interest in the product MRES was selling.
MRES acquires information about available U.S. real
estate through its staff in L.A., as well as through non-
exclusive brokerage relationships such as Cushman &
Wakefield or Jones Lang & Wootton. Properties which
satisfy its "investment standards" are generally urban
office buildings costing between $5 million - $10 million
and throwing off a going-in cash-on-cash yield in the nine
percent range; the internal rate of return, assuming a four
percent inflation factor and a nine percent cap, should be
approximately twelve percent.
Currently, most of the investment opportunities come to
MRES through brokers, while most of their Japanese customers
come in without having been solicited; they are either
referred by Mitsui Trust & Banking or other like
institutions, or respond to articles which publicize MRES'
efforts. "We don't have to pay for our ads," claims Oda.
"[The newspapers] write about us."(134)
But how does MRES deal with the bogeyman of Japanese
investors -- slow decision-making ? Slow decisions may be
even more fatal in the small property market, where a larger
number of prospective buyers exist. Even small Japanese
investors may be slow to make decisions. Furthermore, "many
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of them are first-time offshore investors. They are thus
very cautious, and they want to rely on somebody."(135)
MRES' answer is to acquire the desirable property in
its own name. This allows MRES time to find the appropriate
investor for the property, who will doubtless be comforted
by the MRES stamp of approval. MRES will then sell all of
the property to a single investor, parcel it off to two or
three investors as tenants-in-common, or hold onto all or
part of the property itself.
But how did MRES itself develop the ability to make
such decisions, in contravention of the traditional
decision-making norms ? "It was tough," admits Oda, and
for three years he and his staff had to conform to the
system. But by 1985, his department had developed in-house
investment criteria and experience which satisfied his
board, and since then Oda has enjoyed fairly broad
discretion on deals of up to $10 million.
In 1985, MRES transacted approximately $30 million in
sales. However, in 1986, the number is expected to more than
double into the $75 million - $100 million range. It is a
growth pattern which is likely to continue.
Sponsored Investments
Mitsui Real Estate Sales, while predominantly and
preferably acting as an intermediary on behalf of Japanese
investors, occasionally must act as a sort of sponsor. Such
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a role -- that is, where an investment advisor is also a
sort of merchant banker or equity co-venturer -- is being
evaluated by a number of large Japanese real estate
companies which are currently active in the U.S. market.
Such programs would be targeted towards the larger small
investors, such as small-to-medium sized companies and
second-tier institutions. However, given the sizable
capitalization and natural orientation of those firms
currently studying such programs, such as Mitsui Trading
Co., Mitsui Fudosan and Japan Long-Term Credit Bank, one
might wonder why they would trouble themselves with such
investment vehicles when they are fully equipped to buy on
their own account.
Some corporate representatives express ambivalence
about such sponsored programs. On the one hand, they view
such programs as an opportunity to enjoy significant returns
in the form of fees, return on equity and appreciation. It
is also a method by which they can gain greater market
exposure and expertise while concurrently laying off risk.
Most importantly, however, it is an opportunity to reinforce
existing client relationships by helping to introduce them
into a desirable market which they might not otherwise be
able to enter efficiently. "Many of our clients come to us
for advice on American real estate," claims an executive of
Japan Long-Term Credit Bank.(136)
Some of these representatives express trepidation about
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such programs targeted to the smaller investor. Most
concerns center around the issue of relationships, and more
specifically, the potential damage one might suffer in the
event a sponsored investment sours. One experienced
individual familiar with the issue noted:
[Working with small investors] is a two-edged
sword. Smaller investors tend to be less
sophisticated about real estate. They do not
understand that a pro forma is not a guarantee, not
written in stone. If actual performance falls even
slightly below our projections, I will get a
telephone call, and no matter how much I explain,
they will not be satisfied. They will say, "I
invested with you because of your [company's
reputation and] name. You should make me whole."
This is very serious, because Japan is not
a contractually based society. Very often we will
make investors whole, to protect the relationship
and our name.(137)
But, these companies are almost certainly going to give
such programs a try. Such cooperative efforts are not
completely without precedent; some companies have gotten
their feet wet by "sponsoring" investment opportunities
whereby pre-existing relationships are brought into a large-
scale joint venture. Nonetheless, many large institution
programs geared toward the smaller investor are still in the
planning stage. For Mitsui & Co. (trading company), small-
investor-oriented programs are "stage three" of a three-
stage strategic plan which is just beginning, while for
LTCB, such deals are stage two -- "about five years
away."(138)
Given the pendency of such programs, it is impossible
to precisely predict what form they will take. "It would
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probably be structured like a participating loan, where we
would take the lead position and would bring clients in as
participants," says a representative of LTCB. The likely
clients would be "smaller corporations and institutions --
not individuals, who are more disposed to securities with a
fixed return. "(139)
However, this same representative knew of two separate
programs currently being formulated to tap the Japanese
small institutional investor market. In one program, a
"famous American developer," in concert with a U.S.
investment bank, is creating a program targeted at such
investors; another developer, together with an investment
bank, is seeking to acquire a Manhattan office building by
raising capital in Japan. Unfortunately, the exact nature,
structure and goals of these vehicles "are still secret,"
and because they have not yet been booked, their relative
success cannot be measured.(140)
A novel way in which LTCB exploits this small
institutional investor market, and served its client base,
is through its investment in Peers & Co., the relatively
small (original capitalization: $12 million) merchant
banking house based in Washington, D.C. Formed to help
circumnavigate the "bottlenecks" which obstruct easy access
between smaller Japanese and American companies and
investors, its president notes that "I have started to
germinate this concept in business and investment banking.
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We tend to put our money where our mouth is, instead of just
putting deals [together] and earning fees from that."(141)
Thus, the current status of sponsored U.S. real estate
vehicles which are targeted towards smaller Japanese
corporate investors is just beginning. Most programs are
in the planning stage and are just now being offered.
Institutions which plan to one day offer such programs would
prefer to gain more experience in the U.S. market before
putting their name on a product targeted towards some of
their more valued customers.
Small Investor Securities and Pooled Funds
It can be seen from the preceding two sections that the
distinctions between different kinds of U.S. real estate
investment vehicles available to small-to-medium sized
corporations and institutions are somewhat blurred. Whether
a direct or a sponsored investment, such investors prefer
vehicles which bear the imprimatur of a reputable Japanese
or American institution, are in familiar locations and offer
high and predictable returns.
Investment instruments geared towards the small
individual investor are not any more distinctive or
adventurous; indeed, they are less so, with an even higher
orientation towards fixed-income annuities, yield security
and name underwriting than the relatively larger corporate
small investor.
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Ironically, most of the Japanese interest in U.S. real
estate-backed securitization has been pushed by the large
institutionals towards like-sized institutions rather than
smaller investors. The level of interest from both kinds of
investors appears to be growing. "While much of the initial
activity [in real estate securitization] was centered in
Europe, 'the Japanese are rapidly overtaking everyone else
...."(142) One of the biggest impediments to even greater
growth, however, is mere comprehension -- not only of the
American real estate market, but the secondary market, to
boot. Before such knowledge can trickle down to the "man in
the street," the Japanese brokers must both be educated and
convinced:
The major foriegn investment houses also have
undertaken their own education efforts. "Virtually
every international financial institution has
someone who is aware of securitization and is doing
studies for senior management" ... For example,
Nomura, one of Japan's largest investment firms,
has developed a number of brochures and
publications on U.S. mortgage securities, and the
Nomura Research Institute, which is the biggest
think tank in Japan, has done several reports ...
(143)
Such educational efforts extend to the U.S., as well. Shuko
Akita, a vice president in Nomura's New York headquarters,
has a library of information on U.S. real estate, which
reflects the amount of time and energy he devotes to the
issue. According to his associate, Kazuhito Kondo of the
Nomura Research Institute, an author and noted expert on
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Japan's real estate market, there is growing interest among
the Japanese in U.S. master limited partnerships.
Consequently, a good deal of his time is now spent studying
this new real estate investment vehicle.
Educational efforts notwithstanding, real estate
securitization is being met with tepid enthusiasm by the
Japanese brokers themselves. Although Yukio Moro of
Yamaichi Securities (N.Y.) was quoted in the Wall Street
Journal as claiming that "Japanese investors are very eager
to make more investments in [U.S.] real estate (144), he
later noted in a conversation that Yamaichi was not
currently active in such securitization. "Many of my
colleagues are afraid that they will ultimately lose part of
their securities business if their customers become too
interested in real estate as an investment."(145)
If such reluctance truly exists within the securities
brokerage community, one might expect that it has been
reinforced by the mixed performance of and contoversy
surrounding the Rockefeller Center REIT. This program is
generally considered to have been the first in which the
Japanese investment community took a large position in a
real estate offering; it is estimated that approximately
$100 million of the $750 million program was purchased by
Japanese investors, and Nomura, under the slogan "Let's
Become Manhattan Landlords," both underwrote and placed a
large portion of that amount. Although many critics of the
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offering are willing to concede to the long-term potential
of the deal -- an element of great importance to the far-
sighted Japanese -- a large number of Nomura branch managers
are feeling burnt. Initially skeptical, these branch
managers had to be strongly lobbied to support the program,
and now their clients are reportedly grumbling over the
stagnant issue. Without the full support of these branch
managers, no future offering is likely to be a success.
"[Rock Center] will dampen enthusiasm, not only of investors
but of the Nomura branch managers as well. I think that it
will be very hard to overcome," predicts one experienced
Japanese analyst of the U.S.real estate market.(146)Nomura's
Akita has a completely different point-of-view, however.
"Rockefeller Center was more of a financial asset deal than
a real estate deal. Those who are interested in U.S. real
estate have not been deterred." (147) Others agree;
speaking before the Asia Society in New York City on June
12, 1986, Ken Miyao, Executive Vice President and Chief
Executive Officer of Mitsui Fudosan (U.S.A.), alluded to
Rockefeller Center and said: "We are sure that there is a
large market for such investment vehicles in Japan, and we
are conducting a preliminary study on the subject."(148)
The Bank of America is one American company which has
not only committed itself to developing U.S. real estate
investment instruments targeted towards the Japanese market,
but has also taken tangible steps towards their creation.
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According to Jack S. Cooper, Vice President and Managing
Director of Bank of America Investment Real Estate, BOA has
developed similar "real estate funds" for other foreign
investors, and they have developed four different investment
prototypes which are designed to appeal to Japanese
investors of various size, structure and liquidity. These
funds would be offered in an investment climate which he
summarized as follows:
Typical Expected Returns, U.S. Real Estate, 1986
Downtown U.S. office buildings: Initial return (cap
rate) of 5%-7%; long-term return (IRR) of ll%-13%.
Other U.S. institutional real estate: Initial return
of 7%-9%; long-term return of 12%-14%.
Participating and convertible mortgages: Initial
return (coupon rate) of 9%-10%; long-term return of
11%-12%. Given the relatively low rate of U.S.
interest rates, participating mortgages are currently
less attractive to developers.
Conventional mortgages: Initial and long-term return
of 10%-12%.
Source: (149)
The four generic types of funds being formulated by Bank
of America are: a real estate certificate of deposit; a real
estate open-ended trust fund; a real estate "security'; and
a real estate limited partnership. According to Cooper,
only the open-ended trust program would be targeted
principally towards institutional investors, this in light
of a typical minimum subscription of $500,000 due to the
ability of the investor to redeem shares without penalty;
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the other programs would have minimum subscriptions running
from $1000 (the real estate "security") to $50,000.
Although the respective funds vary in terms of liquidity,
minimum subscription and underlying security, their yield
characteristics are quite similar: 6%-9% going-in, 11%-14%
internal rate of return. Fund proceeds would be used to
place conventional and participating loans against income-
producing properties, or to buy such property for the
account.
To date, however, BOA's program has not been offered to
Japanese investors because the Ministry of Finance has
balked at approving them for sale. Despite the fact that
both Nomura Securities and Toyo Land are co-sponsoring the
instruments, Cooper notes that
the Ministry of Finance is somewhat reluctant to
embrace a real estate fund at this time which might
compete with ongoing Japanese interest rates.
However, I feel that a fund structured so that it
does not compete with those rates, but rather keeps
in line with them, where gains would be realized on
the sale of the property, should meet with a greater
measure of approval by the Ministry of
Finance.(150)
Thus, in conclusion, while a significant number of
authorities and brokers insist that a strong latent demand
real estate-backed instruments exists among the Japanese
small individual investors, programs designed to tap that
demand have gotten off to an erratic start. Blame can be
assigned to a number of parties: overly zealous brokers;
overly cautious investors; overly ministerial governmental
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officials.
Nonetheless, such investment seems almost destined to
become a potent source of capital outflow, for it fits into
the past pattern of Japanese investment in the U.S.
Specifically, while programs attempt to work the kinks out,
larger Japanese institutions will continue to expand their
penetration of the market and with that, expand their base
of knowledge. By the time securitization programs are
smoothed out and have developed a track record of sorts, the
investors will be able to look to experienced Japanese
institutions for investment guidance. And assuming yield
spreads remain sufficiently high, small investor capital is
likely to chase products offered by "name" institutions.
Summary
Opportunities to tap into "small investor" capital
markets are proliferating. Although the number of formal
programs and vehicles currently in place is relatively
small, many of the large players -- Nomura, Mitsui Fudosan,
Bank of America and LTCB, -- are committing significant
resources to their study and formulation. Concurrently,
intermediaries which specialize in finding direct investment
opportunities for such investors are appearing on the scene
in growing numbers. The presence of such a capital market
will increase the options available to smaller American real
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estate owners and developers. Such participants will be
able to look to the Japanese capital markets when
contemplating development, finance or sale. Increasingly,
the small American real estate investor will become a
beneficiary of the internationalization of real estate.
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PART III:
INVISIBLE LINKS -- THE TIES THAT BIND
Chapter VII:
Characteristics Common To All Japanese Investors
In Section III, we studied some of the distinct sectors
of Japanese investors in U.S. real estate, placing emphasis
upon their respective investment strategies and
idiosyncracies. One of the principal pedagogical goals was
to demonstrate that, contrary to popular wisdom, Japanese
"consumers" of American real estate manifest significant
diversity in style, experience, preferences and goals.
In this section, we identify and discuss some important
investor characteristics which are almost universally shared
by Japanese investors. The empirical and sociological
underpinnings of such characteristics are addressed, and
their effect on investment behavior are portrayed. In a few
instances, the authors present strategies which enable
American real estate players to capitalize upon such
Japanese traits.
A. The Corporate Method of Decision-Making
" Traditional Japanese decision-making
takes too long. We have to behave like
American developers, which are generally
closely held, or we will miss
opportunities."
Senior official of a large Japanese
construction company
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Mention "Japanese investor" to an American developer
and he is bound to respond: "Too slow." The American
development community has formed the expectation that
dealing with the Japanese is a slow, tedious and sometimes
tortuous exercise -- qualities which are anything but
heralded by American developers. Accounts such as the
following only tend to reinforce the stereotype:
The developer had scarcely put the prime San
Francisco office property on the market when he
received a call from a Japanese institution eager
to talk about a deal. Discussions followed in
California in August, then a few phone calls, then
-- nothing. The developer found another buyer and
by December had completed the sale. Six months
later he got a letter from Tokyo. To his
amazement, the Japanese institution indicated that
its lawyers were finally ready to return to San
Francisco and complete the deal.(151)
Japanese, too, are critical of such inculcated
slowness. Hideo Niou, president of Jones Lang Wootton KK
(Japan) and a former executive of a large Japanese real
estate firm, complains that "when [Japanese] are ready to
buy, all the good property is gone. And, if the property is
still available, it's either no good or too expensive."(152)
Such sentiments seem to be a bit on the extreme side,
however. Furthermore, not all Americans are uncomfortable
with such glacial tendencies; many have learned to adapt to
the Japanese process and pace. Tishman Construction
Company, for instance, has enjoyed substantial success in
working with the Japanese. "When the Japanese examine a
project, they are not subjective . . . They do an incredible
amount of homework, and it takes a long time to get them to
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the table," notes Christopher McGratty , a senior vice
president with Tishman.(153) And for those patient enough
to play the waiting game, there is often an incentive.
According to Gordon Clagett, executive vice president of
Equitable Real Estate Group, Inc., " [The Japanese] realized
that for people to undergo the type of time-consuming
process they have in place to make a major decision about
real estate, they may have to pay for the extra
consideration . . . ."(154)
Nonetheless, most of the Japanese interviewed are
extremely sensitive to the criticism, and believe that steps
must be taken to expedite the process if they are to be a
competitive force in the U.S. However, before describing
such remedial steps being evaluated and undertaken, a brief
background on the decision-making process will be offered.
The Corporate Method of Decision-Making: The "Ringe"
System
Most corporate decisions of consequence are made in
accordance with the "ringe" system (loosely, "consulting on
a problem"). It calls for a formal, hierarchical review
process, called "nemawashi" (literally, "root binding"),
starting at the bottom of the corporate ladder and moving up
until a consensus is obtained. While certain exceptions can
be made in order to fast-track a decision, such situations
are a rarity and must be of an extraordinary nature.
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The practical effect of the unadulterated ringe review
process as it relates to U.S. real estate investment is that
decisions cannot be rendered in much less than two or three
months. (It is important to note, however, that the process
is further slowed by MOF review, addressed earlier in
Chapter II). An example of how the system works was offered
by the Tokyo-based deputy general manager of a major real
estate development company's foreign section. He described
a ten-step process, as follows:
Step 1: Information on a prospective deal is
received in New York office. After a thorough
review, a decision is made on whether to recommend
further study. Business days elapsed: Three.
Step 2: Information and recommendation is
forwarded to Tokyo. A junior official reviews and
presents preliminary report to his superior. Days:
Three.
Step 3: If interested, Tokyo requests more
detailed cash flow and related information. In
response, New York gathers information, analyzes,
and if satisfied, forwards to Tokyo. Days: Five -
seven.
Step 4: Junior official undertakes a thorough
analysis, including but not limited to computer
runs. Such junior officials have an impressive
knowledge of the expanded real estate market. Days:
Four-five.
Step 5: New York is contacted and consulted.
Senior Tokyo official ascertains whether project
warrants trip to the site. If so, requires two or
three days to obtain approvals for the trip.
Days:Three-four.
Step 6: Senior official travels to States. Days:
Three.
Step 7: If satisfied, senior official, upon
return, begins explaining the project to his
superiors. Normally requires about three contacts,
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"and they are all very busy people." Depending on
their availabilty and familiarity with the market:
Seven -ten days.
Step 8: For a large scale investment
(approximately $50 million), a managing director
may have to fly to the site. Days: Four-seven.
Step 9: A formal presentation is made to the
chairman and his board. Days: Unpredictable
Step 10: If a really large scale investment, the
company president will travel to the site. Days:
Unpredictable (155)
Thus, after a minimum of a month and a half (and more
frequently, two-to-three months) has elapsed, a decision can
be made. At this point, if the votes are favorable, approval
is given -- to begin negotiations.
Given such a laborious process, it should come as no
surprise that opportunities are lost in an industry which
heralds -- and occasionally deifies -- quick decisions,
deals which are made on the back of an envelope. Kurt
Kilstock, president of London & Leeds, a company which is
co-venturing with Sumitomo Life on an apparently successful
office project at 52nd & Lexington in Manhattan, claims that
Sumitomo missed an opportunity to co-venture on a site in
Washington, D.C. solely because it deliberated too long; by
the time Sumitomo responded affirmatively, the position had
been taken by a British pension fund.(156) Similar examples
are numerous. During a recent meeting with the authors,
Arthur Mitchell of Coudert Brothers, who has represented
over fifty Japanese clients (more on him in a later
subsection), received a telephone call from a developer who
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advised him that a deal had been closed with another party
and that, as a consequence, Mitchell's Japanese client had
been shut out. "I tell my Japanese clients that they have
no more than two weeks in which to make a decision," states
Mitchell. (157)
Initial Steps to Mold Ringe to the American Real Estate
Market
Heeding advice such as Mitchell's is one way of
expediting or circumnavigating certain layers of the ringe
system. However, Mitchell believes that, in actuality,
strict adherence to the ringe system is fairly rare. "It
exists in form, but not in substance," he claims. Instead,
there is often a key person "who may not be on the
organizational chart" who, if convinced of the propriety of
a certain action, will act as the ramrod. "The key thing to
understand is that there are 'anointed ones'."(158)
Nonetheless, Japanese employees themselves feel that
the decision-making process is at times too cumbersome to
permit them to compete in the U.S. "We, like others, have
missed good opportunities [because of slowness], and we are
going to change," claims an executive of Mitsui Real Estate
Development Company, Ltd. (Tokyo).(159) According to one of
his subordinates, those changes include the assignment of a
senior officer to the Los Angeles office of their U.S.
subsidiary (Mitsui Fudosan (U.S.A.), Inc.) who would be
specially vested with the discretion to sign off on deals,
154
up to a certain amount.(160) A similar sort of plan is
under study at Yasuda Trust & Banking, according to the
manager of its Foreign Real Estate Group.(161)
A company which has already taken tangible steps to
hasten the decision-making process is Nippon Life. Among
other things, a senior managing director is vested with the
ability to approve certain deals (up to approximately $50
million) without obtaining full board approval. Also, a
special section exists which deals exclusively with Ministry
of Finance officials, helping to ensure that no delays or
snags occur due to misunderstandings by or inadequate
information supplied to such officials. As a result, a
senior manager of Nippon claims that they can submit a
proposal on a U.S. project in about a month, and can close
within three. This may not seem like a particularly speedy
process to most Americans, but when compared to the normal
three-to-four months required by most Japanese institutions
to prepare a mere proposal, it is positively fast-track.
Exceptions to the Ringe System
The formalized ringe system is a creature of larger
institutions which have well-developed bureaucratic
infrastructures. However, in those instances when the
corporation is either smaller or is closely held, the ringe
system may not exist at all. The decision-making "body" may
be a single individual, perhaps even the one who has
handled the deal from the onset. In such instances, one can
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expect a far quicker response.
The contrast can be quite striking. According to
Mayumi Oda of Mitsui Real Estate Sales Co., Ltd.,(MRES)
smaller investors in Japan often make deals over the
telephone, in the quickest of fashions and not unlike some
of their American counterparts. Such speed is principally
attributable to the absence of ringe. MRES, as noted
earlier in the paper, is focusing its attention upon the
smaller Japanese investor, and it views such speediness as
a key asset which is transferable to the U.S. market. In
the aforementioned 1001 Pennsylvania Avenue deal, Kokusai
was able to approve the deal in a matter of weeks.
The Equitable has witnessed a similar disparity between
the speed shown by institutions which are subject to the
ringe system and those that are not. Since 1981, Equitable
has participated in six joint ventures with Japanese
institutions: five with life insurance companies, and one
with Daiei, a retailer which, with 1985 sales of $6.5
billion, a net worth in excess of $1 billion, and 14,500
employees, is only slightly smaller than K-mart or J.C.
Penney. Each project has been large-scale and structurally
complex. Yet the largest of the six -- the Daiei deal,
calling for the development of a regional shopping mall and
complex in Hawaii in which the retailer contributed
(according to Department of Commerce statistics) $330
million of its own capital -- took the least amount of time
to negotiate and close: one month to finalize the
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principles, and two more to close the deal. Why was this
project a relative breeze to negotiate and commence,
notwithstanding the immense size of the Japanese company?
Daiei's corporate structure, according to Equitable's
Clagett; "it is largely a closely-held corporation."(162)
Such an experience confirms what many observers of
Japanese activity have long believed: that, all things being
equal, Japanese companies which are equipped and willing to
make quick decisions will enjoy far more real estate
investment opportunities in the U.S. than those companies
wedded to the unadulterated ringe system.
B. American-based Employees: Staffing Levels
and Acquisition Targets
All blame for slow decision-making cannot be attributed
to the ringe system. Some must be assigned to the staffing
policies exhibited by Japanese institutions. Such policies
affect the ability to comprehensively gather and process
information, not to mention the ability to effect a market
presence. Two of the most pronounced factors affecting
the ability of Japanese companies to make quick decisions
about American real estate investment opportunities are (1)
the size of the staffs in the offices of the U.S.
subsidiaries of Japanese institutions, and (2) the general
hiring policies manifested by such companies.
In general, the size of such staffs is small.
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Notwithstanding the fact that annual investment goals range
from $50 million (Meiji Life) to $300 million (Nippon Life)
while total U.S.-based real estate assets held within
respective portfolios range fron $100 million to $600
million, staffs of U.S. subsidiaries are stretched thin:
Meiji Life has one real estate specialist in its U.S.
offices; Dai-Ichi Life, three; Nippon Life, four; Mitsui
Fudosan, three in New York and four in Los Angeles; Japan
Long-Term Credit Bank, two. Add to this lean condition the
fact that these employees are not only foreign nationals,
but are generally both young and marginally fluent in
English, and the inevitability of workload bottlenecks is
guaranteed. "A lot of my Japanese friends here are
overworked," notes Jon Minikes, senior portfolio manager for
Jones Lang Wootton Realty Advisors.(163) Our experience
seemed to confirm such a judgment; during a single trip to
New York, we learned that two of our interviewees -- the
chief representative of Dai-Ichi, and the deputy general
manager of Meiji -- were returning to Tokyo in part to make
special requests for more personnel.
A seemingly logical way to both beef up a staff and
quickly enhance its expertise regarding American real estate
would be to hire American employees. Such a step would be
inconsistent with the hiring policies of many Japanese
concerns, however. Akira Yashiro, chief representative of
Dai-Ichi's New York office, voiced a representative
sentiment: "Dai-Ichi prefers to teach and use its own
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employees, and that is why we are moving slowly. We take no
short cuts . . . ; it may take a long time, but we don't
care."(164) Nonetheless, a recent trip to Tokyo in search
of more staff suggests that he does in fact care. Similar
ambivalence was expressed by Takahide Moribe, the Tokyo-
based manager of Nippon Life's International Real Estate
Investment department. While he acknowledged that hiring
American employees might be a good idea for a variety of
reasons -- visibility, local knowledge, and influence upon
other employees, -- he doubted that such a step would be
taken. "To date, the personnel policy of Nippon Life is one
of 'pure blood' -- we breed our own from within."(165)
A more dramatic step by the Japanese to "localize"
their expertise in order to facilitate efficient penetration
into the U.S. market would be the acquisition of an
existing, well-established U.S. real estate firm. This is a
strategy which has been pursued in non-real estate areas,
perhaps the most notable example being Sumitomo Bank's
recent purchase of a large stake in Goldman Sachs for $500
million. Given the large percentage of closely-held
corporations and partnerships which make up the U.S.
industry, complicated entry barriers would be relatively
small for a well-capitalized Japanese firm.
Indeed, such steps have indeed been begun by some in
the real estate field. In 1984, Fuji Bank acquired Walter
E. Heller & Co., a $3 billion commercial-finance company
based in Chicago. Part of the prize was Abacus Mortgage, a
159
large and nationally-recognized interim and permanent
lender. As noted earlier, Japan Long-Term Credit Bank
(LTCB) owns approximately five percent of Peers & Co., the
Washington, D.C.-based merchant banking concern which, among
other things, identifies U.S. real estate investment
opportunities for Japanese investors. From LTCB's point-of-
view, a collateral benefit is their affiliation with Kemper
Financial Cos. ( an affiliate of Kemper Insurance), which
owns approximately 40% of Peers. Finally, according to a
knowledgeable source, Sumitomo Life talked to the Ministry
of Finance about the possibility of making such an
acquisition about four years ago, but was dissuaded from
pursuing it further by the ministry's tepid response.
However, given recent regulatory relaxation undertaken by
the Ministry of Finance, together with the fact that other
companies have already charted a similar course, the
ministry should be more amenable to such a discussion
today.
At least two knowledgeable observers are convinced that
further acquisitions of U.S. real estate companies are
inevitable and are likely to take place on a large scale.
One , a leading national mortgage banker, claims that many
Japanese construction companies are searching out and
structuring deals which permit them to get close to major
American construction firms and position themselves for a
buy. Commenting upon a recent project on the East Coast, he
noted that "these guys don't really care about [the
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developer] or the deal. What they really want is the
opportunity to cuddle up to [the contractor]," a major,
closely-held general contracting firm.(166)
Arthur Mitchell of Coudert Brothers predicts that a
similar step will be taken by another industry sector: large
Japanese securities firms. "Currently, they are not
terribly sophisticated about U.S. real estate. But I'll
tell you, they are very sharp, and they in many ways want to
model themselves after Goldman or Salomon. They want to
play the sort of role Goldman played in the Rockefeller
Center offering."(167) To do so, Mitchell predicts that
such Japanese firms will gain market entry and position
through acquisitions. "Much as 20% of Babcock & Brown (an
equipment leasing firm) was acquired by a securities firm, a
real estate company will be bought."(168)
Thus, in conclusion, while it appears unlikely that
Americans will witness a change in the composition and
character of U.S. subsidiaries in the very near term, the
Japanese will continue to expand their penetration into the
U.S. real estate market through company acquisitions and
horizontal integration.
C. The Cultural Disinclination to Sell Real Estate
"In Japan, for a company to sell
property, it would be conduct of shame."
Akihiro Inouye
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Deputy General Manager
Overseas Business Dept.
Mitsubishi Estate Co., Ltd.
Standing alone, the idea that most real estate owners
and developers are reluctant to sell their land does not
seem particularly extraordinary; phrases such as , "I'm in
this business for the long haul," and, "I'm not interested
in flipping property" are well-worn and often-hallowed
passwords in the American real estate fraternity. But as
is often the case, practice varies from dogma, and many of
those who publicly denounce sales strategies are, under a
variety of circumstances, really quite receptive to them.
After all, the phrase, " I don't really want to sell, but my
partner" (choose one or all) (a) "is impossible to deal
with," (b) "wants to sell, and I wish to accomodate him out
of a sense of obligation," (c) "suffered some business
setbacks and needs the cash", is no less venerated in the
annals of real estate idiom.
Nonetheless, such investment "flexibility" does not
appear to reasonably exist within the strategies of the
Japanese real estate investor. In fact, what is quite
remarkable is the overt, unsolicited aversion most of our
interviewees held towards the notion of selling their real
estate investments. "If a Japanese financial institution
were to sell one of its properties in Tokyo it would be a
sign that it is in some kind of financial trouble," claims a
Japanese venture partner.(169) According to Hideo Niou of
Jones Lang Wootton KK (Japan), "most people will hold the
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property forever. They will sell only if
problems." (170)
This disinclnation to sell is a function of a
factors. One is geographic. Japan is a densely
country of 125 million individuals living
slightly smaller than California; of this land
than 33% is reasonably habitable or arable, and
is confined by the politically sacrosanct
"Because land is so scarce, the Japanese have
attachment to land and a disinclination to sell
they might own. This attitude prevails not
individuals but among corporations."(171)
Another factor is economic. The Japanese
in
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an emotional
any property
only among
tax system
penalizes near-term sales:
[O]wners hesitate to sell property [because of]
the capital gain tax. When a Japanese company
sells property that has been in its possession for
less than 10 years, any capital gain from the sale
is treated as short-term capital gain and is
subject to an additional 20% capital gain tax
levied on top of the 42% corporate income tax.(172)
Other economically-based considerations, such as a lending
institution's policy of matching long-term liabilities with
long-term assets, also play a significant role, as was noted
in Section III.
Finally, certain somewhat philosophical factors exist
which influence the national personality and tend to
reinforce the disinclination to sell. In a country where
honor and "saving face" are deeply inculcated, the mere
belief that one's peers are going to conclude -- whether
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correctly or not -- that business problems are necessitating
the sale of property is enough to dissuade most individuals
from taking such action. There are even explanations which
border on esoterica, yet have a ring of truth; one of our
favorites was a comment by Nomura's Shuko Akita, whose
specialty is U.S. real estate investment vehicles: "The
American investment personality seems to have been shaped by
its history as a cattle society, where the asset is mobile
and a commodity. In Japan, we are traditionally an
agricultural society, and land is venerated."(173)
So how do such factors influence the scope and
character of Japanese investment in U.S. real estate ? In a
least two ways. First, these factors artificially restrict
the number of real estate transactions within Japan; "in
Japan, when a major company announces that it will sell
property, most observers conclude that the company is in a
tight financial spot. This attitude cuts the number of
potential sellers and reduces real estate investment
opportunities" (emphasis added).(174) A consequence of such
artificial restrictions is that real estate becomes an even
more illiquid asset. Thus, prudent real estate investors
are enticed to look at different markets in order to achieve
a portfolio which balances yield, liquidity and risk.
Secondly, such factors naturally affect the investment
personality of the Japanese. Having been weaned on a diet of
non-transactional conservatism, the Japanese are more
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inclined to choose U.S. investments and deal structures
which are similarly conservative. A deal featuring a steady
and satisfactorily high income stream is likely to be
preferred to ones whose returns are disproportionately
weighted towards future-sale proceeds. Being long-term
investors by nature, they are well aware of the vagaries of
the market and the unpredictability of long-term forecasts.
Of course, the Japanese have proven themselves to be
geniuses in their ability to learn and adapt to new products
and markets, and many American real estate people who have
worked with the Japanese on U.S. real estate projects claim
that they can already see some manifestations of changed
thinking on the issue of selling realty investments;
furthermore, certain kinds of real estate investors are
better equipped and more inclined to accept a shorter
holding period, as noted earlier in this paper.
Notwithstanding such trends, however, current Japanese real
estate investment behavior is greatly slanted towards a
long-term hold of property, and most investors are likely to
retain such a bias well into the future.
D. The Importance and Role of Relationships
"We're not going to make a decision
based upon the deal; we base it upon the
people."
Hitoshi Suga
New Business Development
Mitsui & Co. (USA), Inc.
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Japanese companies are renowned for the emphasis they
place upon the development and nourishment of business
relationships. Our experience confirmed such an
orientation; every interviewee spoke of his company's desire
to associate with owners, developers and institutions of
high reputation and competence. Such relationships are
developed slowly, over time and deals, and are preferably
done in a direct fashion between principals.
Given this, it is no great surprise that Japanese real
estate companies harbor "almost an animus" towards
consultants and intermediaries.(175) "The Japanese have an
inherent distaste -- or rather, apprehension -- about
dealing with middlemen," notes an institutional
representative who has worked with a number of Japanese
institutions on real estate co-ventures.(176) Such
discomfort with intermediaries is never far from the
surface, claims Leonard Barr Smith, senior partner and
former chairman of Jones Lang Wootton, and can be easily
provoked. In 1982, Barr Smith claims that his efforts to
slowly and properly cultivate Japanese relationships were
brought to a screeching halt when "scores of bag-carrying
Americans arrived in Japan."(177) What these American
brokers failed to realize is that "you just can''t 'sell'
the Japanese; in fact, nothing could be worse. They much
prefer to do their own analysis and let the numbers, not the
broker, tell the story."(178) According to Barr Smith, such
salesmanship tactics "put the Japanese on guard," and set
166
back his and other's efforts by a couple of years.
But the Japanese find themselves in a dilemma. On one
hand, they instinctively eschew intermediaries; on the
other, they realize that they are not only new players in a
large and idiosyncratic industry, but they are foreigners
without established networks, contacts or cultural bonds.
This absence of connections is particularly unsettling for
the Japanese, for, as Barr Smith notes, "the 'old boy'
network is stronger in Japan than anywhere else -- even
Britain."(179)
Steps Taken
As a result, certain Japanese concerns have decided
that it is advisable to enter into consulting agreements
with well-placed firms. This is particularly (and almost
exclusively) the case with Japanese trust banks. Sumitomo
Trust & Banking is in the third year of a five-year contract
with Richard Ellis, Inc., Yasuda Trust & Banking is
represented by Citibank Real Estate Advisors on the East
Coast and Grubb & Ellis on the West, and Mitsubishi Trust &
Banking has recently affiliated with Cushman & Wakefield.
It is quite natural for such trust banks to be the most
willing to affiliate with consultants, for they themselves
act primarily as advisors to clients and as fiduciaries to
pension funds back in Japan. "They are beginning to
acknowledge that the use of consultants in America is
important, and that the lack of their use may well have
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contributed to past mistakes."(180)
Nonetheless, most Japanese firms continue to operate
within the U.S. without a formal consulting relationship.
That is not to say that they categorically disdain
information generally available from consultants; like most
of their American counterparts, they avail themselves of the
numerous -- and often free -- market-status reports and like
information regularly provided by consulting and brokerage
houses.
Central to the Japanese vein of independence is a
desire to build up their own corporate infrastructure
without undue reliance upon outside assistance. "Dai-Ichi
prefers to teach and use its own employees . . .", asserts
the head of the New York office.(181) "We like to do our
own evaluations," notes the Tokyo-based manager of another
life insurance company. "We do not want to limit ourselves
to a single consultant. If we do this, we feel that many
deals [offered by other consultants or brokers] will decide
to go elsewhere."(182) Clearly, when it comes to
information, the Japanese prefer an open-door policy.
Another factor which makes the consultants' lot a
difficult one is the innate Japanese expectation of
unwavering fidelity. "The Japanese expect absolute
exclusivity on a deal, and this is a real problem as to
timing. I mean, they can take so long! And yet, it's death
to invite, say, four potential competitors to review an
investment opportunity, for each one will invariably
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ask,'who else have you talked to?'."(183) The chief foreign
real estate manager for one of the Japanese trust banks is
currently reevaluating its relationship with its American
consultant and evaluating potential replacements; "I am
concerned with the relationship because our consultant also
represents sellers." (184) Wise American partners are
careful to honor the expectation of fidelity. "I would
never even talk to another Japanese concern unless and until
I had first received permission from [my partner]," claims
Will Zeckendorf of Zeckendorf Company, which is currently
co-developing six Manhattan projects with KG Land, the U.S.
subsidiary of Kumagai Gumi, a large Japanese construction
company.
Those consultants and partners who have succeeded in
establishing relationships with Japanese concerns know that
such success is more than a function of possessing good
information or development opportunities. "It is a lot of
dinners and getting to know each other. It is really
learning about the entire company," notes Evan Hellar, vice
president of Richard Ellis, Inc.(185) The Japanese want to
lay a groundwork for "a long term alliance. They want to
know if you are the kind of company where there will be
mutual respect, trust and understanding."(186)
The Equitable Life Assurance Co. Experience
One American real estate company which appears to be
without peer in understanding the importance and process of
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relationships to the Japanese is the Equitable. On a
general corporate (i.e., non-real estate) level, Equitable
began to initiate relationships with Japanese institutions
in the mid-1960's. Employees from Meiji, Sumitomo and other
life insurance companies had clerked at Equitable for
anywhere from six months to two years. The result of such
exchange, according to Kazunobu Nisawa of Meiji (NY)'s real
estate section, is that "the mid-level staffs know each
other real well."(187) And although approximately ten years
passed before any cooperative real estate transactions took
place, Equitable's patient cultivation bore fruit. To date,
Equitable has entered into six joint ventures with Japanese
institutions, and Equitable's Gordon Clagett believes that
"our willingness to cultivate a relationship slowly has
helped to cement our relationship."(188) others are
following the lead; such an apprenticeship program is in
place at Cabot Cabot & Forbes in Boston, where an employee
of Kajima Construction Company is currently working.
But, in light of the earlier observation about the
Japanese insistence upon exclusivity and fidelity, how is
Equitable able to work with four different Japanese
companies, three of which (Nippon Life, Meiji Life and Asahi
Life) being direct competitors? "It's not a problem for us,
because our partners know that information about each deal
is kept in absolute confidentiality. Furthermore, they know
that because we are so big, no single partner can possibly
accomodate all of our business," claims Tim Welch of
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Equitable. "We are very careful about our the sanctity of
our relationships." (189)
Equitable has recently announced plans to open up a
real estate office in Tokyo -- a first among American realty
firms. This office, to be headed by a senior vice president
who has a long history of working with the Equitable's
Japanese partners, is certain to cement existing
relationships while facilitating the cultivation of new
ones.
Trends
But even for Equitable, the long-term prospects for
mutually beneficial relationships with the Japanese are
uncertain. Most Japanese are quite candid about their
desire to ultimately handle almost all components of the
real estate investment and development business. They are
simply required to temper this desire, as well as their
inculcated dislike for intermediaries, in order to conform
to the current realities of their inexperience and the
market. Nevertheless, a senior official of a large Japanese
development firm which has had a long-time affiliation with
an American company notes that "we are beginning to stand on
our own two feet," and adds that over the past few years,
they have begun to look for investment opportunities on
their own.(190) Equitable's Clagett believes that, while
there probably will always be a demand by certain Japanese
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for the sort of services an affiliation with Equitable
brings, the nature of the relationship will change. "It
will be on their terms, not ours."(191)
Lawyers
Curiously enough, one of the growth areas for
consultants is in legal-related services. What makes this
appear so odd is the heralded Japanese animus for lawyers.
"The Japanese believe that parties with problems should
first try to settle them through reasoned discussion, and an
injured party will enter into a lawsuit only after all other
efforts have been in vain."(192) There are fewer than
12,000 attorneys in Japan, compared to more than 600,000 in
the U.S.; Washington, D.C. alone has almost three times as
many as all of Japan. Legal departments within major
Japanese corporations are often staffed, and even headed, by
laypersons; Toyota Motors is an example. Commenting on an
aggregate Japanese corporate entertainment expenditure of
$37 million a day, a director of one such Japanese company
explained:
Americans spend more than that each day on legal
fees. We prefer to invest the money in more
pleasant activity that lets us see if a person is
worthy of trust. If there is trust, there is
little need for lawyers. In Japan, we have a
saying: "You get through to a man's soul at
night".(193)
A senior official of Sumitomo Life provided a graphic
example of the role such trust plays in the Japanese real
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estate world. During our interview in Tokyo, the
representative was lamenting the fact that a recent purchase
of an American office building required almost two thousand
pages of documentation. He then pointed to a rendering of a
$150 million Japanese mixed-use project in which Sumitomo
had recently acquired a majority interest. "The total
length of that purchase agreement was four pages."(194)
Notwithstanding such dislike, the Japanese are not only
aware that they must play the game according to American
rules and norms, but they are extremely anxious about the
potential consequences of failing to do so. Granted,
"sometimes an American lawyer is thought to be taking too
much initiative,"(195) but the Japanese are learning to
accept the lawyer's role much as their American counterparts
have -- as a necessary evil. The Japanese investor,
although "amazed when he sees the high charges billed by
outside experts . . .ends up paying the fees because he
treats them as a kind of 'insurance' or 'security' cost that
is necessary if he is to do business in this country."(196)
Furthermore, some Japanese actually gain comfort from the
thorough process by which property interests are transferred
in the U.S. "In the U.S., it is safer, for you have title
insurance as well as many experts involved in the process."
(197)
One lawyer who was early to recognize the potential
benefits of working with the Japanese is Arthur Mitchell of
Coudert Brothers, an international law firm based in New
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York. Mitchell lived in Japan for over ten years, studied
Japanese law at Kyoto University under a grant from the
Japanese Ministry of Education, and was the principal
American attorney at a major Tokyo law firm. Actively
involved in real estate, he has a client list of more than
fifty Japanese companies, including Dai-Ichi Life, Sumitomo
Life and Japan Air Lines. Among the deals in which he
played an instrumental role was the purchase of the Essex
House by JAL, and his stature was confirmed by a recent
front-page Wall Street Journal article in which he was
featured.
Perhaps what cements his position as a top attorney
acting on behalf of Japanese clients is his role as a
counselor, in the generic sense of the word. For example,
Mitchell was instrumental in orchestrating the recent
cooperative agreement between Mitsubishi Trust & Banking and
Cushman & Wakefield, a relationship which goes beyond mere
consulting to a form of loose joint venture. During
negotiations, the proposed affiliation ran into some
difficulties at the Ministry of Finance; it appeared to both
principals that the deal was in jeopardy. Due to his
intimate familiarity with the legal and regulatory systems
in both countries, Mitchell was ultimately able to craft an
agreement which was satisfactory both to the parties and the
Ministry of Finance. According to Kevin Haggerty, executive
vice president of Cushman & Wakefield,
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There's no doubt in my mind that the deal came
about because of Arthur Mitchell and Coudert . . .
He was the ideal matchmaker. He understands the
people and the culture, and also the regulatory
agencies, the protocol, licensing requirements, fee
structures. No one ever left the table with a
misunderstanding.(198)
Summary
In conclusion, it appears that the long-term prospects
for various kinds of relationships differ. For American
brokers, consultants and other intermediaries who seek
exclusive relationships but who provide arguably fungible
services which either can be acquired for free, performed
in-house or provided by direct dealing with principals, the
long-term future is not terribly bright. Granted, as new
Japanese firms enter the U.S. market, they, like their
Japanese predecessors, will require assistance in
penetrating the market. According to Equitable's Clagett,
however, such companies may well look to the Japanese
pioneers for such services, rather than U.S. brokerage
houses or consultants.
The future for other sectors is rosier. American
lawyers, offering services which the Japanese are in no way
equipped to provide, should be the greatest beneficiaries.
And American joint venture partners who provide sustained
market access and acceptability in preferred markets should
likewise fare well, although expansion of their relationship
with a Japanese partner may prove increasingly difficult as
the partner becomes more acclimated and self-sufficient.
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Chapter VIII:
Washington, D.C.: A Target City, And Why
"Today, Washington is our next target."
senior representative,
Japanese life insurance company
In July of 1985, there had yet to be a single recorded
acquisition of Washington real estate by a Japanese entity.
Today, one year later, Washington has witnessed no less
than three Japanese purchases of interests in office
buildings. Additionally, at least one office building is
subject to a forward-purchase commitment and will be closed
upon this fall, and active negotiations are underway on no
less than four other projects.
Washington, D.C. serves as an example of Japanese
activity in U.S. real estate. Representatives of almost all
sectors have invested or are negotiating to invest there:
life insurance companies, construction firms, real estate
development companies and small non-institutional companies.
Forms and scale of investment have varied. And almost all
of the activity has taken place within the last nine months,
allowing for a fresh snapshot of Japanese investment
patterns.
The Reasons for Coming to Washington, D.C.
Why has Washington enjoyed such an increase in demand,
an increase which, with the possible exception of Boston, is
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seemingly unmatched in the nation ? Most of our Japanese
interviewees cited some or all of the following:
1. Size and zoning limitations
2. Growing familiarity
3. Presence of federal government
4. Smaller dollar size of transactions
5. Large size of base market
6. Current and historically favorable
vacancy rates
7. Emotional appeal
1. Size and Zoning Restrictions
Washington is a relatively small city of sixty-nine square
miles. Its effective size is shrunk even further, however,
given the fact that a very large portion of its area is
dedicated to the federal government, together with the fact
that it has one of the proportions of area dedicated to
parkland and public greenspace any major American city.
The zoning regulations of the District of Columbia are
among the more restrictive of major American cities. The
zoning code has effectively incorporates a 1910
Congressional Act which severely limits the height of
Washington buildings; although originally legislated to
ensure that fire ladders could reach the top of all
buildings,
protector
prominence
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of these
(exclusive
it has been popularized and preserved as a
of the low scale of the city while enhancing the
of Washington's two tallest buildings, The
Monument and the Capitol. The practical effect
zoning restrictions is to limit the height
of penthouse) of most buildings to ninety feet; a
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relatively small area (less than two square miles) allows
structures of 130 feet, while buildings along Pennsylvania
Avenue between the White House and the Capitol may, under
certain circumstances, reach to 160 feet. Applicable floor-
area ratios within the CBD range from 6.5 to 10.
Together, these size and zoning limitations act to
control the amount of space which can be delivered into the
market; one is not going to awake one morning and learn that
his project will soon be competing with a forty-story office
tower. Such restrictiveness appeals to both American and
foreign real estate investors, including the Japanese.
Writing about factors which foreign investors consider
favorably, Mahlon Apgar IV notes in an Urban Land Institute
report that "[i]n zoning and physical limitations and in
the procedures for development, cities like Boston and
Washington, D.C., New Orleans and San Antonio are more
predictable and structured, making competition and growth
more predictable and structured."(199)
2. Growing Familiarity
Although Washington is the Nation's Capital, it is not
now nor has it ever been a center of commerce. Without a
bona fide port or industrial base, Washington had little to
draw the interest of Japanese mercantilists who were
actively pursuing business in such cities as New York and
San Francisco. As companies such as Mitsui & Co., which
established its New York office in 1879, proliferated, it
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was only natural that familiarity bred interest in the host
city's real estate market.
Today, however, Washington has become a much more
familiar town to the Japanese, due to a variety of factors.
First, most Japanese corporate real estate investors have
targeted Washington in their strategic plans for expansion
ever since their U.S. subsidiaries opened around 1981.
Given its proximity to New York, Washington was viewed as
regionally compatible as well as easily accessible to the
relatively thin staffs of the Japanese companies. Secondly,
in the last six years, Washington has gained new prestige as
a center of real estate development; within that period,
national developers such as Boston Properties, Beacon
Companies, Cabot Cabot & Forbes, Cadillac Fairview, Gerald
Hines, Lincoln Property Company, Prudential, Rose
Associates, Spaulding & Slye and Trammell Crow completed
their first D.C. projects. The presence of such developers
is a natural draw for the Japanese, giving a city the stamp
of approval. Finally, in light of the high demand for
Manhattan property by foreign investors of almost every
origin, it is increasingly difficult for the Japanese to
satisfy their investment parameters through realty
investments there; as a result, they have embarked on a
special effort to familiarize themselves with Washington and
other East Coast cities.
3. The Presence of the Federal Government
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The fact that Washington is the home of the federal
government is an immensely important factor for most
Japanese investors. It implies a special underlying
stability in the marketplace, and while Washington may not
be as "recession-proof" as some of the interviewees
suggested (and as many Washingtonians used to herald),
statistics do suggest that the Washington market has
historically been one of the most stable in the U.S. "It
is the center of politics," noted one such person , "and we
don't see much change in the economy. Lawyers and lobbyists
will always be in demand."(200) A number of interviewees
expanded on this point, stating that while they could
envision various factors, including the advent and
improvement of telecommunications, eventually eroding the
importance of locating within any one of many cities, they
did not forsee such factors undermining the importance for
certain tenants to locate in Washington. "Politics and
diplomacy will always be person-to-person 'businesses',"
noted one Japanese institutional investor, " and their home
will always be Washington."(201)
Finally, on a related theme, Washington is the
beneficiary of analogy and transference, for Tokyo, home of
the most highly desired and richly priced real estate in
Japan, is likewise the home of the federal government, and
Japanese investors are well aware of the strength and
stability such a presence brings to that city.
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4. Smaller Dollar Size of Transactions
In many ways, the entry costs of acquiring a real
estate presence in Washington are less than in other
comparably sized cities.
A number of factors conspire to keep the average value
of Washington buildings at a relatively low level. Although
land costs for premium downtown commercial sites are among
the highest in the nation (ranging from $90 to $120 per
F.A.R. square foot), buildings tend to be a good deal
smaller due to the aforementioned height and bulk
restrictions, together with the fact that due to the
maturity of the market there are relatively few
opportunities to put together large-scale assemblages in
established premium locations. The effect of these various
factors is demonstrated in a review of the downtown office
buildings completed or scheduled to be completed from 1985-
1987:
1985 -- Number of buildings: 20
Average square footage: 158,850
1986 -- Number of buildings: 19
Average square footage: 185,750
1987 -- Number of buildings: 23
Average square footage: 208,875
Source: (202)
Of all these buildings, only three are in excess of 400,000
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square feet in size, and none are in excess of 600,000
square feet (although 1001 Pennsylvania Avenue, developed in
two separate phases, totals slightly in excess of 700,000
square feet).
Finally, certain construction-related factors act to
limit the total development cost of Washington, D.C.
product. First, the lower height permits the use of poured-
in-place concrete construction in addition to other (and
often more costly) methods, particularly steel. And
secondly, Washington contracting is not predominantly union;
in recent years, more than fifty percent of the downtown
jobs have gone to open-shop contractors, and many of the
larger contracting firms have both closed- and open-shop
subsidiaries. Testimony to the dominance of open-shop
contractors was the adoption, in 1984, of a "Market Recovery
Plan" by the metropolitan Washington trades council, which
incorporated a number of cost-reduction and no-strike
provisions designed to recapture a portion of the market.
The net effect of all these factors is that the value
-- and hence, the cost, assuming a willing seller -- of the
typical investment-grade Washington office building is less
expensive than in Manhattan, San Francisco or Chicago.
Current total building costs for new developments are
running in the $180-to-$220 per F.A.R.(net leasable) foot
range, and sales prices of premium leased properties have
exceeded $300 per F.A.R. foot. Such numbers would place the
majority of new buildings in the $30 million-to-$40 million
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cost range, while the sales price of the majority of new
fully leased product might range from $35 million-to-$55
million -- all numbers which are well within the "comfort"
zone of most Japanese institutions now active in the U.S.
5. Large Base Size of Market
Perhaps almost as important as acquisition cost is the
potential availability of product; after all, as noted
earlier, it is lack of satisfactory product in Manhattan
which is partially fueling Japanese interest in other
markets. Washington's existing inventory of downtown office
space is one of the largest in the nation. This fact,
combined with the relatively low entry costs, expands the
opportunities for a variety of Japanese investors to acquire
product.
6. Current and Historically Favorable Vacancy Rates
The current office vacancy rate for the city of
Washington is approximately ten percent (203), with it
projected to increase to approximately 15% in the wake of
market oversaturation which is characteristic throughout the
nation. (204). Both figures compare most favorably against
those of other major American cities (205).
Furthermore, Washington has historically fared
comparatively well against such cities. According to
information contained within two separate market reports,
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over the last eight years Washington has not suffered a
downtown office vacancy rate in excess of 14%; only
Manhattan (midtown: 7.4%; downtown: 10%) and Boston (13.7%)
boast better maximum numbers. During that period, Washington
has enjoyed six bi-annual periods in which its vacancy rate
was below 1% (San Francisco: 7; Los Angeles: 5; Manhattan
and Boston: 0), and its unweighted average vacancy rate for
the entire period (5.6%) is surpassed only by San Francisco
(4.2%) and midtown Manhattan (5.4%).(206)
7. Emotional Appeal
The low-slung scale of Washington -- a function of
Pierre L'Enfant's city plan, in concert with the
aforementioned 1910 congressional act -- appeals to many
people; Europeans, finding the scale and urban design to be
pleasantly reminiscent of Paris, Rome, Munich and some of
their other more hallowed cities, seem to be particularly
impressed.
Apparently, such features appeal to some Japanese, for
the same reasons. "There are no high buildings. This is
very similar to many cities within Japan, and appeals to
many of us." (207)
Current Japanese Activity in the Washington, D.C. Market
In the summer of 1985, four years after Japanese life
insurance companies were permitted to invest in U.S. real
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estate, Meiji Mutual Life Insurance Company became the first
Japanese company to acquire an interest in a Washington,
D.C. office building. Meiji and the Equitable (which
introduced the Japanese life to the project) agreed to co-
venture on the development of Lafayette Center III, a
200,000-square-foot office building which is the third of a
planned five-phase office complex. In exchange for
approximately half of the deal, Meiji/Equitable made a very
full loan (approximately 100% of total project cost) at a
below-par coupon rate, and will provide a similarly priced
permanent loan. The project is scheduled for delivery in
late 1986 or early 1987.
This deal incorporates many of those characteristics
which are quite typical of most Japanese investors. First
of all, the project is a well-located one; it is nestled
within Washington's "Golden Triangle," that area bounded by
Connecticut, Pennsylvania and New Hampshire avenues and
which, for the last twenty-five years, has been the premier
office submarket in Washington. Secondly, it is a joint
venture with the Equitable, an association which many
Japanese investors covet both as a learning vehicle as well
as a security blanket; furthermore, according to a
representative of Equitable, " Meiji is somewhat less
experienced and a good deal more conservative than some of
our other Japanese partners, and they take special solace in
our involvement."(208) Finally, the local developer which
sold part of its interest to the life insurance companies
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(Farr-Jewett, on behalf of a development partnership) is an
experienced one, having succesfully developed the first two
phases of Lafayette Center.
At least three other deals involving Japanese investors
have been made or committed to in the last twelve months,
and each of them varies from the above. As noted earlier in
the paper, Kokusai Kangyo Aerial Surveys acquired a partial
interest in Cadillac Fairview's 1001 Pennsylvania Avenue
project. Nissei Realty, Nippon Life's U.S. subsidiary, will
close on an as-yet unnamed office building later this fall.
Finally, a life insurance company (as yet unrevealed) has
reputedly purchased one half of One Thomas Circle, a fully
leased 225,000-square-foot office building located outside
of the Golden Triangle, from Prudential.
Not all Japanese investments have been in the form of
equity or "dequity," however. At least two other Washington
real estate ventures have involved Japanese concerns. The
first, an office building in Northern Virginia, is being
built by Kajima Construction Company on behalf of its future
tenant and owner, N.E.C. ( the large Japanese electronics
firm).
The second is a more intriguing one. About three
months ago, a seven-year open-ended mini-perm was placed
against Washington Square, a new (completed in 1984), fully-
leased 680,000-square-foot office building located not only
within the Golden Triangle but at arguably the best location
in the city. The lender, Mitsubishi Bank (in participation
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with a local bank, American Security, and a consortium of
other lenders) sought to enter the Washington market but was
only interested in absolutely premier projects. In
Washington Square, they found such a building: heavily
capitalized and renowned local developers; prestigious
tenants; high (if somewhat controversial) design; a strong
rent roll; a superior location over a Metro subway station.
And, having found a building which met their investment
criteria, Mitsubishi was prepared to be most aggressive in
order to obtain the loan. Although none of the loan
participants would comment on the terms of the loan,
reputable sources cited a rate which floats at forty basis
points below prime, with a 6% floor and a 13% ceiling.
Not every Japanese effort to penetrate the Washington
market has met with success, however. Sumitomo Life has
expressed great interest in D.C., yet despite extended
negotiations on two joint venture opportunities (one, in the
Golden Triangle, with London & Leeds, its partner in
Manhattan; the other with Gerald Hines Interests on a site
at Franklin Square, a hot new submarket in the East End) it
has yet to close on a property. A similar fate has been
suffered by KG Land, the U.S. subsididary of Kumagai
Construction Company which, among other projects, is co-
venturing with Zeckendorf Company on their $500 million
Madison Square Garden site. Protracted negotiations with a
major Washington general contractor and major Washington
developer were recently terminated, to the surprise of many
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knowledgeable parties. The package deal called for the
development of three separate sites -- one in D.C., the
other two in Northern Virginia. According to an individual
close to the deal, "they [KG] were tough, but quite
responsible and fair. They also showed that they are
subject to some of the same restrictions as we Americans,
for they claimed that, while they wanted to do the deal,
their home office just couldn't approve it." (209) At least
a half dozen other developers and contractors claim to have
had "substantive" discussions about a potential co-venture
with a Japanese entity, but nothing has yet come to
fruition.
Finally, there is one Washington project which offers
interesting insight into Japanese investment methodology.
At the same time, it serves to illustrate the point that
underwriting standards and investment goals may vary as much
between Japanese companies and industries as they do between
their American counterparts.
The subject project is currently under construction at
a prominent location within the Golden Triangle.
Approximately 150,000 square feet in size, its design and
construction quality are of the highest order -- factors
which have undoubtedly contributed to its being 55% pre-
leased two months prior to completion.
To date, two Japanese companies have made unsolicited
offers on the property. One, a real estate development
company, was introduced to the property by an American
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company with which it has a pre-existing relationship.
Their interest is limited to a 100% purchase, based upon an
8%-9% cap of the stabilized first-year income. The second
entity, introduced to the project following a blind call
from a Washington broker, is a life insurance company. They
are proposing a convertible mortgage, which would have a
coupon rate based upon an 7.5%-8.5% cap of stabilized first
year income; in addition, credit would be given for any
stipulated rent bumps incorporated into leases. At some
point between five and ten years, the company could opt to
convert the outstanding debt into a 70%-80% stake in the
building. One apparent problem, as yet unresolved, is the
desire on the part of the Japanese company to receive a
preferred return on its equity stake following conversion, a
requirement which could well limit the developer's ability
to finance the project.
C. Summary
The dramatic increase in investment interest in
Washington real estate over the last twelve months seems to
foreshadow a sustained influx of Japanese capital into the
metropolitan area. The variety of the kinds of investors --
life insurance companies, construction companies, banks,
real estate companies and "individuals" ( corporations, as
well) -- attests to the diversity which the market seems to
offer.
189
The nature of the Japanese investments in Washington is
consistent with investment patterns described throughout
this paper. Well-located downtown office buildings are the
preferred product. Whenever possible, an affiliation with a
prestigious developer or institution is sought. The
buildings should be existing and fully or substantially
leased, unless the development project is a co-venture with
a strong and experienced developer or institution.
Of course, the predicted influx of Japanese capital
into Washington could well be stemmed by one or two highly
publicized investment mistakes which would induce anxiety
among nascent Japanese real estate investors. Judging from
the first wave of investments which have been noted above,
however, there would seem to be little chance of such a
catastrophe; all but one are equity investments in well-
established buildings, and the other is a fairly
conservatively-structured joint venture enjoying a fine
location and a strong institutional partner. Thus, given the
predicted success of these initial investments, more
Japanese capital is almost certain to flow into Washington.
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PART IV:
SUMMARY
Chapter IX:
"So What Does This All Mean, And How Can I
Take Advantage of It ?"
The authors have demonstrated Japanese activity to be a
broad and diverse real estate phenomenon. Japanese activity
in U.S. real estate has expanded into all product and
service areas of the investment, development, construction
and management businesses. Firms in each of these areas
operate with different goals and business philosophies.
We have observed that life insurance companies and trust
banks are MOF regulated, risk-averse and conservative
investors. They are fiduciaries and not operators, investors
and not developers. While the quantitative amount of their
U.S. investments must increase due to higher U.S. than
domestic Japanese property returns and scarcity of domestic
Japanese real estate product, nevertheless the qualitative
extent of their presence in the U.S. will grow within a
slow, evolutionary process. These companies will be allowed
to invest more but will be no less regulated by MOF. They
will follow a step-by-step incremental investment approach
rather than innovate the expansion of Japanese real estate
activities into products, areas and services. As Japanese
development companies and contractors seek new geographical
markets and project opportunities, life and non-life
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companies and trust banks will cautiously follow them into
second-tier cities and non-prestige investment deals. These
institutions are oriented to size and location, and the
nature of their activities will not change over the medium-
term future. They transact with major U.S. institutional
counterparts and not smaller investors, developers or
builders. Innovations in strategy and operating procedure
will come from learning through association with U.S. joint
venture partners.
Real estate development companies are involved in
different geographical areas and a variety of businesses.
They generate product and often need intermediary services
to be able to understand local U.S. real estate markets.
Real estate development firms associated with "Zaibatsu"
groups benefit from ties to big banks and powerful trading
companies which ease adjustment to unfamiliar environments
and provide local U.S. intermediaries for project
partnerships. Medium-sized and smaller Japanese development
companies want to enter the U.S. market, but do not have
group-related advantages as do the larger firms. Therefore,
medium-sized and small U.S. real estate developers,
financiers and brokers can establish relationships with
these companies through domestic U.S. banks, brokers and
personal intermediaries. Though larger Japanese real estate
development companies understand regional U.S. markets well
enough to progressively dispense with expensive
intermediation services of investment bankers and brokers,
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U.S. intermediaries must help newer Japanese developer
entrants to the U.S. market to overcome entry barriers.
Construction companies need to learn the intricacies of
the U.S. construction business before they can implement
strategies for full-scale, full-service operations.
Construction companies have neither the experience of real
estate development companies nor the limited strategies of
institutional investors. Because they wish to provide many
services to clients of differing size, construction
companies will want to learn about real estate markets and
participants via an ample range of joint ventures in
scattered markets throughout the U.S. Therefore, medium-
sized developers and builders have a chance to form joint
ventures with Japanese contractors. The plant construction
phase of Japanese foreign direct investment is a
transitional cushion for Japanese contractors. During this
period they want to become fully involved in mainstream U.S.
real estate contracting with medium and small
developer/builders in geographically diverse markets.
Small Japanese investors have few opportunities to
invest in U.S. real estate. There is little supply of direct
investment vehicles, and institutions gearing up to market
U.S. real estate investment to smaller Japanese investors
face significant MOF approvals and scrutiny. However, the
opportunities are great and at every stage of the real
estate process, Japanese securities firms will attempt to
create markets for U.S. product. Pending MOF approval,
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pooled investment funds will co-venture with insurance
companies, make construction loans to contractors and joint
venture with development companies. U.S. brokers and
developers who can identify product segments and develop
business strategies should be able to generate exciting new
business opportunities. But, the development of this aspect
of Japanese real estate activity in the U.S. is likely to be
an extremely time consuming process for Japanese and U.S.
participants.
We target, therefore, five areas of immediate business
opportunity for U.S. real estate participants interested in
working with Japanese institutions, developers and
contractors, or in gaining access to sources of Japanese
capital. Whereas some opportunities are longer-term than
others, all can be actively probed for relationship
development.
OPPORTUNITY #1:
AMERICAN REAL ESTATE PROFESSIONALS CAN INTERMEDIATE ON
BEHALF OF JAPANESE AND U.S. PARTIES WISHING TO JOINT
VENTURE. FURTHERMORE, AMERICANS WISHING TO CO-VENTURE WITH
JAPANESE MAY EMPLOY JOINT VENTURE STRUCTURES AS A FORM OF
INTERMEDIATION.
Opportunities for U.S. intermediaries of Japanese
activity in U.S. real estate are considerable. Japanese
contractors and developers in U.S. real estate separately
lack a key dimension of their respective business processes.
Real estate development companies want to liquify their
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projects by packaging and selling residential, industrial
and suburban office projects to medium-sized and,
eventually, smaller investors in Japan. These types of U.S.
real estate are not traditional forms of investment for most
Japanese. Therefore, particular care must be taken in the
early stages of business development to ensure that project
mix, geographical location and deal structures are managed
well. For this reason, smaller U.S. developers with quality
projects and proven expertise can capitalize on joint
venture opportunities with Japanese real estate development
companies. Newer Japanese development company arrivals are
particularly vulnerable, through inexperience, to errors in
risk management and partner selection. Japanese trading
companies expect to fulfill intermediary roles with Japanese
investors for these projects in Japan, but may have problems
in providing coverage of diverse and distinct local markets.
Although Japanese companies dislike having to deal with
intermediaries, there is little alternative to U.S.-based
intermediation services for most developers. Real estate
development companies eschew dealing with Wall Street firms
because of exorbitant commissions, together with Wall
Street's apparent lack of interest in small and medium-sized
development businesses. Consequently, there is a clear role
for U.S. intermediaries to link between Japanese real estate
development companies with local markets. Japanese real
estate activity outside major metropolitan areas has
potential but has not been understood by U.S. real estate
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participants. The move to second-tier cities and suburbs is
a logical extension of current activities for most Japanese
real estate development companies. They need local
representatives to help them adjust to these markets.
Similarly, construction companies need help in learning
the construction business and judging appropriate joint
venture partners. In situations where a Japanese
construction firm contributes equity to become involved in a
project, project analysis and market judgment are essential
to success. Major institutional investment banks do not
operate in these markets nor command contacts with which the
contractor can enter into business. Japanese trading firms,
once again, want to play an intermediary role in the
introduction of contractor with local developer. However,
these companies neither have local expertise nor cover
regional markets with a depth of knowledge required by
construction company managements. Intermediation
possibilities exist for introducing Japanese and U.S.
participants to each other, as well as for presenting new
markets for Japanese contractors and developers to enter.
Life and non-life insurance companies and trust banks
are large-scale investors with narrow geographical and
project parameters. They are adequately served by Wall
Street investment banks and major national brokerage houses.
Opportunities for smaller and medium-sized intermediaries
are limited, for these firms deal exclusively on an
institutional basis within major metropolitan areas. Future
196
business opportunities should develop along lines similar to
those of domestic U.S. insurance company real estate
investment. Japanese life and non-life insurance companies
and trust banks have been given regulatory approval to
invest a greater percentage of total portfolio in foreign
currency denominated assets, among them real estate. In the
future these companies may target different types of
investment in regional U.S. markets, such as major U.S.
pension funds have done in recent years. Nevertheless,
unfamiliarity with development projects and extreme aversion
to risk make this a longer-term perspective. U.S.
intermediaries wishing to create opportunities in marketing
development projects and regional marketplaces to Japanese
institutional investors thus must adopt a similarly long
view. It will not happen in the near term future.
Furthermore, although these life, non-life and trust
investors can invest greater amounts than before, their
activity will continue to be heavily regulated by the MOF,
which approves individual investments on a case-by-case
basis. Decision times are slow and are not expected to
change dramatically.
Securitization of real estate oportunities is an
important focus of large institutional U.S. firms. The sale
of U.S. securities to the Japanese market offers direct
opportunities for U.S. product developers, marketers and
managers. Major Wall Street firms have devoted substantial
resources to building a direct sales capability in Japan for
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U.S. securities as have Japanese firms in New York. Matching
good real estate projects with financing and distribution
potential is a high growth area of opportunity for U.S.
institutions. Also, foreign investment by Japanese savings
institutions can be facilitated by creative, new links
between small Japanese investors and U.S. markets. These are
very long-term prospects.
OPPORTUNITY #2:
ESTABLISHED AMERICAN REAL ESTATE FIRMS WHICH DESIRE TO TAKE
PROFITS OR TO RE-CAPITALIZE THROUGH THE ADMISSION OF
PARTNERS SHOULD CONSIDER CO-VENTURING WITH JAPANESE
INSTITUTIONS AND REALTY FIRMS.
Large Japanese institutions which are investing in U.S.
real estate have many valuable assets: significant capital
resources; deep and firm relationships with other Japanese
investors, builders and financiers; hard-working and well-
trained staffs. At the same time, they lack many of those
qualities which they recognize as being critical to
sustained success within the U.S. real estate market: large
and experienced staffs, established client bases and a
mature, well-developed network of contacts. While the
Japanese can effect purchases on an ad hoc basis, such an
approach does not permit them to establish the well-
integrated, long-term market presence which they desire.
Some Japanese companies, such as life insurance companies
and trust banks, which are fiduciaries, are content to wait
until they unilaterally develop in-house expertise. Others,
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however, do not appear to be as patient.
Such impatience presents a real opportunity for certain
American companies. Established U.S. brokerage firms
incorporate the market knowledge, staffing, and networking
system which all Japanese real estate investors covet, while
American development companies possess a highly specialized
and non-fungible expertise. The bigger, the better; firms
which specialize in a variety of different regional markets
would be an especially attractive purchase for large
institutions intent on diversifying their real estate
portfolio on a national basis. This is not to say that
highly-regarded regional firms lack any appeal whatsoever;
rather, if the market is large and attractive, and the
credibilty and expertise of the firm great enough, certain
Japanese firms would want to acquire a stake in such a
regional company.
However, it is unlikely that a Japanese firm would wish
to buy the entire company and its goodwill. Such an action
would be counterproductive; it would reduce incentives for
the principal "asset" -- the personnel -- to perform, and
may well lead to an exodus of staff. This would not only
leave the Japanese with a shell corporation, but would make
them business managers, as well -- a status which they do
not currently desire. Consequently, those American firms
whose principals desire to sell only a part of the business
and remain actively involved in the firm's management and
profit participation are likely to receive a more receptive
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audience from Japanese investors.
Such acquisitions are not without precedent. The Long-
Term Credit Bank took a position in Peers & Company, and
Fuji Bank acquired Abacus Mortgage. Knowledgeable sources
believe that it is only a matter of time before Japanese
construction companies and securities firms undertake
similar acquisitions. Therefore, qualified U.S. firms may
enjoy a seller's market.
OPPORTUNITY #3:
SMALL AMERICAN REAL ESTATE OWNERS AND DEVELOPERS SHOULD
BEGIN TO CONSIDER THE JAPANESE SMALL INVESTOR CAPITAL MARKET
AS A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE SOURCE OF FUNDING. NOW IS A GOOD
TIME FOR SUCH AMERICANS TO BEGIN RELATIONSHIPS WITH
INTERMEDIARIES ACTING ON BEHALF OF SUCH INVESTORS, BECAUSE
THESE INTERMEDIARIES NEED MORE PRODUCT IN ORDER TO CONVERT
SMALL INVESTOR CURIOSITY INTO INVESTMENT ACTIVITY.
The time is ripe for smaller American real estate
players to tap the Japanese small investor capital market.
Tokyo real estate investment opportunities have evaporated,
due to a superheated market which has priced property beyond
the means of most small investors. Yields on Tokyo
investment-grade real estate have dropped to the 1%-2%
range, compared to the 8%-10% range extant in the U.S. The
yen has appreciated forty percent against the dollar in the
last eleven months, but is likely to fall against the dollar
over a foreseeable future. Large Japanese companies have
pioneered investment in U.S. real estate, developed a track
record and thereby established both the credibility and
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desirability of such investment.
But, the supply line is clogged. Neither large
American brokers nor large Japanese institutional investors
have any interest in such product, so there is relatively
little information transfer between small American
owners/developers and small Japanese investors. As a
consequence, Americans who are able to circumnavigate the
informational "roadblocks" will enjoy a fairly broad field
of potential buyers who do not enjoy many U.S.real estate
investment options.
How does one go about charting such a course ? For the
time being, through established intermediaries and contacts.
Firms such as Mitsui Real Estate Sales and Toyo Real Estate
Sales are well-recognized and highly-regarded companies
which possess extensive client bases and substantial
knowledge about the U.S. real estate market. Jones Lang
Wootton KK, although a new corporate presence in Japan, is
headed by an experienced and well-connected native who is
targeting the smaller investor market. Pacific Rim Research
Limited is similarly new and shares a similar focus.
American lawyers such as Arthur Mitchell of Coudert Brothers
and Jeff Dwyer of Lane & Edson have overcome the Japanese
animus towards attorneys and become trusted advisors, thus
illustrating how lawyers can serve as valuable
intermediaries and counselors.
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OPPORTUNITY #4:
CULTIVATE WITH NUMBERS, NOT SALESMANSHIP: AMERICAN
DEVELOPERS AND PROPERTY OWNERS WHO ARE CAPABLE OF PRODUCING
STATE-OF-THE-ART QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS ARE GENERALLY
PREFERRED OVER THOSE WHO LACK SUCH CAPABILITIES.
When evaluating a project, Japanese do not like to be
"sold." The information which is submitted to them should
be principally "objective" measures of a project's value or
feasibility, such as spreadsheets, appraisals and
feasibility studies, together with maps and aerial
photographs. Personnel of the large Japanese institutions,
who possess their own computer models, closely evaluate all
information provided and are not at all hesitant to ask
probative, detailed questions.
Consequently, all things being equal, American real
estate professionals who are facile with computers enjoy a
substantial advantage over those who are not. The advantage
is particularly pronounced when required to quickly respond
to Japanese follow-up questions which require the use of new
assumptions or a re-programming. The Japanese may be slow
to decide, but they expect quick responses.
OPPORTUNITY #5:
MANHATTAN, WASHINGTON, D.C., BOSTON AND SAN FRANCISCO REMAIN
THE MOST FAVORED CITIES FOR A MAJORITY OF JAPANESE REAL
ESTATE INVESTORS. THE FAVORED PRODUCT REMAINS DOWNTOWN
OFFICE BUILDINGS. CONSEQUENTLY, OWNERS AND DEVELOPERS OF
SUCH BUILDINGS IN THESE CITIES ARE MORE LIKELY TO RECEIVE A
FRIENDLY AUDIENCE FROM JAPANESE INVESTORS THAN THEIR PEERS
HAVING OTHER PRODUCT IN OTHER CITIES.
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The Japanese prefer real estate investments in these
cities. San Francisco's long experience with the Japanese,
its tight market and tough zoning restrictions give it
special appeal, while Manhattan, Boston and Washington --
the epicenter and anchors of the "Bowash" corridor -- all
combine a number of desired factors.
Projects in other cities do continue to appeal to
Japanese investors, however. For instance, Mitsui Fudosan
and Sumitomo Life's recent investments in Chicago is likely
to stimulate further interest in that city. Due to its large
Japanese-American community, Los Angeles is familiar to
representatives of Japanese investors; it has a large base
of Japanese real estate investment. Currently, it is
perceived as being oversaturated with product; however, the
right deal with the right parties is likely to elicit quick
and favorable Japanese interest.
In conclusion, the authors believe that an increasing
Japanese presence in the U.S. marketplace will present great
opportunities for almost all kinds of U.S. real estate
players. Japanese capital will be available and will promote
new development and management techniques that can
strengthen U.S. industry efficiency. The rising sun will
shine a most favorable light on the American real estate
game.
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